FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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KOREA IN PERSPECTIVE

By Adlai E. Stevenson

THE strength of America is rooted in a great principle—individuals are an end, not a means. That is the American idea. Schools, colleges, labor unions, political parties and the Government of the United States exist for American men and women; never the other way round. The corollary of the idea is that every individual must take responsibility for the whole. He must himself take responsibility for the safety and the wise development of his country, and for the selection of policies which determine its safety and progress. The basic requirement for the success of a democratic system of this sort is, of course, that individuals see their country's problems whole. In a word, they must have perspective.

This is especially true, and especially difficult to achieve, in problems of foreign relations. "Foreign policy," in the year 1952, covers the globe. In no other area is it so easy to have a picture of many single trees and no idea what the forest looks like. But the neatest description of a tree is not a dependable map for making one's way through a forest.

Gaining perspective on American foreign policy begins with gaining a view of America's position in the world—her position as a World Power. This can be indicated in half a dozen words: American interests, power and responsibilities are world-wide. Alongside this must be set two other basic facts which are revealed in any full view of the field of foreign policy. One is that a world-wide imperialist war is now being carried on by the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites. The other is the existence of a world-wide organization of states "united in strength to maintain international peace and security"—the United Nations. The relationship of these three great world forces—the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations—are the primary elements in the American problem of foreign policy today.

There is no possibility of doubting (and no reason for ignoring!) the fact that the Soviet objective is one world—one Com-

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munist world. Thanks to the interconnections of Soviet imperialism and international revolutionary Communism the Soviet Government is able always to pursue a dual strategy. The strategy is implicit in Bolshevik theory. From the day Lenin seized power in Russia—and indeed even earlier—his strategy was one of "double diplomacy:" a long-range policy, a short-range policy; a set of slogans for home consumption, a set of slogans for foreign confusion; warfare against the Russian people, warfare against all foreigners; political warfare and military warfare, simultaneous or interchangeable. No American foreign policy which does not allow for the over-all view of this Soviet duplicity, and which does not have both political and military weapons to counter it, can provide for our safety or enable us to carry out our responsibilities. The effort to achieve the over-all view is the basic task of Americans.

This is a campaign year in America, and we must expect oversimplification of issues and contradictory advice regarding them. Men, even responsible men, will wander far afield in search of votes. They will capitalize every discontent, every prejudice, every credulity, even in the deadly serious business of foreign policy. Will we emerge from the ordeal of the campaign more aware of the true causes of our difficulties and the magnitude of the stakes involved? Or less aware? Will we emerge better prepared to turn with fortitude to the work in hand? Or worse prepared? These are the central questions which should be answered decisively by the elections.

II

The election campaign has not begun too well in this respect. What, for example, are we to make of the repeated charge that the Korean war is "Truman's war," that the President thrust the United States into it lightly, inadvisedly and against the best interest of the Republic, that it is a "useless" war, and that "we stand exactly where we stood three years ago"? What is the purpose of the petulant animosity shown in some quarters toward the United Nations, and of the despairing conclusion in others that the United Nations has "let us down" and has become more a danger to us than a source of strength? This kind of talk is deplorable because it belittles the heroic sacrifices of American and Allied soldiers and depreciates the value of an international effort that cost us an even greater war to achieve. But it seems to

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me more than deplorable. It seems to me dangerously misleading. What are we to think of statesmen who don't lead, but who mislead?

The purpose of such utterances apparently is to seek to make a single individual responsible for developments resulting from past actions taken by all the American people. Our present troubles do not stem from the bad judgment or weakness of particular individuals, any more than it would be true to say that any one man's insight has been responsible for our successes—which have been notable. Our setbacks and our victories are alike the products of the full sweep of recent history; and for that we are all of us responsible. Twice within 25 years this country felt compelled to intervene in wars to redress the balance of power in the world. At the close of World War II, with Britain exhausted and France demoralized, with German and Japanese power crushed, the United States and the Soviet Union stood virtually face to face, with other nations polarized around them. Imperial Russia, historically a great expanding Power, now heavily armed and equipped with the seductive weapon of revolutionary Communism, soon showed that she was on the move again, seizing weaker nations here, probing there, pressing relentlessly with propaganda and infiltration against the free world. During the Second World War, and with the experience of the prewar period fresh in their minds, our people concluded that isolation was no solution to the problem of security in a shrunken world. Their decision was reinforced by this rising spectre of another ruthless imperial power on the march. They concluded that the time to stop aggression, like a plague, was before it started; and that the way to do it was by organized community action.

It is now some time since we engaged in the formidable task of developing the community of free peoples—first through the United Nations, since the problem is inexorably world-wide; then through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, designed to strengthen a particularly exposed salient—the Western European "peninsula" of the vast central "Heartland," as the great geographer Mackinder called it; simultaneously by strengthening the important Organization of American States in our own hemisphere; and by numerous other treaties and agencies. The American response to the North Korean aggression, which was supplied and equipped by the Soviet Union and could not have occurred without its instigation or approval, was therefore nei-

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ther erratic nor impetuous. It was part and parcel of a strategy of collective security which had been in the making for a long time and which had been urged, welcomed and agreed upon long since with virtual unanimity by the American people.

When North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950, with the full support of Peking and Moscow, most of us knew what was at stake. One of the men who took part in the long, anxious meeting at Blair House gave the simplest explanation of the decision: "This attack on South Korea is like Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland." Historians have for years commented on the tragic mistake of France in not ordering the instant mobilization of the French Army when Hitler's troops started marching—and on the shortsightedness of the British and others who failed to urge and support such action.

An American columnist pointed out in June 1950 that President Truman's decision, taken with the virtually unanimous support of the American people and their representatives in Congress, recalled the words of former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson following what he termed "the tragedy of timidity" in the Far Eastern crisis of the early thirties: "I broke out and said," wrote Mr. Stimson, "that I was living in a world where all my troubles came from the same thing . . . where we are constantly shut in by the timidity of governments . . . and I said that the time had come when somebody has got to show some guts."

Senator Knowland, Republican, of California, a frequent critic of Administration Far Eastern policy, was the first to take the floor of the Senate in support of the President's announcement: "I believe that, in this very important step the President of the United States has taken to uphold the hands of the United Nations and the free peoples of the world, he should have the overwhelming support of all Americans, regardless of their partisan affiliations." In similar vein the approving chorus swept the Congress and the country. One Member of Congress only opposed American armed aid to the victims of Communist aggression—Representative Marcantonio of New York, subsequently defeated for reëlection.

To call Korea "Truman's war" distorts the entire historical significance of our prompt response through the United Nations to the cynical Communist challenge to the whole concept of collective peace and security—the concept which we are pledged to defend and which only the Soviet Union has an interest in de-

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stroying. Mr. Truman happened to be the President of the United States when the challenge came. Did the American people wish it to go unanswered, did they wish all hope for the new community of nations banded together in strength to limit war to collapse? *Time* magazine, with a backward glance at the equivocation of the League of Nations, summed up the matter simply: "This time, when the challenge came, the United States accepted it." So did the United Nations. To call this "Truman's war" is to deny the manifest common approval of our prompt action.

Inevitably there are differences of opinion now about the course of events in Korea. The decision to defeat the challenge of aggression by force brought grievous losses in blood and treasure. The first feeling of relief which welcomed the stern, swift action of two years ago has given way to criticism and impatience. In taking stock of where we now stand, however, we should not talk about our problems out of context.

There is nothing to be gained by what General Marshall used to call "fighting the problem." The problem is that the Soviet rulers and their Communist satellites consider themselves at war with us, but that we are not in fact at war with them. It is complicated by the further fact that war in their sense is waged interchangeably by military and political instruments. In view of this it is proper for us to ask ourselves what would have happened if we had "fought the problem"—that is, evaded it—in June 1950. What would have happened if the United States and the United Nations had ignored the Korean aggression?

I can venture a guess. Our friends throughout Asia and in the Pacific would with perfect reason have doubted our intention to resist Soviet design elsewhere in that area, and they would of necessity have taken the path of appeasement. Disillusionment would also have swept Western Europe at this impressive demonstration of Soviet-satellite power and of American indecision in the face of a direct challenge. Then would not the Soviet Union, having challenged us successfully in Korea, have followed that challenge with another? And still another? Munich would follow Munich. Our vacillation would have paralyzed our will and worked havoc in the community of like-minded nations. Then when we did succeed in pulling ourselves together we would have found it too late to organize a common front with our friends. I think there is good reason to believe that the resolute action by the United Nations forces in Korea not only gained

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time in the East but saved NATO in the West. The alternative was to surrender all positions of strength, to enfeeble if not destroy the grand alliance of the free—and then, perhaps, to resort in desperation to a general war when our moral, political and strategic position had been weakened disastrously.

There is, of course, no tidy solution to the Korean problem, precisely because it is only a part of the whole Soviet imperialist drive—an episode, really, in the sweep of history which relentlessly confronts freedom with thralldom. In a world where the objective of the Soviet Union is to eliminate every rival center of power we must measure our gains and our losses not in absolute terms but in relation to the over-all situation. The Soviet rulers themselves describe their struggle with the non-Soviet world as war. In Korea we have made plain to the Kremlin that we are not fooled by its use of catspaws, and that we recognize war fought at second hand when we see it. Our object is to convince them that other aggressions, disguised or direct, will meet the same response, and thus deter them from a perhaps fatal gamble. At the same time, by limiting the war in Korea, we hope to avoid a third general holocaust. We are trying to use force not only to frustrate our immediate antagonists in the hills of Korea but to preserve world peace. For that reason the full settlement of the Korean problem is likely to take a long time and to wait upon the settlement of many other issues. Once again, perspective.

It is possible, of course, that we may fail in our effort to keep the Korean fighting limited: for just as it takes only one to start a war, so it takes only one to prolong it. The aggressor is the one who decides whether or not the war he has started can be limited. But we have diligently and painfully sought to keep it from spreading. Given the terms of the problem, there is no guarantee of success. It simply seems wiser to pay large insurance premiums than to look forward to rebuilding after the fire.

Meanwhile, some of the positive gains of our policy thus far may properly be noted. Talk of the "uselessness" of the Korean war gained currency only when negotiations for an armistice dragged out, and after we had in fact accomplished the primary objective of stopping the aggression and driving the aggressors back from whence they came—across the 38th parallel. Assured of satisfactory armistice terms, we would have little purpose in continuing hostilities. But what sort of logic is it to say that be-

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cause the continuation of the war does not serve our interests, the entire enterprise was futile from the start?

And while it is too early to make any final estimate of the Korean experience, it is also foolish and misleading to say we "stand exactly where we stood three years ago." The first reason is that the Korean engagement put the American rearmament effort into high gear. Having virtually obliterated our armed strength after World War II, we were slow to reconcile ourselves to the economic dislocation and sacrifices needed to recreate it. Proof that the Soviet Union would speed the advance of troops across a national frontier dissolved our reluctance. Now our increasing strength not only puts us in a better position to answer further military aggression. We also are in a position to conduct a bolder diplomacy—in other words, to take the initiative politically.

Second, our leadership in fighting aggression in Korea not only saved the moral and psychological defenses of Western Europe from possible disintegration but sparked the rapid build-up there of physical defenses. The demonstration that there could be successful resistance to the Soviet Union and imperial Communism gave the leaders of Europe hope and persuaded their peoples to accept more readily the burdens and risks of rearmament. It is routine politics for even the timid and faint of heart among us to talk about the necessity for American "leadership." Had America not in fact led, but shrunk from the challenge of Korea, would Europe have tackled the vast, costly and painful program of organizing Western defenses?

Third, the Soviet Union now knows that the path of conquest is mortally dangerous. The Korean aggression very likely was planned as merely the first of a series of military actions—initially by satellites, finally to be undertaken by the Soviet Union itself. If so, the lesson of Korea may be of historic importance. Speculation about possible adjustments in the thinking of the men in the Kremlin must be cautious. Perhaps for a time the Soviet Union will now content itself with manœuvres in the cold war; or perhaps Western strength of will is to be further tested by some other military challenge; or perhaps Stalin and his partners will reason that a full-scale war (which Communist theory foreshadows) had best be waged in the immediate future rather than when the armament programs of the West become more fully effective. It can be argued that Stalin, in his old age, will never risk the loss of the empire he has built up; but it can also be said

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that he may believe what his sycophants tirelessly chant—that he is "the greatest commander of all times and peoples"[1]—and that if the "terrible collisions" prophesied in Communist dogma are indeed to come, then they had best come while he is still alive. We dare not tie our policies to any one assumption regarding Soviet intentions. Whatever those intentions are, however, the Soviet miscalculation in Korea will make them harder of fulfillment.

Fourth, our support of the first great collective military effort of the United Nations to resist aggression demonstrated that the organization is adaptable to the rôle of enforcement as well as that of conciliation. In the crisis there emerged proof of the viability of the concept of collective security, a fact of inestimable importance for the security of every free country—including our own. Sixteen countries contributed fighting forces. The policies of the free nations have been concerted consistently in the votes relating to Korea. While troops of the Republic of Korea and the United States have been obliged to carry the main burden of the fighting and we may properly regret the absence of more help from others, we should not overlook the fact that the responsibility for resistance to Communist military aggression in certain other areas is borne more by others than by ourselves. If another showdown is provoked elsewhere, the system of collective security is in better shape now to meet it than it was before June 1950. In short, while Korea has not proved definitively that collective security *will* work, it has prevented the Soviet Union from proving that it *won't* work. And the Korean experience, moreover, has hastened the development of the General Assembly of the United Nations as an agency of enforcement, free from the Soviet veto.

Fifthly, we may record that the successful resistance in Korea has contributed greatly to the successful negotiation of a Treaty of Peace with Japan, as well as of arrangements satisfactory to us regarding the future security of that country. A failure on our part to give evidence of a willingness to act in a time of crisis would not have encouraged the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Japan to enter into the recently negotiated network of the Pacific security treaties.

One further national advantage from this "useless" war deserves at least to be mentioned. We have learned vital military lessons in Korea. I am not competent to discuss improvements

[1] *Pravda*, November 6, 1951.

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in tactics and weapons, nor would it be appropriate here to do so. But a more effective use of forces and armaments as a result of long testing under actual combat conditions is to be counted as an important residual return on our investment in this savage conflict.

III

So much for this historic frustration of Communist military conquest. Soviet policy, however, is dual. Indispensable as was the United Nations for the repulse of the aggression in Korea, it is needed even more in the political struggle in which we are engaged.

Obviously the United Nations has not fulfilled all the high hopes that some people entertained when it was founded. The idea that it would automatically usher in an era of sweetness and light was exaggerated at the start, as was soon demonstrated when Soviet imperialism made plain that it was determined to prevent the organization of the world on any but its own terms. But again look at the woods, not the trees. Although the United Nations has worked haltingly, at times badly—it has worked. Since the present *world-wide* coalition of free peoples is inconceivable without a central forum and instrument for discussion and adjustment, it remains an indispensable part of our foreign policy. The problem is to make the organization function more perfectly. Granted that it has done little to adjust the differences between the Soviets and the free world: so long as the Soviet rulers prosecute their dual war—against their own people and against all outsiders—there is no reason to expect that it will. Even so, it maintains at least formal contact between the two worlds. Our willingness to keep the door open for talk and negotiation is essential evidence for our friends (who stand more deeply in the shadow of the Russian fist than we do) that we will accept any reasonable opportunity to better relations and avoid all-out war.

Again, the United Nations is indispensable as an agency for concerting policies among the free states, including (as we found in the case of Korea) enforcement action. The bulk of the members of the General Assembly are free nations. In spite of the discouraging and frustrating debate with the Russians—or perhaps thanks in part to their recalcitrant and dogmatic postures—policies have been developed in the General Assembly to cope better

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with many of the perils to economic stability and international justice. Obviously not all international questions need or should be put before the United Nations; and certainly we should use our influence to preserve a safe boundary line between those domestic affairs which are our own concern and the external affairs which are of concern to all. These are matters for careful study and progress by stages. But surely to prevent a trespass it is not sensible to shoot the watchman; nor to burn down the barn to roast a pig.

The audible yearning to escape from it all, the murmurs and cries of disdain for the "meddlers," the "globalists" and the "foreigners" now sometimes heard in our midst, are strangely familiar. Are they groans from the ghost of America First, still looking for an unassailable Gibraltar, safe from assault by men—or ideas? I doubt if many Americans will be drawn into a renewal of that wishful search. I think the eagle, not the ostrich, will continue to be the American emblem.

The reality of the matter is that American power is going to be preponderant on our side of the Iron Curtain for many years to come, and that without this concentration of power there would be no possibility of pulling the free world together or providing for an effective common defense. Our friends abroad know this. And the reality is likewise that a successful military defense, and a successful political advance, depend on the coöperation of a large number of governments—in the Far East and the Middle East, in Europe and in this hemisphere. More, our ability to take the initiative depends not simply on the coöperation of governments, but on the good will of peoples who support these governments. We live in a new world—a world where the stronger need the help of the weaker!

We should not be too surprised that the same nations that formerly were alarmed at our isolationism are now concerned about how we will use our power. Just because of our strength we are a target for much unjust resentment. Surely we can call upon a sufficiently long historical perspective, and a sufficiently intelligent understanding of human nature, not to be too much surprised by that. Men in lands which have recently freed themselves from old tyrannies know all too well the temptations of power. Their fear that we may fall into old errors is not unnatural. And indeed, who among us would dare say that we do not have much to learn? No single nation, viewing the world from

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a particular perspective, can have a monopoly of insight. We must take the criticisms as they come—sometimes as fair warning—and redouble our efforts to develop mutual policies based on adequate understanding between sovereign but interdependent partners.

Sovereign international authorities over a wide area, or fully unified political councils in the whole of the free world, are not in prospect. We must concert our policies with those of our friends by the instruments available. Our aim should be to improve the machinery for mutual give and take, both in the United Nations and in regional agencies. Fortunately, the menace of the Soviet Union tends to promote a common view among those marked out as prey; and it can further be said that despite differences in approach and emphasis, much of the free world now shares a wide range of political and economic interests which move it in the direction of unity. The United Nations is an invaluable instrument for harmonizing differences in those interests. It and other agencies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have given us—and our friends—considerable experience in this unceasing task of mutual accommodation. The United States will find support among peoples in the free states to the degree that they believe that we do not simply consult our own interests but give consideration to their interests as well—that we in truth have a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind." Other nations have a reciprocal obligation to give weight to our interests too. There is no doubt that our power gives us an advantage in this process. But neither is there room to doubt that if we wish allies who will go forward with us with courage and fortitude into the risks of the future, they must be willing and confident allies.

Let us also remember that the alternative to the United Nations is not a vacuum. There would at once be formed another "world organization." The Soviet Union, true to its policy of duplicity, has this alternative organization already in hand—presumably to be based on the "World Peace Council," formed on November 22, 1950, at the "Second World Peace Conference" in Warsaw. Professor Frederic Joliot (known better as Joliot-Curie through his appropriation of a revered name on which he has no claim of blood) presided, as "President of the Bureau," at the most recent meeting, in Vienna last November. Various trained seals were brought from all corners of the world. For the gist of the program one can take almost any of the old Marxist

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fighting slogans and substitute the word "peace" for the word "revolution." In Soviet double-talk they mean the same.

IV

The burden of my argument, then, based on the meaning of our experience in Korea as I see it, is that we have made historic progress toward the establishment of a viable system of collective security. To deprecate our large and decisive share in that undertaking as "useless" is both mischievous and regressive. It will stiffen no backs, lift no hearts and encourage no one except our enemies.

The particulars of the forward political movement which our successful acceptance of the Soviet challenge in Korea has made possible for us would form the beginnings of a new analysis, not a conclusion for this one. What is incontrovertible, I think, is that America needs and wants allies. I think most Americans know this. I think we believe that the redress in the balance of power in the world must be completed, and quickly. I think we believe that the great experiment in collective security on which we embarked in 1945 is still in the long run our best chance for peace. I think we believe that international coöperation is more than elocution. In short, I think most of us have convictions about the position of the United States in the world today and accept the risks and responsibilities inherent in that position. The nature of the American decision was shown—is shown—in Korea. Shall we retreat from that decision? Shall we go it alone? Or shall we go forward with allies? When our experience in Korea has been placed in perspective, this remains the issue behind the dust and turmoil of this election year.

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THE CHIMERA OF GERMAN NEUTRALITY

By Erich Dethleffsen

THE Atlantic Pact Governments are recommending that the West German Federal Republic be admitted to the Western supra-national community and that West German troops be integrated with the mutual defense organization which they wish to bring into being as rapidly as possible. At the same time Western public opinion, particularly in Western Europe, has frequently voiced doubts as to the expediency of this policy.

The thesis that Germany should be neutralized rather than integrated with the West is based on several arguments. To begin with, there is a belief that a neutral Germany would serve as a buffer zone between the two power blocs of opposed social systems, help relieve the tension between them and diminish the danger of war. Secondly, there is anxiety lest Germany, having risen from being a mere object of policy for the occupying Powers to become once again an active element in her own right, might soon develop into a dangerous factor of power within the Western world. As *Le Monde* puts it, in what is probably an accurate expression of the present French feeling: "That autocratic and militaristic apparatus which was responsible for two devastating wars and the ruin of Europe would rise again, despite the democratic and peace-loving tendencies which are present in Germany for the first time." In other words, when Germany became aware of her recovered strength she would again develop aggressive inclinations and, driven by the desire to regain her lost territories in the East, draw her future coalition partners into a war. Finally, there is the fear that a rearmed Germany might join forces with the Soviets and turn the very guns which had been purchased with American means against the West, repeating the reversal of fronts which the Prussians executed in the winter of 1812–13 when they signed the Tauroggen Convention with the Russians. Those who oppose Germany's rearmament also point out that her military contribution would be of doubtful value to the West on account of the strong demand for neutrality made by various groups within the Federal Republic.

Now the idea that the neutralization of Germany might help avoid another world war and at the same time relieve her Western neighbors from the nightmare of a new threat arising from

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her regained strength is indeed so tempting that we must look into its actual possibilities and form a judgment regarding it. It would be a mistake, however, to study the question of German neutrality as a separate problem. It should be scrutinized in the general setting of the world situation created by the opposition of the social systems of East and West.

II. THE SOVIET TACTICS

The conflict between Bolshevism and the nations of the free world has reached a decisive stage. The final victory of Bolshevism and the defeat of the "capitalist," that is, non-Bolshevist, world is the long-range goal of the Kremlin. This has been made clear again and again as a matter of principle in Lenin-Stalinist theses as well as in an uncompromising series of actions in Soviet politics.

Granted that the determination of the United States to hold its ground, rouse the Western nations from their lethargy and build up their defenses has somewhat shaken Soviet hopes that the internal decline and disintegration of the Western nations might in the end save them a long war. Yet the Soviets will keep on striving to realize their imperialist aims without actually letting the cold war turn hot. Their tactics are to create local trouble spots through restricted acts of aggression, civil wars and strikes in order to shatter the Western economy, increase social tension, feed the discontent of the masses and thus prepare them for the infiltration of Bolshevist ideas.

Such endeavors may receive considerable support from the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of Asia and Africa who are in the process of trying to emancipate themselves. As early as 1927, at the Congress Against Colonial Oppression held in Brussels, the Soviets inaugurated a policy of encouraging rising nationalism in those countries which, as a "third force," may become a decisive threat to the economic structure of the West and to its capacity to defend itself.

Parallel with their efforts to wrest one position after another from the West through the cold war, the Soviets keep on arming for a hot war. They steadily raise their defense production, decentralize their industry and evacuate their essential war plants to the Far Eastern areas in order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air attacks. They intensify stockpiling. They expand the industries of the satellite countries and exploit them for their

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own defense purposes. They redouble their efforts to catch up with the West in the development of atom and hydrogen bombs. In spite of all this, a considerable time must still elapse before the Soviets will have pushed their preparations to the point where they would be in a position to conduct a lengthy war.

On the other hand, it is now too late for Soviet Russia to wage a preventive war. She no longer is able by a limited superiority in equipment and personnel to force a decision which would be so disadvantageous to the Western Powers that they never again could find their feet. Present relative strengths leave hardly any doubt that a Soviet surprise attack would succeed and that Soviet armies would rapidly push forward to the Rhine, probably even to the Atlantic. Certainly the difficulties thereby caused to the Western defense situation should not be underestimated. However, the arrival of the Communist forces at the Atlantic coast would not be decisive. A decisive advantage would be achieved only after they had captured all the air bases from which Western air forces could strike decisive blows against Soviet weak spots and after they had taken all the bridgeheads whence counterattacks could be launched—in other words, if the Soviets succeeded in occupying and holding all Europe from the North Cape down the Atlantic coast through Spain to North Africa, as well as that area itself and the Near East. For this purpose, however, present Soviet forces are insufficient, particularly in view of the fact that Western defenses are increasing month by month. Also, the inefficient network of communications in Eastern Europe would delay the arrival of reinforcements from inner Russia to such an extent that the West would have ample time to take counteraction.

From all that we know about Stalin, we may assume that he is not likely to plunge into military hazards and foolishly risk his life accomplishments. If he makes war, he will see to it that the risks involved have been reduced to a minimum. He will soberly weigh the key factors and decide to bring about the final showdown only after Soviet preparations have reached a climax, and political as well as economic stability have been established in his own domain. Until then, the Kremlin will have to put up with the "peaceful coexistence" of the two social systems.

The Soviets, of course, do not use this period only to reinforce their own position. They seek at the same time to weaken the West and thus improve the conditions for a final decision. By ag-

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gression at second hand, through satellite nations, they engage parts of the Western defense forces at fronts which are of little importance to the total operation. And by bribery, propaganda and intimidation they try to prevent the formation of an integrated front in the West and to undermine the will for defense which has just started to rise there. Thus they use every opportunity to extend their power and weaken their antagonists, the while carefully avoiding a direct clash between Soviet and American troops, well aware that this would risk the long war for which they are not yet prepared.

III. WESTERN COUNTERACTION

The Western Powers know what countermeasures are needed against the Kremlin. They seek to stabilize the Western economy to stand against any crisis and to immunize the free world against Soviet seduction by relieving internal social tensions. And they reinforce their own military capacity so as to deter Soviet political and military aggression. They realize that modern political, economic and strategic conditions no longer permit individual nations to lead isolated existences and that selfish barriers of national politics and national economy must be removed in order to prepare the way to a free future. Not only will the merging of small national economies into a large community by the removal of trade barriers cause a tremendous rise in business activity in the Western World, but a fairer participation in profits by the individual will build up moral strength in the West to such an extent that eventually it will become immune to all attempts at Soviet infiltration. What is more, it will gain sufficient strength to penetrate the Soviet-dominated area with psychological and spiritual weapons. All nations of the non-Bolshevist world, including the peoples of Asia and Africa, must be admitted on a par to the Western community, thus winning for the West the "third force" which will decide the future political shape of the international situation.

However, even on the assumption that Stalin does not for the moment want a war, we are not relieved from the duty of building our strength. Wars do not break out only when they are "desirable" to one or other of the two opponents. In most cases they are the product of a complex of circumstances, or the unexpected result of developments understood too late. If Soviet Russia were to realize that she must abandon hope of the Western

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world's internal disintegration and if she were pushed onto the defensive, politically and economically, she might feel tempted to use her military power. The West at that moment must be so strong that it can issue a warning to the Soviets with more emphasis than England and France were able to muster in addressing Hitler in 1938–39. The Kremlin must be made to realize that a resort to force will involve the risk of total defeat, the loss of everything it has gained in the past decades and more besides. And Western strength is not only necessary to check Soviet expansion; it is needed also to hearten elements of resistance in the East European countries and even within the Soviet Union itself.

These ideas are familiar in Germany.[1] The knowledge that all free nations are inescapably linked by a common fate has come to dominate German public opinion to an increasing degree. More and more it is the guiding factor of German national decisions.

IV. THE GERMAN SITUATION

Germany lies between the power blocs of East and West, split in two by the Iron Curtain; the German people know that if there is war between East and West their country will be a battlefield, that the tanks of one Power will roll over their fields while the planes of the other will bomb their cities. The knowledge, then, that the Soviets will be defeated by the Western Powers in the long run is but poor consolation. The future existence of Germany will be determined in the first phase of the war.

But the Germans also know—they only have to look across to their compatriots on the other side of the Iron Curtain—what they would lose if the Soviets succeeded in drawing them into their domain. They would lose their freedom and their culture and become slaves in a system of cruelty and terror.

Even more than other Western peoples, the Germans yearn to be spared a war which, regardless of its final outcome, would be fatal to their country. They equally yearn to be spared the fate of Bolshevist slavery which particularly threatens them because of their country's geographical situation. Avoidance of these two dangers is the overriding aim of their policy.

Soviet policy toward the German Federal Republic is also determined by two particular factors:

1. Germany's economic strength and efficiency, her manpower

[1] In particular, they have been presented in recent years by the *Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947*, of Frankfurt.

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and her key geographical position in control of the European traffic system make her a prize to be separated from the West and incorporated in the Soviet realm. To this end, encouragement is given to Western anxieties regarding the military and political hegemony which Germany might exercise in Europe once she had been rearmed and given the same privileges as her European partners: in order to make her seem an impossible ally in Western eyes, the Soviets strive to create the impression that she is still thoroughly Fascist. Simultaneously, the West Germans are threatened with armed intervention in the event German rearmament takes place. Skillfully playing on national resentment and sentiment, Moscow seeks to make the Germans themselves dismiss the proposal of a German military contribution to the Western community as psychologically impracticable.

2. The Soviets aim to make the Western Powers—above all, the United States—withdraw from Western Germany. This would serve a double purpose. For one thing, it would increase the Soviet chance of some day taking possession of the Ruhr intact. The indispensable factor here is that the Western Powers be manœuvred by political means into withdrawing behind the Meuse—that is to say, that this be done without fighting. Furthermore, Moscow realizes that the chances for the Western nations to resist a Soviet attack in Europe would diminish as their area for preparing defensive operations narrowed. They therefore miss no opportunity to rouse German suspicions against the Western Powers. Great play is made with the illusion of a Germany relieved from the burden of the occupation and living happily and tranquilly between the two rival power blocs. Indeed, the Soviets might even go so far as to put up with German reunification, if that would make American soldiers vanish from the border which separates the East and West Zones, where their presence today means that a Soviet attempt to cross it would start a great war.

In view of the foregoing, the aims of Western policy should be as follows:

1. To strengthen German morale and to continue efforts to immunize the Germans against Soviet infiltration, with the object of preventing Soviet expansion into Western Europe by cold war methods.

2. To preserve Germany's economic capacity for the West and to deny it to the Soviets.

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3. To keep a firm hold on West German territory up to the border between the East and West Zones, since this area would be required for effective flexible defense on modern strategic principles. If the Western defense were limited to the area west of the Meuse the Western forces would be prevented from expanding sufficiently. Their airfields, communications, supply depots and ports of debarkation would be crowded together on a narrow strip of land where they would be continuously vulnerable to attack by the Soviet air force.

V. NEUTRALIZATION OF GERMANY

Before we turn to whether these three requirements of Western policy could be fulfilled if Germany were neutralized, we should first ask whether neutrality is, in fact, conceivable for Germany if war should break out between the two Great Power blocs. A country can stay neutral only under one of three conditions. Either it has to be so strong that neither of the antagonists can afford to attack it without considerably lessening its own fighting capacity; or its geographical position must be particularly strong—as is the case, for instance, with Switzerland; or it must lie so far "out of the way" that recognition of its neutrality does not restrict the operations of the fighting nations. To these three historical conditions for neutrality should today be added a fourth: the unanimous desire of the whole people to stay neutral. Fifth columns, Quislings and political parties backing either of the outside antagonists may make neutrality collapse from within.

Not one of the foregoing conditions for neutrality is applicable in the case of Germany. The supporters of neutralization believe, nevertheless, that Germany might be kept out of a potential war between East and West if only the two opponents could be induced to guarantee her neutrality. But in a war between the Soviets and the West not two nations, and not two groups of nations, but two whole worlds would be facing each other. The entire northern hemisphere would become a battlefield. And Germany stands precisely where the two worlds meet, placed so that it would be impossible for either of the two to "pass her by." The Ruhr and the Central European network of communications must always tempt one antagonist to possess Western Germany, the other to take Western Germany away from him. Neither will therefore be able to guarantee German neutrality in sincerity

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unless both have dropped entirely the idea that the conflict may be settled by force. The probability of this happening is so slight that neither the Germans nor the Western world can base their vital decisions on it.

But if Germany cannot preserve her neutrality by her own means, and if neither the Soviets nor the nations of the free world can in sincerity guarantee it, then the concept of neutrality can never become, as its supporters hope, a contribution to peace and world disarmament. Quite the contrary. Weak and vulnerable spots, particularly in areas of economic and strategic interest, are a greater menace to peace than two opposed Powers of more or less equal strength. A vacuum has drawing power.

The neutralization of Germany would be bound to entail the withdrawal of the occupying Powers. Only in that case could Germany assume the rôle of "buffer" imagined by the "neutralists." Only so, also, would the Soviets agree to it, since the whole value of German neutrality in their eyes lies in the fact that it would get the Americans out of the West German Federal Republic. But that withdrawal would cause an explosion of all the inner German political and social conflicts which so far have been kept under control through the presence of the occupying Powers. Fifth columns would get to work; riots, strikes and civil war would break out. There is no doubt that the well-prepared underground movements of the Communist Party, aided by the People's Police of the Soviet Zone—an organization especially trained for fighting against "enemies of the people"—would quickly introduce a Soviet-supported régime of terror. Abandoned by the Western Powers, the freedom-loving forces in Germany would lose their capacity for resistance. It is simply absurd to believe that a Germany troubled within, threatened by Soviet troops from without, and defenseless and feeble in the very center of a vast international dispute, would be able to summon sufficient moral and spiritual strength to build a bridge between the two social systems.

Let it be granted that a neutralized Germany—a "buffer" between East and West, as the popular phrase goes—might relieve the tension temporarily. This, of course, is the Soviet aim, on the assumption that the nations of the West would fall back into their old lethargy and discord which for the time being have been dissipated by the feeling of common danger. The Soviets push ahead wherever they detect a weak spot. A vacuum in Germany

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would offer them a tempting chance to improve their position.

The possibility of neutrality for a country located between two hostile economic systems depends also on certain economic conditions. The would-be neutral either has to be self-supporting, or must be of so little economic importance that it does not constitute a prize worth striving for. Neither condition applies to Germany. The likelihood of success of a bilateral control system, based on a Soviet–Western agreement not to attempt to exploit Germany's economic capacity from either side, can readily be imagined. And if it was observed in good faith, the effect would be to keep the German standard of living at a low level and thus make the German people all the more susceptible to Soviet infiltration. And even if no attempt were consciously made to restrict the economy of a neutral German state, trade relations between Germany and the West would be bound to be severed; the West would reason that it was dangerous to build up a German economy that might fall as a prize to the Soviets; or, at the least, that such a Germany was a funnel through which Western economic strength would pour into Russia. The upshot would be that the Iron Curtain would move westward from the present eastern border of the Federal Republic to the eastern frontiers of France and the Benelux countries, while Germany, merged in the Soviet economic system, would rapidly sink to the level of her Sovietized neighbors.

And if war should come between East and West, with Germany neutralized, the military factor thus created would be decisive. The Soviets would not have evacuated even one percent of the territory which they now control in Europe, whereas the Western Powers would have given up more than 11 percent of the area which they dominate, equivalent to about 30 percent of the area between the present East–West border and the Atlantic. They would be pushed back into the exceedingly narrow corner of the Continent.

To sum up, one may say that the neutralization of Germany would not help to prevent a war, but would weaken the position of the West from both the moral and economic point of view and would greatly reduce, if not critically destroy, the chances of successful military operations should war in fact come.

VI. INTEGRATION OF GERMANY

The integration of Western Germany within a supra-national

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Western community is the only course which will equip her with sufficient moral firmness to hold her own. If she knows that she need not rely entirely on her own strength, still weakened from the aftermath of total defeat, but will find assistance and support in the common front of all free nations, she will be able to resist the tactics of Soviet political warfare. Moreover, as part of the Western community she can serve as a "show case" for the material and moral values which the West offers to individuals in Eastern Germany and the East European countries now suffering from Soviet terror; by force of example she can help restore their hope and build up their will to regain the freedom they have lost. But to set up a community of the free nations without German participation would be to block the way for any further eastward integration which might finally include all peoples unwilling to bear the Soviet yoke.

Only the integration of Western Germany with the other Western nations will enable her to develop her economic forces in free competition with them and in such a manner as to help achieve the common aims of the whole Western community. These aims are to increase defense production in order to secure peace, and to make life worth living for every individual—in other words, to enable the least privileged classes to realize the advantages of Western freedom over Soviet dictatorship. The inclusion of the German economy as part of this process becomes even more important because of the larger tasks faced by the West in developing the world's backward countries and in incorporating this "third force" also into the Western economic system.

Only the integration of Western Germany with the West will in the long run preserve the space needed by the Western Powers to defend themselves successfully against potential Soviet aggression on the European Continent. Some military experts say that the Central European battlefield would play only a minor rôle in a war between the Western Powers and the Soviets, reasoning that the Soviets would not take aggressive action in that area. It is true, of course, that the further west the Central European front is moved, the greater the Soviet disadvantage due to the increasing distance; however great might be their efforts to base their supply service as largely as possible on the industry and agriculture of the German Soviet Zone and the satellites, the Russians would constantly have to receive additional supplies from inner Russia. It is pointed out rightly that, in this event, the

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"road of starvation" between Warsaw and Moscow which was fatal first to Napoleon and then to Hitler would become a problem to them in reverse, and that every further step which the Russians took into Western Europe would, so long as North Africa and the Near East were still in Western hands, stretch their flanks and damage their strategic position. There is indeed something to be said for the theory that in another war the Soviets would once again try to turn to advantage Russia's vast depth and poor traffic system, and hence might base their strategy upon defense of their own territory. If they inclined to take preventive measures with a view to improving the conditions for such a strategy, these measures would consist of an attack in the direction of the Suez Canal—to break the claws of the Western pincers, to eliminate the air bases in the Near East which would otherwise become particularly dangerous to Russian industrial centers, and finally to get possession of Persian oil.

But let us remember, first, that this is theoretical; and second, that none of it means that in case of war the Soviets would refrain from any military action in Western Europe, particularly under conditions of Western weakness in the area between the East–West zonal border and the Atlantic. A local and limited Soviet raid toward and across the Rhine will always have to be expected, unless the Western Powers become so strong beyond the Rhine that the Soviet forces would feel the need of engaging them at a point where their operations could not be decisive. The danger for the Western economy of such a Soviet penetration into the industrial center of Europe is obvious, as are the devastating effects which it would have on the morale of the Western European peoples, quite aside from the losses caused in personnel and matériel.

In order to counter this danger it is necessary to be able to mobilize all available forces at the point which, though possibly of secondary interest from the point of view of operations, is of particular strategic importance. It is in relation to this necessity that the question of a German military contribution should be studied. The object of Western policy is twofold: to give the Germans—soldiers with special experience in fighting the Russians—a chance to defend their own soil as members of a supranational military organization; and at the same time to bring a considerable reinforcement to the Western potential. A German military contribution would also have psychological importance.

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All the nations of the Western world would in that case be united in a common effort to ward off the Soviet menace, regardless of the ancient hereditary feuds and discords which may have separated them in the past. The German people would be given a sense of security, their self-confidence would be awakened and they would be brought to realize their own responsibilities—both for their own future and for the future of Western civilization.

Will a rearmed Germany be a danger to the West? Warnings have frequently been given that a draft of German troops would rouse a new militarist and imperialist spirit in Germany, and that this would again crush all efforts to build up a peaceful democracy there. But such warnings do not take account of the change that has taken place in the German social system. The abuses of a criminal régime, the loss of two wars, the experiences of two inflations, and the expulsion of millions of East Germans from their homes and soil have brought a vast majority of the German people to a realization that the old road which led them over the precipice must not again be trodden. Most Germans know that the ideas which gave the German soldier a disproportionate influence in the country's social structure are obsolete. The reluctance of the Germans to take up arms again is genuine —hard to believe abroad though that may be. It will be overcome when the German people realize that they must protect themselves against Bolshevism; but it will help to prevent any attempt of the military to increase their influence in the state beyond fixed limits. A future German military force will be supported by the people, and will in turn contribute to Germany's military and moral strength, only if it seeks to train the people to defend their democratic freedom as responsible citizens and avoids any attempt to impose an autocratic system.

The concern of Germany's immediate neighbors that the *poilu* will have to go to war some day to help the displaced German peasant from Silesia get back his farm overlooks a number of factors. In the first place, once German units have been integrated with a supra-national army, and once the nation has become part of a Western community, a common view and policy will tend to develop. The suspicion that the Germans will follow a line of their own, diverging from their coalition partners, is, I think, unfounded. Again, let us remember that the deepest desire of the German people is to be spared another war. Even the spokesmen for the German expellees from the Eastern Zone have repeatedly

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stated that the way back to their old homes must not lead by new-dug soldiers' graves. The final settlement of the refugee problem, and of Germany's future relations with her Eastern neighbors, must be arranged peacefully and on a supra-national level after a careful consideration of the vital needs of the individual nations concerned.

Fear lest the Germans, once they had been rearmed, would reverse fronts and join the Soviets is based on a total misapprehension of the German situation. The Germans realize well that the free world could not tolerate a German-Soviet alliance which soon would come to dominate the European Continent, and hence that the formation of such an alliance would automatically bring about war. That is precisely what the Germans want to avoid. The more closely Germany is integrated with the West, especially as regards her economy and her defense, the less point or chance there will be in her trying to break out of the community.

No Western nation knows the Soviets—their terror, their cruelty, their brutal totalitarianism—as thoroughly as do the Germans. To compare what might happen now with what happened at Tauroggen a century and a half ago is to miss the point entirely. When the Prussians under General Yorck broke the coalition with Napoleon and entered into an alliance with Russia they were withdrawing from slavery and choosing the way to freedom. Today, a Tauroggen would mean the reverse: Germany would be leaping from freedom into slavery.

VII. A PHONY CONTRIBUTION?

One further argument is used against the rearmament of Western Germany and her integration into the Western community—namely, that large parts of the German people themselves are opposed to it. The point is made that the idea would be so openly rejected in Germany that the West would suffer a decline rather than a rise of moral strength. In this connection references are made to the strong echo which the views expressed by Mr. Niemoeller and other advocates of neutrality have found among the population.

The actual fact is, however, that the majority of the German people feel that they belong to the West. They know that Germany is a Western nation and that it is of utmost importance for her to be closely connected with the countries of the free world. The misgivings about a military contribution to Western

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strength spring from fear that it represents a first step toward another war, and from grave concern that it would postpone indefinitely the reunification of German territories severed by the Potsdam Agreement. Popular judgment is often clouded by resentment and a certain distrust, typical of the German people under present conditions, which puts them in continual fear of being used by a foreign Power for its own purposes. The German people have been slow in readjusting themselves psychologically from their rôle as an object of policy to that of being an active element—from demilitarization, with all its unpleasant if understandable characteristics, to rearmament. At any rate, they could not keep pace with the speed at which the resurrection of the German soldier was prepared, in political terms and in actual practice, at Petersberg and in Paris. A readjustment of that size needs time and patience.

The German people are beginning by degrees to understand that integration with the Western community protects their own interests just as much as it helps the entire Western World; that the purpose of rearmament is not to cause war but to prevent it; that restoration of German unity will be beneficial only if it brings freedom to the Germans on the other side of the Iron Curtain and not if it means slavery for all Germans in the long run; and that the best chance for it lies in making it part of the question of the freedom of all the anti-Soviet nations.

Germans who believe in a Western brotherhood and the necessity of forming a firm front against the Bolshevik menace have a single aim: to speed the process of psychological readjustment. They believe that their particular task is to try to overcome resentments and suspicions by reasoned argument and personal example. They know that the German people must be convinced that the Western World realizes the pointlessness of harnessing three fast race horses with a fourth whose front legs have been tied together. Confidence must be mutual if there is to be a basis for honest coöperation. It is hard for both parties to understand one another, to forget former injustices and to draw a final line under the past. But in no other way can a community be created —and it must be a real community if it is to withstand the pressure that will be levelled against it.

It is true that the German people themselves must take the lead in winning the confidence of other nations, lost during the Nazi régime. But they must also be helped, if they are to recover

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the moral strength required from them; their fall from the height of boundless insolence to the depth of helpless despair has tested that almost to the breaking point. In material respects, help has been granted most generously in recent years by the United States. But the Western Allies should not forget that the value of a German contribution to Western rearmament will depend less on the number of its divisions than on the moral preparedness of the Germans. Let us hope that psychological blunders which raise doubts that the spirit of genuine partnership exists can be avoided. These will simply strengthen the extreme elements in Germany and forward the objectives of Soviet propaganda. There certainly is no reason for considerateness toward German resentments; but the decision which the German people are facing will be easier for them if they can be made to feel that there is no reason to distrust the sincerity of Western intentions. If the West succeeds in overcoming this distrust—not too difficult a task, if both sides coöperate—the majority of the German people will, in full conviction and consciousness of responsibility, make the one decision which will prevent them from being engulfed by the Soviets. That right decision will at the same time serve the security of the entire Western world. I believe that the German people should be given this chance.

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"SOCIALIST COMPETITION"

By Isaac Deutscher

THE economists and theorists of all Socialist schools of thought agree in the denunciation of capitalist competition and of its laissez-faire apologists. But behind this unanimity in denunciation can be discerned wide differences in approach and argument, differences which finally come into the open when any Socialist school tries to look beyond capitalist society and to answer the question whether Socialism itself is compatible with any form of competition. The different answers given to this question reflect broader differences between the various visions and conceptions of Socialism.

Perhaps the most crucial theoretical controversy over this subject took place between Marx and Proudhon more than a century ago. Proudhon saw Socialism essentially as a "free association" of small property owners, of independent producers owning their means of production. It was natural for him to envisage the economic activity of such a society in terms of competition. The evil of capitalism, Proudhon argued, was that it gave the banker and the industrialist a monopoly on the means of production and thus degraded the small artisan and peasant into wage-slaves. Under such conditions, genuine competition, which presupposed the equality and the freedom of those taking part in it, was impossible. The form which competition had taken under capitalism was therefore the Hegelian antithesis of free association and coöperation. Socialism would break the capitalist monopoly on the means of production; it would restore to the individual the tools of his labor; and thereby it would also restore competition to its proper rôle. From a factor of social disruption and disintegration, competition would become a factor of harmony; and Socialism would represent the final synthesis between association and competition. "Competition," Proudhon wrote, "is as essential to labor as is division of labor . . . it is necessary for the advent of equality." It is inherent in human nature, and therefore "there can be no question of destroying competition, a thing as impossible to destroy as liberty; we have only to find its equilibrium. . . ."

Marx's approach was essentially historical. He replied to Proudhon's argument with the assertion that pre-capitalist so-

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ciety knew little or no competitive economic activity. The feudal landlords had been engaged in all sorts of political and military rivalry; but, as a rule, they had not confronted one another as economic competitors, buyers or sellers, because their economy had not developed in terms of market relationships. Nor had the peasant serfs (or the slaves in economies based on slave labor) competed with one another as laborers. Only as market relationships had spread and become universal, *i.e.* under capitalism, did every form of economic activity assume a competitive aspect. Even capitalism was not always competitive. In its mercantilistic beginnings it was monopolistic. Only with its growth and consolidation, and with the development of modern industry, did monopoly give place to free trade and competition. But then free competition itself, progressively concentrating wealth in the hands of the few, tended towards monopoly. Competitive economic activity was thus characteristic only for a relatively short period in man's history; and from that period Proudhon mistakenly projected it into the past and the future.

Marx did not question the assumption that the urge for emulation was inherent in human nature. He merely insisted that this urge ought not to be confused, let alone identified, with economic competitiveness. "Competition is emulation for profit." Since, in contrast to Proudhon, he saw Socialism as the abolition of property, not a new redistribution of it, and as a free association of producers collectively owning their means of production, not as an association of small property owners, Marx could see in Socialism no room for profit and, consequently, no room for "emulation for profit." "Socialist competition" was to him a contradiction in terms; and he ridiculed Proudhon's view about "the eternal necessity of competition."

Of special relevance to the subject of this article is Marx's view of competition as it affects the working class, that is, of competition among the workers themselves. In one of his earliest works, "The German Ideology," he wrote: "Competition makes individuals, not only the bourgeois but *still more so the workers,* mutually hostile, in spite of the fact that it brings them together. It takes therefore a long time before these individuals can unite." The worker appears on the market to sell his labor force, which has become a commodity. On the labor market he competes against other members of his class; and this competition is governed by the law of supply and demand. When the market is

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against him, the worker cuts the price of his peculiar commodity, agrees to work for lower wages and longer hours and compels other workers to do likewise. The competition rages inside the factory and workshop as well—competition in intensity and productivity of labor; and at the bench as on the labor market the brutality of the competition depends on the size of the "reserve army of unemployed." Through trade unionism the workers may restrain and curb their own competition, but they cannot abolish it. The whole social and political development of the industrial working class is nothing but a constant struggle of that class to keep down the economic individualism of its members and to impose on them solidarity vis-à-vis the employers.

"The separate individuals form a class," continues Marx, "only in so far as they have to wage a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors." Only in so far as the workers overcome their own competitiveness and grow aware of their deeper and broader antagonism to the capitalist class do they begin to act as *eine Klasse für sich,* a class for itself. Nevertheless, under capitalism they can never quite escape the curse of competition. No matter how strong their trade union, every slump tends to destroy or to weaken their hard-won solidarity. And throughout all the phases of the trade cycle competition goes on inside the factory and the workshop; and each form of wages has a different effect on it. Time wages appear to be less detrimental to the workers' solidarity than piece wages, for although they may induce some men to work longer hours, they do not induce them to outdo their fellow-workers by greater intensity of labor within any time limit. Piece wages, on the other hand, play much more strongly upon the worker's competitive instinct. "Since the quality and intensity of the work are here controlled by the form of the wage itself," Marx writes in "Das Kapital," "the piece wage automatically registers the slightest difference in the quality and intensity of the work performed." It "tends to develop on the one hand the individuality of the worker and with it the sense of liberty, independence and self-control of the laborers, on the other—their competition with one another. Piece work has, therefore, a tendency, while raising individual wages above the average, to lower this average itself. . . . *Piece wages is the form of wages most in harmony with the capitalist mode of production.*"[1]

[1] The italics are those of the present writer. Incidentally, Marx carefully distinguished be-

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Neither Marx nor Engels, nor any of their eminent intellectual disciples such as Kautsky, Plekhanov or Lenin, has ever drawn any blueprints of the society of the future. At most they all deduced certain general features of Socialism by inference from the opposite. They assumed, expressly or implicitly, that economic phenomena which they saw as being peculiar to capitalism would vanish with capitalism or would not, at any rate, survive into the age of fully-fledged Socialism. Wages, profit and rent represented such social relationships, peculiar to capitalism and unthinkable in Socialism. The same was true of the modern division of labor, especially the separation of brain work from manual labor; and, last but not least, of competition.

Marxist theory takes it for granted that the members of a Socialist community will have to perform certain functions in many ways similar to those performed by their ancestors under capitalism or feudalism. In every social order men have to produce in order to live. In every economic system there must be some balance between production and consumption. Every society, if it is not to stagnate and decay, must produce a surplus of goods over and above the sum total of the goods necessary for the upkeep of the producers, the maintenance and replacement of productive equipment and so on. Yet the social relationships within which these functions are performed are so different in various systems that it is useless to search for common historical and sociological denominators for these functions. The surplus produce of a capitalist economy takes the form of rent, profit and interest; and this determines the entire mode of life of the capitalist world. In Socialism, the surplus produce, belonging to society as a whole, would cease to be profit. The function of that surplus and its impact upon social life would be altogether different from what it was under the old order, when the scale and the rhythm of any nation's productive activity were normally determined by whether that activity was or was not profitable to the capitalist class. In the same way, the emulation in which men would engage under Socialism (or Communism) would have little or nothing in common with their ancestors' competition. Under capitalism, men compete for profits or wages. Socialist emulation would be economically disinterested.

tween "productivity" and "intensity" of labor. Higher productivity comes with improved machinery and better organization of labor; it may or it may not indicate increased exploitation. Higher intensity of labor comes from the greater physical exertion to which piece wages spur on the worker—it nearly always amounts to increased exploitation.

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It is perhaps important to remember the major premise of this argument. In original Marxist theory, Communism (or Socialism) is associated with a development of mankind's productive resources and capacities superior to that achieved under capitalism at its peak. Marx and Engels held that man cannot make his leap "from necessity to freedom," from "pre-history into history," or for that matter from competition to emulation, as long as he has to devote the major part of his creative energy to the satisfaction of his material needs. Unlike some Socialist sentimentalists, the founders of the Marxist school had no quarrel with the familiar view that the higher achievements of our culture and civilization have been essentially the work of the "leisured classes." But they believed that the time was not very far off when technological development would enable mankind as a whole to become a single "leisured class," as it were, provided mankind could in time achieve a new social organization. In Marx's age the average working day in industry was twelve hours; and Marx hailed the introduction of the ten hour day in England as the first great victory of the Socialist principle. To most of his contemporaries the idea of a six or seven hour day appeared as fantastic as that of a two or three hour day may appear now. Yet, some Americans at least will perhaps agree that if the United States were merely to maintain the rate of its technological progress (and on condition that this progress does not become a factor of destruction and self-destruction), the two or three hour day should come within the realm of the possible for the American people before this century is out.

What are the implications of such a hypothesis? What would a two or three hour working day mean to the American people? It would certainly revolutionize their way of life and their outlook to an almost unimaginable extent. It would in the first instance render obsolete the inherited division of labor, especially the separation of brain work from manual labor. It would leave the physical worker with enough leisure for him to be free to acquire the education and to engage in the intellectual or artistic activity which under the present division of labor is open to the brain worker only. On the other hand, even the most specialized scientist and artist could easily perform physical labor for two or three hours, without thereby being diverted from his special intellectual pursuit.

It was some such society as this hypothetical American society

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of the end of the twentieth or the beginning of the twenty-first century that Marx and Engels had before their eyes when they discussed the various phases in the development of Communism. Only in this light can one understand, for instance, the following passage, almost bursting with optimism, from Engels' "Anti-Dühring:"

> In making itself the master of all the means of production, in order to use them in accordance with a social plan, society puts an end to the former subjection of men to their own means of production. *It goes without saying that society cannot itself be free unless every individual is free.* The old mode of production must therefore be revolutionized from top to bottom, and in particular the former division of labor must disappear. Its place must be taken by an organization of production in which, on the one hand, no individual can put onto other persons his share in productive labor, this natural condition of human existence, and in which, on the other hand, productive labor, instead of being a means to the subjection of men, will become a means to their emancipation, by giving each individual the opportunity to develop and exercise all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions; in which therefore *productive labor would become a pleasure instead of a burden.* (Italics those of the present writer.)

Only in such a society, holding a modern industrial cornucopia, did Marx and Engels expect that productive labor could become a disinterested sports-like social activity and that competition could give place to emulation.

To most reform-minded Socialists and trade unionists these Marxist vistas of the future have always seemed either too unreal or too remote to be taken very seriously. The romantic undertone in Marxism has evoked a response in the revolutionaries, as Lenin's "State and Revolution" strikingly testifies. The reformists have tried more empirically to find a compromise between capitalism and Socialism; and they have tended to project that compromise on to the future, at least on those rare occasions when they have not shied off from generalizations about the future. Thus, the English Fabians imagined that Socialism would inherit most economic "categories" from capitalism and "remodel" rather than abolish them. They believed that workers' competition, *i.e.* their competition for material rewards, would be both useful and necessary to a Socialist economy, as John Stuart Mill had pointed out even before the Fabians. But while Fabian ideologists were anxious theoretically to infuse competition into the future Socialist order, the trade unionists, who have directly or indirectly drawn inspiration from them, have been concerned

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mainly with eliminating or mitigating workers' competition under the existing order. The trade unions of most countries have at one time or another bitterly opposed the advance of "scientific management and organization of labor" and the introduction in industry of such innovations as the stop-watch, the man-record chart and so on. Before World War I, the American Federation of Labor vehemently denounced the attempt of employers to drive the workers into scientifically organized, "suicidal" competition in the factory shop. The A. F. of L. then rallied its following to resist the onslaught on their class solidarity, the onslaught led by Frederick Winslow Taylor. American trade unionism seems long since to have made its peace with scientific management; but the old battle-cry of the A. F. of L. was taken up in Europe, and there it has resounded for decades. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Taylor and Taylorism were to the European worker synonyms of the worst capitalist exploitation. In this opposition to "technical rationalization," the defense of the worker's interests and the fear that scientific organization of labor would result in an increase of redundant labor have inevitably been blended with an instinctively conservative attitude towards technological progress. The more limited a country's resources, and the fewer its chances for economic expansion and rapid absorption of redundant labor by new industries, the more acute has been the workers' fear of their own competitiveness.

II

Any labor party, Marxist or non-Marxist, Social Democratic or Communist, revolutionary or reformist, finds this traditional attitude untenable as soon as it assumes office. In this one respect there is little difference between Lenin and Trotsky and Attlee and Cripps. Very soon after the Bolshevik revolution Lenin tried to impress his Party with the crucial importance of industrial productivity and with the need to raise the discipline and efficiency of labor. Without hesitation he recommended to his followers "the adoption of much that is scientific and progressive in Taylor's system, the correlation of earnings and output."[2] He further urged his adherents to try out the effect of piece wages upon the workers and their productivity, although at the same time, in March 1918, he proposed that the new program of the

[2] *Cf.* "The Next Tasks of the Soviet Régime." Lenin's Menshevik critics bitterly attacked him more than once for urging the Russian workers to imitate the methods of American capitalism.

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Party should provide for the "gradual levelling out of *all* wages and salaries in *all* occupations and categories." He encouraged the introduction of piece work and piece wages with some caution, as an experiment; and he went on to insist on the régime's basic commitment gradually to reduce the inequality of wage- and salary-earners. He also placed great emphasis on the value of emulation, which was to develop "in humane not in zoological forms." He interpreted emulation rather broadly:

> The problems on which emulation in the communes, associations of consumers and producers and in the soviets ought to center . . . are these: in which commune, in which part of a city, in which factory, in which village are there no hungry people, no unemployed ones, no rich idlers . . . where has more been done to raise the productivity of labor, to build new and good homes for the poor or to house them in the mansions of the rich? Where has most been done in order that every child in a poor family should get its bottle of milk?

There was little emphasis in all this on competition between individual workers for higher output and higher wages. Lenin returned to the idea of emulation in 1919, when he wrote on the so-called *Subbotniki*, groups of workers, Communist railwaymen, who, at the height of the civil war, volunteered to do special shifts of work during weekends in order to help to supply the Red Army. The *Subbotniki* started an "emulation;" and they received and expected no pay at all for their weekend shifts. Lenin extolled their enthusiasm and disinterestedness and remarked that the example given by them pointed by way of anticipation to the Socialist emulation of the future. This was an incident in the building up of Communist morale during the civil war rather than a pronouncement on economic policy; and the incident would not perhaps have been worth mentioning had it not been for the fact that Stalinist publicity for the latter-day brand of "Socialist emulation" uses Lenin's words on the *Subbotniki* as its text. As we shall see later, the "Socialist emulation" of the Stalinist era has little in common with its alleged precedent.

During the civil war (1918–1920) and in the years that followed, Lenin did not specifically resume his advocacy of "Soviet Taylorism;" and this was no matter of chance. Scientific management and organization of labor are meaningless unless they are applied to a more or less orderly economic environment, in which at least the even flow of raw materials and equipment to the worker is assured and the worker's basic needs are more or less

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satisfied. None of these conditions existed then. The Russian economy had utterly disintegrated; industry was cut off from raw materials; industrial plant was half destroyed or rotting; and the industrial population was starving—in Moscow and Petrograd the worker's daily food ration often consisted of one-eighth of a pound of bread and a few potatoes. It was an extraordinary achievement for the Soviets to wrest from this disintegrated economy the munitions, the food and the clothing which the Red Army needed. The achievement was due to a set of emergency policies which came to be rationalized and idealized into the system of "war Communism." There was no lack of emulation among groups of Bolshevik enthusiasts; but there was little talk as yet about *Socialist* emulation. Despite all the familiar illusions of war Communism, the Bolshevik leaders were aware that this idealistic emulation was not characteristic of the economic climate of the country. Amid the appalling poverty of those years, the prevalent form of "emulation," a form in which the vast majority of the people engaged, was black market competition.

Only towards the end of the civil war, when the Soviet leaders began to prepare for the economic transition to peace, did they make a new attempt to tackle the problem; but the attempt was still made in terms of war Communism. Trotsky, hesitantly supported by the Central Committee of the Party, was the chief author of the economic policy of that period, a policy which consisted in militarization of labor, labor armies and "Socialist emulation." He submitted to the 9th Congress of the Party (1920) the following resolution which was adopted:

> Every social system . . . has its own methods and ways of labor compulsion and education for labor in the interest of the exploiting classes.
>
> The Soviet order is confronted with the task . . . of developing its own methods, designed to raise the intensity and efficiency of labor on the basis of a socialized economy and in the interests of the whole people.
>
> On a par with the propaganda of ideas, which should influence the mind of the toiling masses, and with repressive measures, to be used against deliberate idlers, drones and disorganizers, emulation is the most powerful means towards raising productivity of labor.
>
> In capitalist society emulation had the character of competition and led to the exploitation of man by man. In a society in which the means of production have been nationalized, emulation in labor ought, *without impinging upon the workers' solidarity*, only to raise the sum total of the products of labor.
>
> Emulation between factories, regions, shops, workshops and individual workers should be the object of careful organization and attentive research

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on the part of the trade unions and the economic administration. (The italics are those of the present writer.)

To this day these words are quoted in the U.S.S.R., without their author ever being mentioned, as a sort of a Magna Carta of Stalinist Socialist emulation. Trotsky was aware of the dilemma implied in his appeal. He insisted that emulation should not "impinge upon the workers' solidarity," that it should not, in other words, "degenerate" into competition. But how was this to be achieved? In the hypothetical Communist society of the future the contradiction was to resolve itself automatically. Amid an unheard-of abundance of goods, collectively produced and owned, the producers' interest in the material rewards would gradually wither away. Men would no longer wrest from one another the necessities, and perhaps not even the luxuries, of life. Only then would emulation and solidarity become fully compatible. But how could they be made compatible at the early stages of the transition from capitalism to Communism, in a country whose economic resources were then, and were to remain for decades, greatly underdeveloped? Trotsky placed qualified trust in the nationalization of the means of production as a safeguard against the recrudescence of the old competition among the workers. But was this an adequate safeguard? Years later, Trotsky himself remarked with disillusioned sarcasm that by itself "state ownership of the means of production does not turn manure into gold." Nor could it by itself transform competition into emulation.

In the last year of war Communism, Trotsky in his turn appeared before the Russian workers as the chief advocate of Soviet Taylorism. He had to consider whether the Russian worker could be persuaded to accept Taylorism or whatever was to pass under that name, and not to expect special material rewards for individual efficiency. Could "scientific management and organization of labor" make progress, without using wages policy as its instrument? Trotsky hesitated. Alternately he advocated the adoption of incentive wages and the equalization of wages. Lenin was quick to point to Trotsky's inconsistency: "You cannot have emulation, *i.e.* inequality in production," he argued, "without admitting inequality in consumption." But "inequality in consumption"—differential wages—tended to undermine the workers' solidarity. The "gold" of Socialist emulation was turning into the "manure" of bourgeois competition.

On the eve of N.E.P., Lenin, at any rate, was clear-sighted

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enough to see that the Russian economy could not be rebuilt, and that the next step towards Socialism could not be made, without the reintroduction of a strong element of ordinary bourgeois competition, including competition between workers. But as a Marxist theorist, Lenin was also scrupulous enough not to label this "Socialist emulation." Thus he who early in 1918 had first sketched in public statements and more extensively in private notes the prospects of Socialist emulation was in later years more reticent on this subject than almost any Bolshevik leader.

After the introduction of N.E.P. in 1921 little or nothing was heard about emulation during nearly a decade. During the major part of this period the Soviet economy had to contend with vast industrial unemployment; and neither the workers nor the trade unions nor even the Party were in a mood to work out the Soviet version of Taylorism.

Only in 1929, at the beginning of the first Five Year Plan, was the call for Socialist emulation raised again. It was Stalin himself who raised it; and he did so without any of the theoretical or socio-political scruples that had inhibited the leaders of the earlier period. He was embarking upon the industrialization of the U.S.S.R. with the conviction that he had to foster among the workers the most intense competition in productivity and that he had to offer them, together with persuasion and coercion, the attraction of incentive wages. He was determined to unleash "bourgeois" competition among the workers; but he was also bent on labelling it "Socialist emulation." With characteristic vigor and crudity he stated in May 1929:

> Emulation is the Communist method of constructing Socialism on the basis of the utmost activity of millions of toilers. . . . Socialist emulation and competition represent two altogether different principles. The principle of competition is defeat and death of some competitors, the victory and domination of others. The principle of Socialist emulation is that the advanced workers should render comradely assistance to those who lag behind in order to advance together.

This oversimplification served a definite purpose. The "principle" of competition is, of course, not "the defeat and death of some and victory and domination of others," although this may be the result of competition. Its principle is, as Marx put it, emulation for material reward. Stalin banished this plain and incontrovertible definition from Soviet economic thinking in order that the new régime introduced in industry together with the

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Five Year Plans—the régime of shock work, Stakhanovism and of sharply differentiated incentive wages—could be invested with the halo of Socialist emulation. At the 16th Congress of the Party (1930) Stalin went even further: "The most remarkable feature of emulation," he stated, "is that it brings about a basic change in people's views on labor, that it transforms labor from a drudgery and a heavy burden . . . into a matter of honor, a matter of glory, a matter of bravery and heroism." The more brutally he shifted his practical emphasis towards material rewards (and other methods in which there was neither honor nor glory nor heroism), the more did Stalin's "ideological" propaganda describe his labor policy in terms of the ultimate Communist ideal.[3]

Whatever the ideological embellishments, the "bourgeois" competition which Stalin fostered in the Soviet working class was to a large extent both necessary and useful to Soviet industry. This is not the place to try to summarize Soviet labor policy under planned economy—I have recently attempted to do this in a monograph on the Soviet trade unions. Suffice it to say here that in the last decade or so before World War II the industrial working class of the U.S.S.R. expanded so rapidly that it grew from about 10 to nearly 35 percent of the Soviet population. This growth was interrupted by the war, but it has continued again since 1945–6. The bulk of the new labor force—24,000,000 people under the prewar Five Year Plans—has been recruited from the rural population. It has had to be given some elementary, hasty industrial training; and a relatively numerous section of it has had to be trained into skilled and efficient workers. The Government has had an obvious interest in gradually raising the efficiency of this vast and ceaselessly expanding mass. For this a comprehensive and elaborate system of incentive wages has been

[3] That Stalin and the Politburo had their reasons for surrounding "Socialist competition" with ideological embellishments is understandable. This helped them to break down the original resistance to competition inside the Party, in the trade unions and among rank and file workers. What is much more strange is the assiduous credulity with which the ideological embellishments were sometimes accepted at the face value by outsiders. The Webbs, for instance, devoted a whole chapter of their "Soviet Communism" to the reproduction of all the myths on Socialist emulation. They surpassed themselves, however, in the following incongruous passage:

"The pleasurable excitement of Socialist emulation was actually brought into play in 1931–33 among the tens of thousands of convicted criminals, 'politicals' and *kulaks* employed, as we have already described, on the gigantic civil engineering works of the White Sea canal. Brigade competed with brigade as to which could shift the greatest amount of earth, lay the greatest length of rail or construct the greatest amount of embankment within the prescribed period—sometimes, it is recorded, refusing to stop work when the hour for cessation arrived, in order to complete some particular task."

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needed. Piece wages, that classical stimulant of workers' competition, became the dominant form of payment in Soviet industry. Already towards the end of the 1930s about 75 percent of all Soviet workers and employees were paid piece rates; and their proportion has grown since, while the rates have been ever more and more differentiated. This alone gives a measure of the competitive climate prevailing in the Soviet factory and workshop.

The "Socialist emulation" of the 1930s and 1940s represented only a primitive though broad approach by Soviet industry towards Taylorism and kindred versions of scientific management and organization of labor. No doubt some technologically advanced concerns and establishments carried out complex experiments in this field throughout this period. But in most sectors of Soviet industry the rhythm of technological advance was at first too slow and then too uneven and jerky, the labor force too raw and management too much hampered by political and bureaucratic interference for any systematic scientific organization of labor to be practised over most of these years. Only recently has there been evidence of a more genuine attempt to apply Soviet Taylorism more or less on a mass scale. Specialized Soviet periodicals discuss this attempt in a tone suggesting that Soviet management is breaking completely new ground. On closer analysis it seems that, despite all claims to originality, the U.S.S.R. is essentially still in the imitative period in this field, trying hard to adopt methods which have long been familiar elsewhere. The stop-watch and the man-record chart are still startling innovations. Undoubtedly, they do mark an important stage in the growth of Soviet industrial productivity.

It is only natural that Soviet conditions should impose modifications, which make the Soviet version of Taylorism in part less and in part more effective than its American original. By and large, Soviet workers still compete for the bare necessities of life. This in itself tends to make the competition much more brutal than that to which a working class living in a capitalist country but enjoying a higher standard of living would be willing to lend itself. The fact that the Soviet trade unions, or the bodies that exist under that name, far from curbing the competition, do their utmost to spur it on, works in the same direction. Too fierce competition between workers is by no means conducive to scientific organization. Nor does the customary Soviet emphasis on quantity production, so often harmful to quality, agree with either sci-

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entific management or the rational planning of labor processes.

On the other hand, Soviet industry derives certain exceptional advantages from the circumstance that it is publicly owned and centralized. It is not encumbered by vested interests and restrictive practices. It is—or, at any rate, it should be—easy for any successful innovation in scientific organization of labor to spread, without undue friction or delay, over any sector of industry where it can be applied. Whatever other sorts of secrecy may be characteristic for the Soviets, internal commercial secrecy is not one of them. No Soviet concern or trust can have any solid motive for withholding its experience and achievements from other concerns; and the central pooling of technological and organizational experience is a decisive advantage.

In one further respect does the climate of Soviet industry favor Soviet Taylorism. The fear of unemployment never haunts the Soviet worker, whatever other fears may prey upon his mind. Restrictive craft practices are virtually unknown to him. Vertical mobility, to use the American term, is extremely high. In a society relentlessly forging ahead with its industrial revolution, to which it sets no limits, the chances of promotion open to workers are practically unlimited, or limited only by the fear of responsibility that goes with promotion. Nothing deters the skilled worker from imparting his skill to the novice and the junior at the bench; and there is much to induce and even to compel him to do so. It is one of the characteristic obligations which figure prominently in all the contracts for Socialist emulation that experience in more efficient management and use of labor should be unstintingly turned into common property.

It is rather difficult to gauge the effect of the non-material incentives and deterrents which are widely employed in "Socialist competition." The rewards of the efficient worker include official decorations, flattering publicity, social standing. The inefficient finds his name on the blackboard over the bench. Whether favorable distinction or blacklisting has the intended effect depends largely on the morale of the environment in which the worker finds himself. Among a discontented or sullen factory crew, official praise and honors are most likely to isolate the Stakhanovite. But it is impossible to say what is the prevailing mood at the bottom of the industrial pyramid. As a rule, the moral prizes go to the Stakhanovite together with the material ones; and both mutually enhance their respective effectiveness.

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Finally, one more aspect of this problem, a purely political one, should be considered. We have quoted Marx as saying that "competition makes individuals, not only the bourgeois, but even more so the workers, mutually hostile." Marx goes on to say: "Hence it is a long time before these individuals can unite. . . . Every organized power confronting these isolated individuals, who live in relationships daily reproducing their isolation, can be overcome only after long struggles. To demand the opposite would be tantamount to demanding that competition should not exist in this epoch of history, or that the individuals should banish from their minds relationships over which, in their isolation, they have no control." Competition, in other words, tends politically to atomize the working class and to prevent it from organizing and using its strength for its own ends. Here is perhaps a clue —to be sure, only one of many—to the political amorphousness of the Soviet working class in the last decades, an amorphousness contrasting sharply with the political initiative, vitality and organizing ability of the Russian workers under Tsardom. The new generation of Soviet workers has brought with it from the countryside a residual but still strong peasant individualism, upon which "Socialist competition" superimposes a new brand of individualism. Because most often the Soviet worker must fiercely compete for the bare necessities of life, his competitive individualism has certainly assumed extreme forms, making it difficult for him to develop his own political personality. Primitive economic individualism in the worker is, paradoxically, one of the essential preconditions for Stalinist collectivist uniformity, as essential as political terror, if not more so. Socialist emulation, because it is only competition under a new name—the struggle of all against all—makes the workers mutually hostile and "isolated from one another." They live in relationships which daily reproduce their isolation. Their energy, politically shapeless and undifferentiated, is therefore easily made to flow into molds operated by a single party. They work and build new cities and open up deserts and fight world-shaking battles; but, like most of mankind, they are still merely the object of history. They may become something more only after long struggles. "To demand the opposite would be tantamount to demanding that competition should not exist in this epoch of history." Or, that the Soviet workers should "banish from their minds relationships over which in their isolation they have no control."

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ARGENTINA IN THE TUNNEL

By Z

THE political régime which now rules Argentina cannot accurately be called Communist, Nazi or Fascist. It is not an exclusively military dictatorship, nor is it one of the tyrannical civilian variety which has frequently occurred in American countries. What is important, however, is not the label given to a government by itself or its opponents, but an understanding of its essential characteristics. Let us look, then, behind the labels.

The government headed by Perón has characteristics which coincide in certain respects with those of Fascism, and in others with those of Communism and Nazism, as is natural enough since those three forms themselves have much in common. Like them, the Peronista régime is of course dictatorial and totalitarian, arbitrary and all-embracing, and it seeks and gains support by constantly exacerbating morbid nationalism and by creating xenophobia. Its most salient characteristic, however, the one that really distinguishes it from more or less similar governments, is the fiction that it is democratic. Perón counts heavily on this camouflage in his campaign of deception; he draws from it a large part of his capacity for survival; and in it, as we shall see, resides the principal danger which his régime creates. Sometimes this régime calls itself Peronismo, sometimes *justicialismo,* and originally *laborismo*. Within the terms of the unceasing camouflage, change of name is a tactical detail. Each is a phase of the "democratic fiction."

Nazism and Fascism shared a hatred for everything Anglo-Saxon and especially, of course, for the democratic institutions exemplified in Great Britain and the United States. That hatred provided the slogans of Mussolini and Hitler, and their wrathful voices found responsive echoes in distant communities which felt that they had accounts pending with the two Powers in question, or which harbored grudges against them. Among the areas or nations thus affected were the Asian and African colonies, Japan, Spain and parts of Latin America. The sympathetic responses there did not represent true adherences in principle to totalitarian dictatorship as a formula of government. Rather they were a shared resentment. The drawing power of the dictatorial banner was not that of a political concept, new or old, but of a common

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hatred for anything contributing to sustain the norms of democracy. Hatred is never in itself constructive, but it often serves as a motive for coalition.

After the collapse and defeat of Fascism and Nazism, the banner of hatred passed into the hands of Stalin. Stalinism is not simply and exclusively Communism or Marxism; it is, besides, basically chauvinistic. Little by little many of those in both hemispheres who years ago chorused the furies of Hitler and Mussolini are now accepting and supporting the preachments of Moscow. They dissimulate in varying degrees. But all follow the banner of hatred. Stalinism attracts them not because it is Marxist but because it is anti-Anglo-Saxon. On the Latin American scene the transmutation is very marked, for it is at this point that Peronismo most clearly conjoins with Nazism, Stalinism and Fascism. Hitler and Mussolini, however, like the Communists today, named names in their attacks. Peronismo does not. Its strategy is to disparage imperialism and capitalism as such; but those who know the language of the farce can recognize the countries referred to just as clearly as when the boss of Peronismo or one of his adherents says "Braden" or "Wall Street."

Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism attacked parliamentary democracy openly. They denied its virtues. Perón does something different: he affirms the virtues and asserts that his government is parliamentary and democratic. In 1949 he modified and deformed the democratic Constitution of 1853, but he did not dare disown it completely. He prefers simply not to observe it (even as "reformed"), all the time boasting of faithful compliance. He affects idolatry of the law and covers everything with the mantle of legality. To maintain the fiction of legality he relies upon submissive parliamentary majorities. In lieu of outright fraud at elections he obstructs the propaganda of his adversaries, persecutes them, and alters the electoral laws to regroup the voters in electoral districts to suit his convenience. Then, confident of the result, a few hours before the election he delegates his executive power to the chief of the Peronista Party and hands over custody of the electoral urns to the Army. In short, the anti-democratic procedures culminate in a fiction of meticulous legality.

II

Peronismo has, properly speaking, no political ideology. Peronismo is Perón, and he is not a man of principles, of ideas, but of

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ambition and resources. The resources are infinite, being unbounded by scruples or inhibitions. He confessed this in public, last January 5, to Argentina's recently promoted generals. In his speech on that occasion he described himself as *conductor* (leader) and asserted: "The leader leads; and if, in order to lead, he needs to make use of reliable measures, he should do so. What he must do is to lead his troops to victory." Hitler also preferred *Führer* to all other titles, and he concurred in the idea that the leader should not refrain from "reliable measures." However, unlike Hitler, Perón does not support any social doctrine. He seeks simply to maintain and prolong his power, and to that subordinates everything.

Only in this light can one understand the contradictions of the Peronista régime. Perón himself was never in the opposition. Before General Ramírez, President Castillo's Minister of War, helped carry out the coup d'état of June 4, 1943, and was placed at the head of the revolutionary government, Perón had been active only in the ministerial bureaucracy and in the barracks. Seeing, however, that the movement had no real chief, he set out with determination and astuteness to direct it from behind the scenes. He proved to possess not only more ambition but more capacity than any of his companions in arms and adventure, and soon was able to assume effective control. Generals Ramírez and Farrell, the heads of the provisional revolutionary government, were his puppets and he utilized them to the full in preparing for his election. He was wise enough not to wish to be President of the *de facto* government, a title in itself precarious and at the margin of the law. Already we see appearing, closely joined with the ambition for power, the attachment to the legal fiction as a means to power.

Instead of becoming President, Perón took over the Ministry of War and the Secretariat for Labor, which meant that he could not only keep an eye on the Army and the labor unions but would be in a position to pay court to them. With them in his hands, he was able to silence public opinion whenever it exerted pressure on the Government or cow the Government whenever it showed signs of acting independently. Of course he operated his marionettes secretly, and repeatedly denied that he was preparing his own presidential candidacy. On April 23, 1945, through the Under Secretariat for Information and the Press, he issued this emphatic public declaration: "I do not aspire to be President of the Repub-

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lic, and I shall energetically oppose any efforts which may be made to present me as a candidate." In those same days, nevertheless, he was organizing a political fusion based on his candidacy.

To bolster the fiction, he withdrew from the Government toward the end of 1945, but needless to say without letting go of the wires that controlled the puppets. Then he petitioned the Government—rather, ordered it—to decree the payment of a month's wages at the end of 1945 as a bonus to all of the employees and workers in the country. That bounty, coming less than 60 days before the election, naturally proved a most influential and effective stratagem. Meanwhile, the entire electoral proceedings took place in a state of siege. This was lifted for 24 hours on February 24, 1946, the very day of the election. The same thing occurred on November 11, 1951. Fiction again—the last-minute fiction of normality.

Stalinism, Nazism and Fascism never allow any party but the official one. Under those totalitarian régimes, state, government and party merge in a single entity and come under a unified all-embracing command. Peronismo cannot openly go to that extreme. To decree and legalize the single party system would be publicly to confess totalitarianism, to disown democracy; and that is not yet possible in the Americas. Perón has always said that he is realistic, and in that he is right. The "democratic fiction" is indeed vital for his régime. By mimicking democracy he has succeeded in deceiving many, both within the country and abroad. Some cheerfully allow themselves to be deceived; many more are genuinely deceived or at least bewildered.

Even without proclaiming the single party, however, Perón's dictatorship finds ruses which in practice preclude the existence of any competitor to his own *Justicialista* Party. No other party, for example, can lease or otherwise procure a place for holding a political rally. How is this possible, when in the last election the opposition parties obtained 2,500,000 votes? The effective agent is fear. The owner of a place loaned or rented for such a purpose knows that he would be persecuted and the premises permanently closed.

Similarly, in the past six years no political party except the Peronista has managed to secure the use of the radio for any of its members during the campaign. The radio is exclusively for the Government and its cohorts. There are no exceptions. Similarly,

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no partisan press exists—save, of course, the Peronista press. The extremely few independent newspapers struggle along under arbitrary restrictions of all sorts, in daily fear of the mortal blow. The tiny remnant of a free press is permitted to continue because the fact of its existence suits the prevailing fiction.

There is no practical difference, then, between the situation in Argentina and that in countries where only the single government party is legal. The only difference is in theory; and this is important only because it helps Perón maintain the current "democratic fiction." Even when an opposition political party succeeds in electing legislators, as did the Radical Party, they are obstructed in their routine duties, brought to trial for anything they may say and can be divested of their parliamentary titles. Quite ingenuously, the vice-president of the Peronista bloc of national deputies offered last September a draft resolution forbidding Radical deputies from making any speeches at all.

So long as it can be given the semblance of legality no act is considered arbitrary, regardless of the methods by which the "law" came into being or is given effect. As an instance take the confiscation of the Buenos Aires newspaper *La Prensa.* This independent newspaper was delivered over to coreligionaries of the President of the Republic who in his name and under his instructions boss the General Confederation of Labor. Because this arbitrary act was authorized by a law of Congress, President Perón alleged that it was not in fact a *coup de main.* As he said repeatedly, "a law was complied with." What the Constitution does not permit is done in the name of a law adopted *ad hoc.*

Argentina has a national Congress and provincial legislatures; but there is no parliamentary immunity. It has elections; but it does not have freedom for campaigning. It has newspapers; but it does not have freedom of the press. It has judges; but there is no justice. The free expression of public opinion, democracy's cardinal virtue, indeed its raison d'être, has vanished. Adulation of the Government is free, and can—and must be—listened to. Analysis or criticism of the Government is not free, and cannot—and must not—be listened to. The hulk of democratic institutions exists, but not democracy. The automaton is not a man. What exists is deceit.

Not long ago, on November 15, 1951, President Perón gave a speech before some workers from South American countries who had been invited to Buenos Aires by the General Confederation

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of Labor and by the Government to witness the general elections of November 11. Perón told them: "We are proceeding toward the syndicalist state, the old dream of the human community. . . . I still maintain political forms because we are in the throes of evolution." Involuntarily, the fiction is admitted—"I *still* maintain" the forms! With greater truth he might have said "democratic" instead of "political" forms—but that would have let the cat out of the bag.

Even the reference to syndicalism is not valid; it is another fiction for the unionist audience. There can be no syndicalism without syndical autonomy, and in Argentina the syndicates are merely bureaucratic dependencies. At present they neither govern nor influence those who govern. The Government controls, through pseudo-syndicates. A triumvirate of ex-workers is at the head of the General Confederation of Labor, just as Generals Ramírez and Farrell were at the head of the Government from June 1943 to June 1946. The wires of the General Confederation of Labor (the *C.G.T.*) pass through the hands of the President's wife, but are manipulated directly and personally by the President.

The *C.G.T.* is the most important mechanism of the Government. It is the Government's real party. It is the executive arm for carrying out sanctions and persecutions. Not merely does it clench nearly the whole of the proletariat within its single fist. The variety of its functions is indicated by the fact that when generals, colonels and civilians were accused in the abortive revolution of September 28, 1951, it was the heads of the *C.G.T.* who carried out the arrests. In Argentina if the *C.G.T.* decides to punish a laborer he will thenceforth find no work. The police obey the *C.G.T.* The power of that organization is plenary.

In these circumstances, to call the *C.G.T.* a syndicalist body is as wrong as to class the Peronista Party as a political entity. Both are stage settings of the Argentine puppet-theater. But this is not to deny the *C.G.T.*'s effective social and political strength. Its orders are carried out in the farthest corner of the country—automatically, but whether eagerly or reluctantly is another matter. Over the radio it controls the thought of millions of men. No real syndicalist organization exists, but there does exist the power of the *C.G.T.*, in the same fashion that though a government may not have public opinion in its favor its orders nonetheless are carried out. The psychological effect of the voice of command is ex-

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traordinary; governments make themselves obeyed even when they are discredited and ready to fall.

III

The universities of our continent and students of the political sciences should investigate and analyze the Argentine case, not in order to remedy it but to avoid its repetition in other American countries. The cure rests in the hands of the Argentine people themselves. But the possibility that the phenomenon may recur is of continental interest.

Political pathology is very similar in methods and aims to human pathology. In either case, the study of diseases requires that the origin, symptoms and possibility of extension or contagion of the illness be determined. From a distance, or in the absence of careful observation, it would certainly appear strange if not impossible that a régime so abnormal and violent as Peronismo should last in Argentina for more than five years. Before us, however, is the stark fact. From the seat of the Argentine Government, taken by assault, a type of totalitarian rule has been cumulatively strengthened—a rule which is new in our hemisphere—new, as has been pointed out above, for its painstaking hypocrisy rather than for its progressive violence.

The democratic fiction, the mimicry of democratic institutions, is the defensive cloak of the Peronista régime. Its modes of combat are bribery, lies and fear. It corrupts, deceives and intimidates. These three means have been used on the internal and external fronts; on the former they were effective, on the latter they were not.

Experience shows that lies, bribery and terrorism generally miscarry in international politics. Perón declared, and the statement is documented, that Mussolini made many smart moves and a few errors and that he, Perón, would not repeat the errors. In spite of studying the Duce firsthand in Italy, however, he forgot or failed to notice that the use of lies, bribery and terrorism on the international front failed Mussolini, and even Hitler.

To prevail even temporarily, the lie demands an environment in which there is no freedom of speech and press. Such an environment can be created in a national sphere, but it never becomes world-wide. The lie loses efficacy and disappears if faced with free information and subjected to free discussion and comparison with the truth.

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There is not enough money available for bribery to gain full sway internationally; and in any case today's bribe-taker becomes tomorrow's enemy if instalments are not kept up. The money lavishly squandered by the Peronista régime in the Americas and Europe has given very meager results. Outside the borders of Argentina there are not ten newspapers of importance that sing Perón's praises or seek to justify his régime. As soon as he took office, General Perón hastily sent the Argentine Senator, Diego Luis Molinari, aboard the battleship *Rivadavia* on a propaganda mission around the American continent—to spread the good news of the Peronista apostolate and of its alleged democratic and Americanist faith. The ship's storerooms bulged with gifts ranging from tens of thousands of refrigerated turkeys to gold bracelets and packages of dollars. The hubbub caused by the mission ended along with the money and the presents. At one point billions of dollars were offered for establishing an international import-export bank in the Caribbean area under the aegis of Peronismo. The collapse of this ridiculous attempt at continental bribery wrote finis to the political career of the battleship's fantastic navigator.

And how can a government sow fear throughout the whole world? Hitler and Mussolini devoted themselves to frightening the two hemispheres, and their fate is well known. Perón is not apt to succeed where two such redoubtable protagonists have failed.

Unhappily, however, bribery, lies and fear implanted and implemented by a strong and determined government can be highly effective within a country where there is no freedom of opinion or the press, where the parliamentary function of enlightenment and control is nullified, and where justice has lost its independence and finds itself subservient to the government. In such an environment the big lie leads the way, bribery bears abundant fruit, and fear dissipates and annuls all individual efforts of will. A mere human being feels himself blind, deaf, abandoned.

In Argentina today every increase in salary or wages is obtained by an employee or laborer through the agency and grace of Perón. There is no other way of obtaining it. And the over-all increase, from 1946 to the present, represents many times the initial bonus of 1945. Periodic petitions are presented through the syndical officials, sometimes at weekly intervals, as if for a gift; and the Minister of Labor, the President or his wife makes the

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final decision. Out of each increase a sum proportionate to one month goes as a forced "donation" into the treasury of the Eva Perón Social Foundation—in addition to the several days' pay which also winds up in the same bank account every year. The Government, *i.e.* Perón, therefore emerges as a kind of Santa Claus disbursing funds among employees and workers.

Under the basic system of compensating salary increases with price increases, and vice versa, the Government keeps capital and workers in line and also plays up to them. In this sort of race both believe themselves victors. Only when one lives under a régime that forbids expression of public opinion does one realize how long the crudest frauds can go unrecognized.

In view of the continuous increase in prices, the employee and laborer still have a certain margin of advantage as a result of the freezing of rents since 1943. Of course Perón makes the most of this, besides emphasizing that he gives the working masses pay increases while allegedly combatting the rise in prices. Employees and laborers receive much more pay, in terms of pesos, than they did six years ago; and when they discover that their monthly earnings are losing their purchasing power they place the blame on the industrialists and merchants who raise prices. Then they run to Perón and get a pay increase. Thus there is a substantial reason why the masses play along with the régime. Other aspects of the vast problem they perceive with much difficulty and only very slowly. Meanwhile the cost of living reached 394.4 in May 1951, from an index of 100 in 1943, according to official statistics based on official prices—prices which in reality are largely exceeded despite the rent-freezing which was mentioned above.

The rise in the cost of living is indeed making alarming progress. Between August 1950 and the same month in 1951 it went from 299.9 to 448.6, or a rate of increase of 50 percent a year. The most recent indices have not been officially published, but it is known that they reveal a still more accelerated tempo. The inflation can be gauged by the following figures. Six months after the inauguration of Perón's Government (December 1946) the media of payment totaled 11 billion pesos in round numbers; in December 1951 the figure was 40 billion pesos. Between 1946 and 1951 the circulating medium rose from 2.7 to 14.5 billion. Bank credits, which in December 1945 came to 3.7 billion, exceeded 23.7 billion by the end of 1950.

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IV

If an Argentinian is able to stifle his moral and juridical principles he undoubtedly finds that to be a Peronista brings him great benefits, while to be an oppositionist carries major risks. In an exhortation to the Central Committee and regional delegates of the *C.G.T.* on August 9, 1950, in the Presidential residence at Olivos, General Perón summed the situation up crudely: "Let us be well aware of who are our friends and who are our enemies. Let us give all to the friend—and to the enemy nothing, not even justice." It was the President of a Republic with democratic institutions who spoke those words. And the worst of it is that his words precisely indicate what has taken place in the Republic since he became its leader.

"To the enemy nothing, not even justice." Consequently the jails are full of prisoners who have for years awaited the end of their trials, and the number of Argentine citizens in voluntary exile continues to mount. In connection with the attempted military uprising on September 28 of last year, many civilians and retired Army officers were arrested, confined in the penitentiary of Buenos Aires, and subjected to much harsher treatment than that undergone in the same prison by persons convicted of serious common crimes. Some were questioned by judges, others were not. All were locked up for at least two weeks incommunicado in cramped cells. They saw no one except a guard who was under orders not to talk; they were not allowed to have books, paper, pencil or spectacles. Under Argentine laws, and even in current practice, such complete and prolonged incarceration is quite new. After a further three months of somewhat relaxed imprisonment the prisoners were released, without any judicial condemnation ever having been handed down; they were released, as they had been arrested, without explanation.

To justify such excesses it was argued that the country finds itself "in an internal state of war according to legal stipulation." No such thing as "internal state of war," however, exists in the text of the Constitution. A law violating the Constitution is all that substantiates the fiction. Incarceration under such a provision also flagrantly violates the Declaration of Human Rights, signed by Argentina. In this regard the Declaration states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts

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violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." "Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty." Nevertheless, political prisoners in Argentina have been treated worse than convicts and subsequently set free as innocent persons. Among them were ex-generals, university professors, writers, lawyers, doctors and journalists, all with distinguished careers in their country and many of them with international reputations.

Ever since just before the general elections of November—and no one knows for how much longer—the Argentine Government has taken over Calle Florida, in the city of Buenos Aires, for propagandizing its activities, all under the party label *justicialista.* This narrow, lively, commercial street of the port city, so full of tradition, has been converted into virtually a tunnel. Huge scaffoldings, bearing Peronista photographs, statistics, slogans and emblems, cover both sides of the street. The fronts of the tall buildings have disappeared behind the posters, and the whole length of the artery is draped with Argentine flags. The hundreds of shops lining the street have been obliged to offer their show-windows for displaying propaganda drawings and pictures of Perón and his wife.

This hideous and inflammatory propaganda tunnel, through which thousands constantly circulate, boxed in by eulogies of their oppressors and their official works, is a symbol of how the Argentine people live today. On all sides they can see only what the Government chooses to display to them. And at every hour of the day and night blaring loudspeakers repeat Peronista jingles, party songs and phrases from speeches by Juan and Eva Perón. It is the symbol of a régime which regulates what the people may see and hear, which makes them live in near darkness, a captive audience submerged in propaganda. The tunnel of the Calle Florida exemplifies what is happening in Argentina.

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THE WORLD BANK AT WORK

By Eugene R. Black

ANYONE who reads the newspapers will agree that the mid-century is a time of turmoil. Whether it can become an era of increasing stability in international affairs depends, in part, on the measures taken to strengthen the Atlantic Community. It also depends on what advances can be achieved in other areas which are still free from Soviet Communist domination but are not yet the full beneficiaries of twentieth century progress. The free world will not remain free if the hunger of millions of human beings for progress is neglected. Instead, it will go on being vulnerable to encroachments from without and to disputes within. A stable world cannot be built out of populations engaged in a tooth-and-nail struggle for a poor subsistence.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been at work throughout the free world making loans to increase production and raise living standards. At the end of January 1952 it had helped finance productive projects on six continents, in 25 of the Bank's member nations. It arrived on the European scene in advance of the Marshall Plan, with half a billion dollars of investment to help in the postwar reconstruction of Western Europe. Since then, the Bank has turned its attention increasingly to less highly developed countries, which are now its main field of operations.

Capital has been provided by the Bank for a wide variety of undertakings. These include, among other things, industrial enterprises (chiefly in Europe), electric power production and distribution (chiefly in Latin America), farm improvement and mechanization, flood control and irrigation, railways, highways, shipping and port development. Loans total $1,265,000,000. For the most part, they have been made in United States dollars. But British pounds, Canadian dollars, French francs and other currencies of the member states have also been loaned, and some Swiss francs as well. When account is taken of sums spent or committed by borrowers and other investors, the total cost of projects completed or going forward with the help of the Bank comes to more than 3 billion dollars. These sums are the accumulated result of five years of lending.

In every way the Bank seeks to accelerate the speed of develop-

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ment in its member countries. The rate of lending is being increased as fast as possible—subject always to the limitation that more will not be loaned than the borrowing country can utilize effectively and has a reasonable prospect of repaying. But the financing of development faces many formidable difficulties. Most of the underdeveloped countries lack technicians and entrepreneurs; experience in public and private business is limited; disease and illiteracy hold down productive ability; and the dearth of basic facilities such as electric power and transportation further restricts the opportunity for the fruitful application of capital. These limitations deter international investment, and inhibit the productive use of such funds as the underdeveloped countries themselves possess in potentially useful amounts. In short, the problem of lifting living standards is not just to provide capital, but to help create conditions and skills for using it effectively.

The World Bank tries to approach its task with all of these considerations in mind. Through lending, it assists in raising productivity and providing basic facilities on which further productive investment can be built. It frequently gives technical assistance not only in planning and carrying out a project, but in preparing for successful operation after completion. This does more than help ensure the effective use of loans; since borrowers always finance a substantial part of the costs of their projects out of their own resources, such assistance aids underdeveloped countries to use their own capital expertly.

The Bank is owned by the member nations, and it does its business in these countries. This special relationship gives an unusual opportunity for close and friendly counsel. Through such counsel we can, I hope, help our members take action in many fields which will mobilize neglected energies and resources. Our lending operations, in other words, are intended to stimulate economic progress which goes beyond particular projects and to help create conditions which will encourage greater private initiative and a greater flow of private capital. This is essential. Desirable and necessary as governmental action may be in many instances, individual enterprise and private resources are indispensable ingredients of economic progress.

II

However, while the Bank is always concerned with the broad economic problems of member countries, its work as an investor

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normally begins with specific loans and loan projects. Here is where the borrower and the Bank come to grips with the problem of applying capital creatively and efficiently, and where it makes its most immediate contribution to increasing production, raising living standards and opening opportunities for further investment. It seeks to finance those projects which will bring the most important benefits to the borrowing country in the shortest time. Sometimes member countries can be shown that proposed projects do not deserve high priority, and can be helped to choose and carry out more pressing enterprises. In any case, the Bank does not provide loans simply for the convenience of the borrower. It has declined to make loans which, while sound from a credit standpoint, would merely enable the client to avoid the necessity of making better use of his own resources. The undertakings financed must be economically justified.

A major test of any project the Bank is asked to finance is whether, directly or indirectly, it will increase production. Farm production is fundamental in the underdeveloped countries. Agriculture is the chief economic activity in most of them, and the pressure of growing populations on available food supply is one of their major problems. Moreover, productive agriculture is usually a basic requisite for ultimate industrialization. Farm productivity must rise if manpower is to be released for industry; farm earnings must increase if a healthy market is to be provided for local manufactures. And the export of agricultural commodities is one of the important ways of paying for imports of machinery and equipment needed for the establishment of industry.

Of two simultaneous loans made by the Bank when it first turned from European reconstruction to development financing, one was a loan to provide machinery to Chilean farmers. Since that time, the Bank has engaged in a wide variety of lending to increase agricultural production and earnings—among other things, to help finance farm mechanization in Colombia, Nicaragua and Paraguay, land clearance in India, irrigation in Chile and Thailand, flood control in Thailand and Iraq, grain-storage facilities in Turkey and Nicaragua, and individual farm improvements in Iceland. Agriculture also benefited directly from the Bank's early reconstruction loans to Denmark, France and the Netherlands. In all, the Bank's lending in direct support of agriculture and the allied pursuits of forestry and fishery amounts to $127,000,000. And this is only part of the picture; many other

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loans by the Bank, particularly for transportation and power, have been designed to promote agricultural production indirectly. Much more agricultural investment is undoubtedly needed, and the Bank stands ready to supply it. But patience and care are required. The adequate preparation of sound agricultural projects is a time-consuming effort which may involve simultaneous and related studies of such matters as markets, soil, seed, cultivation methods, topography and water resources.

Transportation is an indispensable aid to all economic development. Without access to markets the farmer will not fully use his land, and will grow only what he needs for his own consumption. Industry will be unable to reach its potential customers and raw materials will lie idle in a world that hungers for them. Poor facilities for international transport reduce export earnings and raise the cost of needed imports. The basic need in the underdeveloped countries is for fundamental facilities: roads and railroads to link farms and towns and open up new land, adequate ports and dockside equipment. In some countries, difficult surface terrain may make investment in facilities for carrying cargo by air both economical and beneficial.

The Bank's lending for transportation, including a minor amount in the related field of telecommunications, totals $273,000,000. Some of this went to Europe (especially France and the Netherlands), but loans for transportation in the less developed countries are an important part of the Bank's portfolio. The first such loan, one of $32,800,000, was made in 1949 to purchase rolling stock and spare parts for the Indian Railways. As I write, the most recent loan of any kind is for the improvement of the port of Callao, Peru. In between, funds have been provided for port development in Thailand and Turkey, for highway development in Colombia, Nicaragua and Ethiopia, and loans totalling more than $90,000,000 have supported programs embracing a variety of transport facilities in the Belgian Congo, Jugoslavia and the Union of South Africa.

Another foremost requirement of economic development is the electric power so essential to modern industry. Electricity likewise benefits agriculture by making possible pumping and irrigation, and all the other efficiencies of rural electrification; and it provides light for schools and homes. It is urgently needed in most of the underdeveloped countries, and, while generalizations are dangerous, I would venture the guess that in many countries

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investment in power brings a proportionately higher economic return than any other kind. The Bank's largest investment in the less developed countries—more than $300,000,000 in all—has been made for this purpose. Power projects, for the most part still under construction, are situated in Australia, Finland, Iceland, India and six countries of Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay. The development of electric power in Latin America is particularly significant. For instance, in Mexico, where power is supporting the rapid growth of both industry and agriculture, projects financed by the Bank will by 1955 add 700,000 kilowatts of generating capacity to the 1,000,000 that existed when the Bank made its first loan for electricity there four years ago.

The largest single category of financing by the Bank is for industrial development, including manufacturing and mining. It has amounted to more than $540,000,000—most of it, however, lent for the urgent needs of economic reconstruction in Western Europe. The Bank has not been comparably active in promoting industrialization in the less developed countries. There are several good reasons for this. Industrial enterprise is, *par excellence,* the province of the private entrepreneur and investor. The Bank's Charter requires that loans to private borrowers be guaranteed by the government of the country in which the project is located. It is politically very difficult for any government to guarantee a loan to a private enterprise because it lays itself open to the charge of favoritism—a charge which is likely to be made no matter how useful the private project may be. There may also be difficulties for the firm sponsoring the project, since it may fear that the government's guarantee of its loan will be taken to imply a right to interfere with the conduct of its business. A firm may be particularly reluctant to agree to a governmental guarantee if the enterprise happens to be one not visibly affected by the public interest, such as a shoe factory or a glass plant.

Finally, in many underdeveloped countries the lack of basic facilities, of the kinds the Bank is trying to create, means that industrialization must begin modestly with small and light industries; but it is extremely difficult—as well as costly—for the Bank to assess the comparative economic value, including the marketing possibilities, of many small industrial enterprises and to make judgments at a distance on the merits of managements and organizations.

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The Bank's interest in industrialization is keen, nevertheless, and ways are being found to promote it. While the Bank has not yet made a direct loan to any individual manufacturing or allied enterprise, it has provided funds, both in the early period of lending in Europe and in the later loans to underdeveloped countries, for groups of industrial projects, most of them related within a program of reconstruction or development. Much of a $100,000,000 loan to Australia, for instance, is for industrialization, as is the $28,000,000 in European currencies loaned to Jugoslavia. The Bank has helped organize new banking institutions, or consortiums of existing institutions, in Ethiopia, Mexico and Turkey and has lent them a total of $30,000,000 for re-lending to individual business enterprises. In these latter cases, while the Bank receives the required governmental guarantee of repayment of the loan, no similar guarantee is required for the loans made to the ultimate borrower with its funds.

I am sure that in time the Bank will be able to make direct loans for individual industrial undertakings. We obviously would wish to give serious consideration to any particular enterprise which promises important foreign-exchange earnings or savings to a country, especially if it would at the same time increase the supply of any valuable product for which a sustained and long-term demand reasonably can be anticipated. Such a case might arise, for instance, in connection with coal production in Europe. In addition, the Bank is now studying a proposal—originally made in the report to President Truman by the International Development Advisory Board, headed by Nelson Rockefeller—for the establishment of a new institution to help private enterprises by doing two things the World Bank may not do. The proposed International Finance Corporation, financed by governmental subscriptions, would make equity investments and would make loans without governmental guarantee. A corporation of this kind might be able to do much to stimulate both local and international investment in private enterprise in the underdeveloped countries that would be of the greatest advantage. The Bank's own study of the matter will be reported to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, at the request of that body, in May or June.

III

All this indicates, I think, that the Bank does not fling money

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into an economic void. We do not plant steel mills in the desert; we do not help put street railways in a country whose first need is for port development. Working with the borrower, we try to select loan projects which are appropriate to the nation and the economic setting in which they are to be placed. We are particularly glad when we are able to finance not merely one isolated project, but several projects which will have a cumulative effect on a country's economic life. In Ethiopia, for instance, we have made separate loans for highways, for telephone and radio communication, and for a development bank. The roads should give farmers and stock-raisers an incentive to added production through easier access to markets; the development bank should be able to make loans for processing plants which will increase the earnings from Ethiopia's agricultural exports; and new communications, making possible the dissemination of market information and the control of freight shipments, should greatly aid the country's domestic and international commerce in agricultural products. In Thailand, the Bank has made separate loans for irrigation, for railway improvement, and for the development of the port of Bangkok. Here again, there should be a chain reaction, based on the production of more rice and greatly improved facilities for transporting rice and other goods to consumers both inside and outside the country.

In a few cases the Bank has already been able to help provide funds which are related to an entire national or sectional program of development, and we hope there will be more in the future. The $10,000,000 Italian loan, which will pay for some of the import needs arising from the first year of the ten-year program for the development of the long-depressed area of south Italy, is one of this kind. And a $100,000,000 loan to Australia, for example, supports a wide variety of private and public undertakings throughout every major sector of the Commonwealth's economy. The $28,000,000 of European currencies lent to Jugoslavia will also affect every major field of production in that country.

The immediate results of the Bank's loans are, of course, the most striking and tangible. Loans are designed to enable the borrower to earn by his own production considerably more than the amount of the Bank's investment. Eventually, the $8,500,000 loan for land clearance in India, for example, will help make possible the production of about 1,000,000 additional tons of wheat each year which, at current prices, would cost India about $95,-

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000,000 to import, not including shipping costs—in other words, half the amount of the $190,000,000 loan which India obtained from the United States for the import of wheat.

Less visible but potentially even more important are the mutual confidence and respect which these lending operations can establish between the Bank and the borrower. Such intimate relationships, particularly in underdeveloped countries, give the Bank an opportunity to help its members master techniques for using capital, whether that capital comes from the Bank or not. The borrower and the Bank examine a proposed project together with great care at the outset. Discussion often indicates that the borrower's experience is inadequate in important technical or administrative areas, and the Bank can then provide additional knowledge, either through members of its own technical staff or expert consultants employed for the purpose. Many projects now under construction would either have been impossible, or executed badly with long delay, had not this kind of assistance been available in the preliminary phase of loan discussions. Advice has been provided in such diverse matters as engineering, bond issues, corporate organization, and procurement methods. Knowledge and experience thus gained should be useful on future projects.

When a loan has been made, the borrower sends regular reports of progress to the Bank, and the Bank's representatives visit the site of the project for on-the-spot observation and discussion. In this connection, the Bank tries to help its members develop adequate methods for budgeting and accounting, and for controls of materials and manpower. In some instances, methods learned from the Bank have already been applied to projects which it has not financed; indeed, one of the Bank's member countries now seems likely to apply these auditing and control methods to all the development projects which it is carrying forward. When the client is likely to need assistance in operating a completed project, the Bank is ready to help work out devices looking to that end. Thus highway loans to both Ethiopia and Colombia provide for training programs to enable local labor and management to take over road maintenance and administration in due course.

Just as the Bank is willing, on occasion, to finance broad programs of development rather than individual projects, so it may offer its members technical assistance which transcends individual loans. In 1949 the Bank sent a 14-member mission to Colombia at the invitation of the Government to make a comprehensive

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survey of that country's resources and to help prepare a plan for using them to the best advantage. The group included experts in such fields as transportation, power, agriculture, industry and public health, as well as economists specializing in problems of national income and accounts, and monetary and fiscal policy. Its report was published in 1950, and was followed late last year by recommendations for specific action by a non-partisan committee of outstanding Colombians. Already, as a result, Colombia has made budgetary and banking reforms, lifted exchange controls, adopted a more liberal attitude toward foreign capital, and successfully checked inflation; and we are continuing to work closely with Colombia on a variety of development problems which the mission and the committee found important. Such results may well prove to be worth more than the direct returns from the $30,000,000 of loans the Bank has made in Colombia.

Similar missions have been sent to Turkey, Cuba, Guatemala, Iraq, Surinam and Ceylon, and at this writing the Bank is preparing to send one to Jamaica. In Nicaragua, a somewhat different technique is being followed. On the basis of recommendations being made on the spot by a Bank representative, who calls on outside experts for particular technical advice, the Government is drawing up a development program and adopting the fiscal and administrative measures essential to executing it. The results achieved by survey missions depend on the attitude of the receiving country; and, except in the case of Colombia, it is too early to say what they will be. But this kind of collaboration between the Bank and its member governments is potentially a major instrument in promoting economic development.

IV

I have given a good deal of space to describing what the Bank can and does do; perhaps it would be well to close with a word about what it has *not* done, and is not likely to do. In the first place, the volume of lending cannot be fixed at some predetermined, hypothetical level. The Bank and its borrowers must base their joint operations on projects and programs which are soundly conceived and have real economic value. To draw up such projects and programs takes time. Real progress is being made, but the Bank's capacity to provide capital has by no means yet been outrun by the number of feasible plans in existence that ought to be financed through public loans. The rate of lending

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will increase, but the rate of increase will depend on specific investment needs, not on theoretical assumptions as to global requirements for capital.

It is obvious, too, that if the Bank is to succeed in stimulating the flow of private capital, the integrity of our lending operations must be preserved. This is of the highest importance to the Bank and its members, and it means that we cannot and will not lend more than borrowing countries can afford to repay. Nor can the Bank tailor its lending to political purposes of any kind. We can and do hope that the Bank's operations will, in the long run, make a major contribution to the easing of international tensions. But loans made for political reasons are likely to be so modified and distorted as to fall short of achieving their maximum economic effect. Above all, the Bank believes that no amount of outside capital can relieve any of its member countries of their own heavy responsibilities for economic development. The social institutions of a country, the distribution of wealth and opportunity among the people, the energy and competence of government administration, and the character of the policies governing the use of the country's resources—all these factors bear quite as directly on the speed with which the country can be developed as does the amount of foreign capital available.

There is no substitute for internal effort. Foreign capital cannot be broadly effective in the absence of local capital. Outside advice will be useless unless there are roots which it can nurture. At best, outside aid can provide only a margin over and above what a people are doing for themselves. The margin may indeed be the difference between failure and success, but only when the local effort is substantial—in a word, when a nation has a will to develop. There must be a drive within the country itself to improve living standards, and a government which is responsive to that drive. Fortunately, more and more countries throughout the world are beginning to show this determination to improve the lot of their peoples. There is much work to be done—a challenging work of great importance to the free world and to mankind. The Bank is proud to be helping to carry it on.

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INDIA: DOS AND DON'TS FOR AMERICANS

By M. R. Masani

A VISITOR from India is constantly reminded how great is the fund of good will for the Indian people in the United States, and how keen the interest in their problems. No less evident is a perplexity, bordering on dismay, in regard to certain aspects of India's foreign policy; and it is shared by Americans who have a record of friendship and support for India in her past struggle for independence. The bewilderment and concern, not always clearly expressed, revolve around this question: Why does India, which has in her Constitution chosen the democratic system of government and has dealt severely with the Indian Communists who are carrying out the Cominform directive to disrupt and destroy the new Republic, now fail, when she turns her sights outward to the rest of the world, to show the same clarity in distinguishing between democracy and totalitarianism? Why should India profess equal friendship for the democracies on one hand and the Soviet bloc on the other? And what can Americans do about it?

I believe that American public opinion can be helped to an understanding of India's international attitudes, and that there are steps which the United States can take to win the friendship of the Indian people. But first it must be admitted that this paradox of a double standard of morality—one for domestic problems and another for international problems—does exist in India. It is not to be located in India's policy of refusing to enter into military alliances, however, or in her policy of state neutrality in a cold war or a shooting war, or in her recognition of the Chinese Communist régime. Whether or not such policies are wise, there is nothing paradoxical about their adoption by a democratic state. No one could question the devotion of Sweden and Switzerland to the free way of life, for example, yet both have pursued policies of neutrality and intend to pursue them.

Where a certain influential section of Indian opinion does tend to part company with other neutral countries is in an attempt to "think neutral" which goes beyond the needs of state policy. This neutralist attitude is currently dominant in India. Not that it is representative of the Indian people as a whole—for one reason,

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because the broad masses of the people in the villages are largely unconscious of the world abroad and its problems. And it is important to note that even among the intelligentsia who mould public opinion and influence government there are thousands of men and women who do not share that approach. Evidence of a revulsion of feeling among intellectuals was forthcoming in March last year when the Indian Congress for Cultural Freedom, attended by more than 100 prominent writers and leaders in cultural fields, adopted with near unanimity a Declaration of Cultural Freedom which concluded with this resounding rejection of neutralism: "Indifference or neutrality towards this totalitarian tyranny amounts to a renunciation of the Indian tradition and our human heritage, and a betrayal of all spiritual values."

All this notwithstanding, it must be conceded that a disturbingly large and vocal section of opinion in India is able to express a neutralist attitude without being actively challenged. There are two manifestations of this point of view, both of which must be understood.

II

First, there is a needless attempt to justify the policy of state neutrality by adopting an attitude of "a plague on both your houses." Those who take this attitude profess that there is little to choose between the two "camps" of American capitalism and Soviet Communism; they assert, as did a speaker not long ago, that "the differences between Henry Ford and Joseph Stalin might not be very great." Certainly this is an attempt to straddle the great moral issue of our time—that of democracy versus totalitarian dictatorship; and those who do so are driven to adopt the double standard of morality—an exacting one for the democracies, a complaisant one for the dictatorships. The result is a refusal to see any difference between light grey and deep black.

The origins of this effort to find a point of balance halfway between two unequal quantities are to be found in the acceptance of the idea of an "Anglo-American bloc." This concept was the creation of Cominform propaganda. As the writer had occasion to observe in the course of a speech during a debate on foreign policy on the floor of the Indian Parliament as far back as December 6, 1950, one of the reasons why we in India have been inhibited, despite a basically sound policy, from defending our part of the world and building a system of collective security is the

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misconception that "there are two power blocs, that both are of the same quality and level and that we can, therefore, be equally independent or detached from both." This is a basic fallacy. It lies at the root of the distortions that sometimes take place in the otherwise correct policy of deciding each issue on its merits.

A newer and more disturbing manifestation of this line of thinking is a tendency to idealize and glorify the Chinese Communist dictatorship. Here again the question is not so much that of diplomatic recognition of the Mao Tse-tung régime as of entertaining illusions about it and of turning a blind eye to its shocking record of terror at home and aggression abroad. This is probably the reflection of a desire to transfer from Russia to China illusions that still linger in certain quarters. The hope is doomed to failure, since the dictatorship in China is commencing its career as an offshoot of the Soviet dictatorship at a period when every idealistic and progressive impulse of the October Revolution has already been spent and discarded. The proof is there for all who care to see. While Soviet Russia did not trespass for the first two decades of its existence on one inch of foreign soil, for example, Communist China has already aggressed in Korea and Tibet and is believed to be intervening in Indo-China. The régime has already stated that more than 1,500,000 political opponents have been put to death.

Thus, Mr. K. M. Panikkar, India's Ambassador in Peking, delivered an address in New Delhi in October 1951, in the course of which he is reported to have declared that the Peking régime "is not a Communist government" but "a broad-based coalition" that has launched "a dynamic social revolution." Mr. Panikkar had no doubt that 95 percent of the Chinese people regarded the régime as their own, for they were associated with the formulation and execution of the government's policy at all stages and all levels. The alarming extent to which good and well-meaning people may be misinformed and misled is perhaps best evidenced by the words of welcome in New Delhi to a Chinese Communist "cultural" mission last November by an eminent and respected academic figure like Dr. Zakir Hussain, Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh University, delivered in the presence of a distinguished gathering including cabinet ministers:

> Already your effort has borne fruit. The Peoples' Government has united nearly 500 million people as they were never before united. It has given the "land to the tiller;" it has generated a tremendous enthusiasm for produc-

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tion; it has brought together the peasant, the worker, the petty *bourgeoisie* and the national *bourgeoisie* in one great urge to build up a political and economic system in which each can make the fullest contribution and from which all can derive the greatest benefit. You have evolved the "common program" through full and free discussion and you have created a loyalty and devotion to the purposes of this program which assure its success. You have the best wishes of the Indian people for the attainment of the ends to which you aspire.

Perhaps it is not a matter for surprise that, founded on these quaint misconceptions, the suggestion is now being mooted in certain quarters in India that Communist China and India should jointly pledge themselves to respect the frontiers of the countries of Southeast Asia and that such a "guarantee" should then be made the basis for a demand for the withdrawal of American, British and French forces from the Asian mainland. This naïve acceptance of Mao Tse-tung's good faith does not appear to have been shaken by his duplicity over Tibet.[1]

"But why should this be so?" asks the harassed American observer. Why should otherwise reasonable people find it possible to believe such things in the face of the evidence that is available? Several psychological and emotional factors—some reasonable, others irrational—go into the making of neutralist sentiment in India as elsewhere. Perhaps the most important of these is the desire to assert a newly-found independence—the need of a newcomer on the international scene to make its existence felt. Nobody has seriously suggested that India is a satellite of the Kremlin, and the need to prove our independence of the Soviets has not yet arisen. But the Soviet press and radio, and Chinese Communist propaganda as well (though less markedly in the past year), have consistently referred to the Indian Union as a "British colony" and its government as an agent of "Anglo-American imperialism." Hence the need—sometimes needlessly expressed—to prove that India is nobody's stooge.

[1] The most effective refutation of all these hopes and dreams has come from none other than Mao Tse-tung himself. Ten years ago, in "New Democracy," Mao wrote: "The world now lives in an era of revolution and war, a new era, where capitalism is definitely dying and Socialism is beginning to flourish. In the international environment of the middle of the twentieth century, there are only two ways open to all decent people in the colonies, and the semi-colonies. They must either go over to the side of the imperialist front or take part in the world revolution. They must choose between these two. There is no other way."

Two years ago, Mao was even more specific: "We belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the U.S.S.R. and we can only look for genuine friendly aid from that front and not from the imperialist front. . . . We also oppose the illusion of a third road. . . . In the world without exception one either leans to the side of imperialism or the side of Socialism. Neutrality is a camouflage."

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Secondly, the desire for security and survival works to create neutralist sentiment in India—mistakenly, it seems to me, but also understandably. "Why," people in India ask, "should we stick our necks out? Why provoke Stalin and Mao Tse-tung? Let the giants, America and Russia, fight it out by themselves. It's none of our business." To Americans it seems clear that collective security is the best insurance of national survival, that "peace is indivisible," that the experiences of Beneš, Jan Masaryk and Tito offer a lesson that no free nation dare ignore. And indeed, the fact is that the only provocation known to the Politburo is the one provided by friendliness or weakness or credulity. But these are considerations not yet present in the minds of people in general in India.

The third factor which produces this state of mind is the slowness with which old ideas disappear from men's minds and new ones take hold—in India as everywhere. British rule is recent and the memory of it is strong; it has not yet been supplanted by an awareness of the extent to which "Western imperialism" has receded. But the "Soviet myth" lingers and sincere men still make public references to the "great achievements" of the Soviet Union. The fact of Soviet imperialism has not yet sunk in; sometimes one feels that there is a lurking supposition that unless water lies between one country and another the relationship of imperialism cannot be said to exist.

Finally, there is a natural and often legitimate distaste in most foreign countries for certain aspects of American life, and irritation with some American policies. These normal responses are aggravated for Indians by economic and racial factors. The disparity in living standards between the United States and India is enormous, and, human nature being what it is, the instinctive reaction of a man who looks out from a slum at a mansion is not that of love for his more fortunately placed neighbor. Moreover, the past claims to superiority by "white" people have bred a heightened consciousness of color among the peoples of Asia and Africa. Every act of racial discrimination in the United States or elsewhere is used with devastating effectiveness by Communist propaganda. This racial factor is the Achilles heel of the United States and of all the Western countries in the clash of ideas in contemporary Asia.

All this adds up to a somewhat discouraging picture, and the American response is apt to be: "Isn't it, after all, up to the In-

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dian people to figure out where India's real interests lie? Isn't the question of her place in the free world primarily a matter for Indians to settle among themselves?"

Let it be conceded at once that it is. The main burden of convincing the Indian people of the nature of India's interest must fall on Indian shoulders. And yet such decisions are never reached without reference to what is happening in the rest of the world, and, above all now, what is done by the United States. What Americans do, individually and collectively, will inevitably tend to help or hinder the struggle for the mind and soul of India. What, then, should they do to help? The insistent questioning I have encountered in the United States on this point encourages me to venture for consideration a few general comments, and some specific ones.

III

Patience and tolerance are needed. Least helpful of all is an attitude of superior virtue. A plea for the exercise of what are, after all, nothing more than the ordinary Christian virtues can be supported by very concrete arguments in its behalf. They stem partly from the need for maintaining "the balance of mutuality" in the relations between the United States and her friends in the free world. And they refer partly to the record of confusion, vacillation and appeasement that characterized Western policy in general, including American policy, up to the time of the Communist aggression in Korea in June 1950. Righteous indignation at appeasement by India of Communist aggression in Tibet, for example, merely tempts those who are scolded to cite the record of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam—the attempted appeasement of the Soviet dictatorship by the surrender of the liberties of Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe. Indeed, going a little further back, I may be permitted to recall that, when Mayor of Bombay in 1943–44, I had occasion to make a public protest against the efforts made in Anglo-American wartime publicity to sell to the Indian people the virtue of what was then described as "your glorious Soviet ally." The campaign spread a good deal of confusion and illusion in the minds of the Indian people. The fact is that a large number of Indians today think now the way many Americans did a few years back—and perhaps with somewhat better excuse.

While, however, patience and tolerance are prerequisites to

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understanding and friendship, they are rather passive virtues. Something much more positive and dynamic is required if that third of the world which today occupies a peripheral position alongside the Iron Curtain is to be attracted to the side of the United States and the other democracies. The extent to which the United States places itself in the forefront of the fight for a world order based on the equality of peoples and of races will largely determine the amount of support it will rally to its side in India and the rest of Asia. The assistance given by the United States to the Indonesian people in freeing themselves from Dutch imperialism is still remembered in Asia. If, despite all the doubts and difficulties, America succeeds in her present effort to help the people of Viet-Nam repel the threat to their independence that comes from the Soviet agent Ho Chi Minh, and at the same time helps them free themselves from the relics of French domination, she will find that the Asian people have credited her with the achievement. The vigor of the fight against racial discrimination, whether in the United States or in the U.N., will also be noted. Such are the tests by which Asia will judge where the best hope of happiness and freedom for her peoples lies.

While pursuing such particular ends, it is vital that Americans take care not to identify themselves with the maintenance of the social and economic status quo in Asia. Least of all it is wise for the United States to picture itself abroad wholly in terms of "free enterprise." Free enterprise has undoubtedly "delivered the goods" in the United States, and is the basis of the country's prosperity; but free enterprise in Western Europe means something different; in Asia it is something else again. That it is a sufficient answer to India's overwhelming economic problems is widely questioned. Even those Indians who are conscious of the political dangers latent in centralized planning and the nationalization of industries are driven to advocate a mixed economy of state and free enterprise. The fact is that the United States is now a welfare state, as is every nation that takes responsibility for the unemployed; and a large part of American goods and services are provided by public enterprise in some form. The proper presentation of this development would go far to erase the picture of "reactionary, capitalist America," as painted by the Communists and their friends. The United States has no better ambassador-at-large in Asia than the one which bears the initials T.V.A. Every effort also needs to be made to spread knowledge of the fact that the United

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States has refused to discriminate between capitalist and Socialist régimes in implementing the program of the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security Administration.

IV

The question of help for underdeveloped countries is one which requires particular tact and understanding. What people in such lands want is to be helped to help themselves. If a friend of the United States were permitted to offer advice, he would say: "Do not let those who must have aid wait to beg for it; yet do not be provoked by ungraciousness." India, like other underdeveloped countries, has urgent and vital need for international economic aid. The basic problem is that the population is large and growing, yet production is low and stagnant. The average annual per capita income is Rs. 256, or $54, and population is increasing at the rate of about 4,000,000 a year. Obviously there can be little margin for the saving and investment needed to modernize techniques and tools and increase production—in other words, to raise the terribly low living standards that prevail. Indeed, one is driven to entertain the hypothesis that the Indian Union and the other new states like Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia and Israel, have been born a bit too late in history. They have secured the trappings of national sovereignty just at the moment when the attributes of sovereignty have shrunk and the nation-state seems on its way out. Distant countries have become near neighbors; economic and political coöperation are needed as never before. There is no longer a solution for national problems within the four corners of isolationism and national self-sufficiency, whether for the United States or for India.

Unfortunately, an ambivalent attitude toward the acceptance of economic aid from abroad has been common among influential and vocal sections of public opinion in India. There is on the one hand an awareness of India's needs, and a desire for assistance; but alongside of this there are reluctance and suspicion, springing from the fear that acceptance of such aid on a large scale may mean the loss of newly-found freedom. Thus, the same journal that one day publishes an editorial entitled "The Officious Samaritan" will, a few days later—without any feeling of inconsistency—complain bitterly about concentration of aid in Western Europe and the neglect of the undeveloped countries of Asia. Indian thinking on this subject has advanced noticeably

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in recent months; the draft outline of a Five Year Plan published by the Planning Commission of the Government of India is important evidence of the advent of a more positive approach. All the same, it is difficult to disagree with Professor D. T. Lakdawala, of the University of Bombay, when he writes in his book, "International Aspects of Indian Economic Development:" "To get foreign aid on the required scale, our attitude to foreign capital, direct and indirect, has to undergo a drastic change. There is some evidence of such a change, but the change needs to be carried much further."

Wisdom would seem to lie in recognizing the need of the common people for aid, and ignoring the false pride of a few that may be wounded. An Indian journal, which has attained a degree of objectivity in regard to our international attitudes rare in India, frankly faces these psychological difficulties: "As a people we do not have it in our tradition to ask for help even when we may need it; we remain tongue-tied when it comes to asking a favor; to ask for outside help is contrary to our conception of national dignity."[2] In this context the agreement recently reached between the Governments of India and the United States in regard to $50,000,000 aid for development in the current year is encouraging.

The lesson of China is sometimes misread in this connection. It was not a mistake for the United States to give aid to the Chinese National Government; the mistake lay in giving aid unconditionally, even though the Government was friendly. There is a good deal of talk to the effect that no strings must ever be attached to foreign aid. It is loose talk, for the interests of the people call for the attaching of some conditions to a large grant of funds. Everything depends, of course, on what the conditions are. If they involved interference in India's political or economic objectives, or in her foreign policy, they would not be acceptable to anybody in India. If, on the other hand, they were such as are attached to E.C.A. or M.S.A., calculated to ensure that the aid is devoted to the purposes for which it is intended and reaches the people for whom it is meant, they should be welcomed. A refreshing note in this connection was struck by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, one of the leading members of the Socialist Party of India, who visited the United States last year. Speaking in Bombay on May 4, 1951, he said that India may legitimately be

[2] *Thought*, Delhi, August 24, 1951.

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asked: 1, to check increase in population; 2, to revise laws and holdings of land so as to stimulate farmers to produce more and to encourage voluntary labor of reconstruction; 3, to cultivate new lands through a food army; 4, to develop industries based on the small machine; 5, to give an assurance that India will not provide military assistance to the enemy of the country giving aid. None of these conditions could, according to Dr. Lohia, be called interference in the internal affairs of India and all would further the world-wide fight against poverty and war. Without necessarily agreeing with the criteria suggested by Dr. Lohia, one can appreciate his willingness to realize the need to give as well as to take in an international relationship of this kind.

V

Certainly we must remember, however, that filling empty stomachs, while helpful, is not the whole answer to the problem of defeating Communism. Czechoslovakia is under a Communist dictatorship today, but not because her people were groaning in poverty in the months before the February 1948 coup. Whatever the causes of Czechoslovakia's vulnerability, empty minds and souls can provide as good a breeding ground for Communism as an empty stomach. The Communists understand this, and in India they are actively waging the civil war of ideas which today cleaves the world in two.

India needs American men and women who want to participate on the side of freedom in the world-wide civil war of ideas, and who will offer active comradeship to all those who would be their friends. In India, international Communism is concentrating not so much on the impoverished workers and peasants as on the intelligentsia, who are relatively better off. The pattern of Communist infiltration is no longer that of the twenties and thirties, when the goal was a mass revolution. It seeks to prepare a coup d'état on the Czech model, through control over a few key points in the national life. In furtherance of this aim, India is being flooded with literature from Russia and Communist China. The literature is in the English language, and is far superior both in quantity and quality to the material put out by the local Communists. The effort is obviously heavily subsidized; the literature sells at every street corner at a fraction of what must be the cost of producing it in Moscow and Peking, and transporting it to India.

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A leading member of the Indian Socialist Party has expressed the concern he felt during the recent election campaign when he found that the young men and women who came to solicit his autograph at the close of his meetings in the south asked him to inscribe the book that they were carrying; very often the book was "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" or "The Life of Joseph Stalin," printed by the Peoples' Publishing House, Moscow. The advance made by the Communist Party in the south of India is alarming. There is a great thirst for knowledge among young men and women in India, and the only attempt at a serious answer to the world's problems that is made available to them is that which comes from the Communists. When there is an intellectual vacuum, the enemies of freedom hasten forward to fill it. Can this constant poisoning of young minds fail to bear bitter fruit as the years pass?

What is the answer of the democracies to this challenge? Various books published in the West would be useful in this connection (Arthur Schlesinger's "The Vital Center" or Bertram Wolfe's "Three Who Made A Revolution," to cite only two); but they come to India in such small driblets and sell at such high prices that only a few scores of people can manage to get at them. Could not organizations such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the Freedom Crusade and the Committee for a Free Asia come forward to meet this challenge?

Toward the end of last year, Mr. Edward W. Barrett, then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, conceded that the United States was losing the world-wide cultural war with the Soviet Union in the face of the "gigantic propaganda offensive" launched by the Soviet Government. In Bombay, a columnist had asked a few weeks earlier why it was that Americans, who were the world's best advertisers, should fail so lamentably when it came to the question of presenting their own country in foreign lands. This failure is not the fault of the men and women in the U. S. Information Services and the Voice of America, who are performing a difficult and delicate task. Official agencies can, of their nature, perform only a small part of the work. The greater part of it must be undertaken by unofficial organizations and groups; and the greatest part of the burden of a counteroffensive against Communist infiltration in India must fall on the shoulders of Indians. But they need the support of those abroad who share their democratic values.

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Propaganda divorced from deeds, the printed word without the human presence, can have but a limited appeal. One American working with us in India can exert more influence than a large number of dollars or a heavy pile of literature. But how many Americans have come to India to identify themselves with their Indian fellow-democrats in the field? I know of one who came in a non-official capacity—sent out by the International Free Trade Union Committee sponsored by the American Federation of Labor—who achieved splendid results. I wonder if there are more than a dozen others who have come in the same spirit? And how many Indians are asked to participate in the international civil war on the side of the democracies?

VI

But of course there is more to the problem even than this. Ideological warfare cannot succeed unless diplomatic and military strength supply the foundation on which to build. People seldom rally to a cause, however just, if they feel that it is doomed to fail. It is justice holding the flaming sword that rouses masses of people to live, and, if need be, die, for a cause. I began this effort to suggest how India and the United States can come closer together by speaking of the need for patience and understanding from Americans; I would end by asking for firmness and strength. Neither set of qualities will serve without the other. To understand a point of view other than one's own does not mean that one must necessarily adopt it. Public opinion in the United States is relatively ahead of opinion in Europe and in Asia in recognizing, however belatedly, the Kremlin's aim of world conquest and domination; and it is more prepared to meet this challenge politically, and, if need be, militarily. Consistent democrats in India are glad that there is at least one democracy that is equipped with this clear understanding. Outside the ranks of the Communists and their fellow-travellers there is, indeed, little honest doubt in India of the good intentions of the American people, and of their love of peace and freedom. There is, however, considerable doubt about American strength and sagacity. Let me say frankly that confidence in the capacity of the United States to win a global conflict that may be forced by the Communists has still to be carried to the Indian people.

The aphorism that "an idea cannot be stopped by force" is overworked. It is based, in present circumstances, on the miscon-

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ception that international Communism is a potent idea; in reality it is now primarily a plot and a conspiracy. Neither abstract justice, nor abstract ideas, nor "prosperity" itself is sufficient to defeat a conspiracy that is based on the use of force and fraud, and possesses the instruments to apply them. It is not enough that America's cause be understood to be fair and just; there must be no less a conviction that the United States has the power to uphold justice—particularly in Asia. Since 1945 the tide has moved the other way. Ten countries of Eastern Europe, plus North Korea, China and now Tibet, have successively been engulfed. The Communists in India are taking full advantage of this fact to cajole and intimidate. Five years from now, they say, India will be what China is today: if you want to get on the bandwagon, now is the time. Those who watch the names that appear on Communist "peace" appeals and "Indo-Chinese Friendship" fronts, and study the results of the recent general elections in the south, know that the Communist warning is not without effect.

When in Berlin recently, I listened to the strains of the signature tune of the Berlin Radio *Der Insuliner*. A fundamental truth runs through this anthem which recalls the words of John Donne and Abraham Lincoln: Berlin will cease to be an island and become part of the mainland of freedom, or it will be engulfed by the seas that rage around it. The truth is as applicable to Europe as to Berlin. And as appropriate to Asia as to Western Europe! If Asia were lost, Western Europe would be an island in no better plight than Berlin today. India's strategic frontiers lie in Indo-China; but so do those of the free world. The successful defense of Viet-Nam against aggression directed and supported by the Chinese and the Soviets, the maintenance of the independence of Thailand and Burma—all are part of the defense of India herself. Failure to halt aggression in Indo-China would not only render fruitless the sacrifice of those who have fought and died in Korea; it would leave all the rest of Southeast Asia undefendable and result in the outflanking of India.

The plainer the military superiority of the democracies relative to their enemies, and the plainer their determination to act, the easier it will be for the bulk of Indians, always democratic at heart, to declare their allegiance free from intimidation. As yet only a few in India share the confidence that the democracies have the strength to win a global conflict, should it be forced on them. The likelihood of such a conflict would, however, be vastly

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lessened if the indivisibility of freedom for Asia and Europe were understood and implemented now, and the peoples of Asia freed to participate in the building up of collective security in the region east of Turkey and west of the Philippines.

Still, given this confidence, one final doubt would remain in many Indian minds. Have the democracies the capacity to win a peace? Have they the wisdom, the maturity, to lay the foundations of a world community based on the equality of all peoples and races? The basic policies of the democracies have savored too much of a mere bolstering of the territorial and political status quo. Defenses seem constantly improvised—a hole plugged here, a leak stopped there. With the experience of Korea and Iran and Egypt before us, perhaps it would not be unfair to suggest a parallel going far back in history—the reproach that Demosthenes addressed to the Athenians in 351 B.C.:

> Shame on you, Athenians . . . for not wishing to understand that in war one must not allow oneself to be at the command of events, but to forestall them. . . . You make war against Philip like a barbarian when he wrestles. . . . If you hear that Philip has attacked in the Chersonese, you send help there; if he is at Thermopylae, you run there; and if he turns aside you follow him to right and left, as if you were acting on his orders. Never a fixed plan, never any precautions; you wait for bad news before you act.

Clearly, mere containment is no longer enough. Something dynamic is needed if a responsive chord is to be struck in Asian hearts. The people of India have everything to lose and nothing to gain by going under the heel of a Communist dictatorship. Their religions, their way of life, their great cultural tradition extending for over thousands of years with its basic concept of unity through diversity, their attachment to home and family, the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, their democratic Constitution, their membership in the Commonwealth and their ties with the free peoples of the world—all these are on the side of the forces of freedom. But India is also a new nation, with a future to build. Given time, and the opportunity to learn the facts, the Indian people should find no difficulty in taking their place without reservations among the peoples of the free world.

But let us all remember that time itself is neutral. It works for that side which makes the best use of it.

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COMMUNIST DOGMA AND JUGOSLAV PRACTICE

By M. S. Handler

AN attempt to analyze a dynamic political and economic experiment before it has run its full course is always dangerous. One risks being overtaken by events and developments, even the beginnings of which may not be perceptible at the chosen moment. Any attempt to deal with the changing political and economic policies of the Jugoslav Communist Party is an obvious case in point. Yet even at the risk of being denied by future events, we cannot postpone at least a tentative approach to a problem which not only occupies an increasingly important place in the European policy of the United States Government but, on its own merits, deserves serious consideration as one of the most interesting contemporary political phenomena.

It would appear that the United States Government's policy toward Jugoslavia has been guided to a major extent by strategic considerations. This may have been justified from a short-range point of view. But in basing its Jugoslav policy so largely on military considerations, our Government has tended to neglect political aspects of the problem; and in so doing it has shown little understanding of the motivations of the Jugoslav Communist leaders, who are primarily guided by long-term considerations. If the American attitude toward Jugoslavia is not to remain predicated on short-term considerations of national security only, and if our Government intends eventually to help find a permanent place for Jugoslavia in the Western European concert of nations, then it should follow with much more close attention the internal policies of the Jugoslav Government, the motivations behind them and the practical effect of these policies on the social texture of the Jugoslav state.

II

In order to understand the long-range policies of the Jugoslav Communist leaders, and to mark in what degree they have or have not deviated from the fundamental concepts of Soviet Communism, we must reëxamine their line of progression since June 8, 1948, when the publication of the Cominform's Resolution formalized the rupture between Belgrade and Moscow.

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It is frequently forgotten that for a long period after the Resolution the Jugoslav Communist leaders refused to accept their expulsion from the Cominform and hoped for a reconciliation with the Soviet leaders. A record of the proceedings of the Fifth Party Congress, which convened in Belgrade on July 20, 1948, contains interesting evidence on this point. The Congress was called for several reasons, one of which was to satisfy the Soviet criticism that the Central Committee of the Jugoslav Communist Party had not been legally elected and was therefore not qualified to lead the country. The leaders of the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union had charged that the members of the Jugoslav Central Committee had been merely coöpted and were therefore the creatures rather than the masters of the Party leaders.

On the second day of the Congress, Marshal Tito delivered an eight-and-a-half-hour speech. He argued that the Jugoslav Communists had more than fulfilled their duty as good Communists and that, instead of turning away from the Soviet Union, they had been the most faithful supporters of Soviet policy in war and in peace. On July 25 the Party Congress voted an eight-point resolution which, in effect, sought to prove to Moscow that the Jugoslav Communists had fulfilled all their obligations to the Soviet Union.

The next day, Vice Premier Edvard Kardelj addressed the Congress and pledged the Government to continue to support the Soviet Union's foreign policy against the "imperialist Powers." He denied the Cominform's charge that the Jugoslav Party had deviated from Soviet foreign policy and denied that any of the Party leaders were anti-Soviet. He attacked the foreign policy of the United States and predicted a reactivated struggle in Western Europe against economic dependence on the United States. He claimed that the formation of West European and other blocs against the Soviet Union were predicated on the eventual inclusion of Germany and Japan in these blocs, which he decried. He said that American capital was penetrating the countries composing the Western bloc; and, by way of contrast, he described the Soviet bloc as a united force combating the "political and economic enslavement of Europe."

The polemics at the Congress were confined to attacks on the Cominform. No direct criticism was leveled at any of the Soviet leaders. The Jugoslav leaders were concerned with defending the orthodoxy of their policies and with attempting to prove that

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they deserved Soviet commendation rather than condemnation.

The refusal of the Jugoslav Communist leaders to accept their expulsion from the Cominform as entailing a permanent separation from the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc was also shown in connection with the Conference of Danubian States, which convened in Belgrade on July 29, 1948, for the purpose of voting a new Convention governing traffic on the Danube. Early in the month, Dr. Aleš Bebler, one of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, was sent from Belgrade to Moscow to discuss the draft convention which Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky was preparing. Bebler was rebuffed; he was not welcomed in Moscow as a representative of a state belonging to the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, when the Conference took place in Belgrade, Bebler—who led the Jugoslav delegation—gave full support to Vishinsky and assisted him on the floor in forcing through the Soviet draft convention. As it turned out, this Convention placed long sections of the Danube under Soviet control, to the detriment of Jugoslavia and the other European states, in a manner which Mr. Cavendish Cannon, head of the United States delegation, and Sir Charles Peake, head of the British delegation, had forecast accurately.

The attitude of the Jugoslav Communist leaders on both these occasions illustrated how difficult it was for them to conceive of playing any rôle outside the Soviet bloc. This is a fact of considerable importance when we attempt to assess their intellectual outlook and their present-day political and economic concepts, even though much has occurred since the summer of 1948 to reconcile them to their permanent elimination from the Soviet community.

For the rest of 1948 and a good part of 1949, the Jugoslav Communist leaders remained in a position of indecision. The Soviet Government had imposed an economic blockade on their country. Commercial and political treaties, conventions and accords, and all the legal instruments which normally regulate relations between nations, were progressively severed between the Soviet bloc and Jugoslavia. On the other hand, throughout this period the Jugoslav leaders continued to move forward with their ambitious Five Year Plan, despite the fact that the Soviet blockade and their inability to reorient their trade relations from the East to the West made clear that without some change the country was headed for a smash. Jugoslavia had to receive economic as-

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sistance from some outside source. Nothing appeared to change on the surface, however. It is reasonable to raise the question as to why the Jugoslav Communist leaders failed to act in these perilous circumstances to save the national economy. Instead of moving rapidly, they continued to exhort the population to exert any effort and to make any sacrifice for the Five Year Plan.

The answer to this question may be found without too much difficulty. The entire approach of the Jugoslav Communist leaders to the problem of constructing a Socialist state was Soviet in concept and method. As the most successful adepts of the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union, they could envisage a future Socialist Jugoslavia only in the image of the Soviet state. The evidence indicates that they had so far surpassed their colleagues in the other satellite states in advancing their country through the transitional stage of a People's Democracy toward Sovietism that they must have felt within close range of their ultimate goal. But the primary reason for their inaction was that Socialism was exclusively identified in their minds with Sovietism. Obliged as they now were to walk alone, they yet could not divest themselves overnight of a quarter of a century's training in Soviet theory and practice.

The first symptoms that the Jugoslav Communist leaders were beginning to overcome their inertia became visible late in 1949, when they extended the range of their propaganda offensive to include the Soviet Government. This was an important departure because it meant that they not only had lost all hope of a reconciliation with the Soviet leaders but realized that the time had come when they must reassess their internal policies and their foreign relations. Force of circumstances indeed compelled a change, yet it proceeded slowly. The problem facing the Jugoslav leaders at this point was to devise a foreign policy which would guarantee economic assistance from the West, free of political commitments, and which would pay for the construction of a Socialist society. The important question involved was this: What kind of a Socialist society could they build under these difficult circumstances? At this point, one enters a phase wherein it is difficult to disentangle the threads and to determine relationships of cause and effect.

If the Jugoslav Communist leaders ever entertained the idea that, having been cast out from the Soviet fold, they would be permitted to go their way unmolested, they were disabused

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quickly. Such thinking could be based only on the belief that the Soviet Government practises a policy of noninterference in the affairs of other countries, which, as mature political leaders, the Jugoslav Communists should have known from the record to be untrue. Yet there is reason to believe that the Jugoslav Communist leaders held to this belief for some months after their expulsion from the Cominform.

By the beginning of 1949, however, they began to realize that the Bolshevik Party and the Cominform had embarked on a policy of attempting to destroy the existing order in Jugoslavia. The action of the Albanian Government—the smallest of the Soviet puppets—in breaking all trade agreements with Jugoslavia; the maltreatment of Jugoslav officials in the satellite countries to which they were accredited; the efforts to suborn thousands of factory apprentices, whom the Jugoslav Government had sent to Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries to learn industrial skills; the economic blockade imposed on Jugoslavia by the Soviet Union; the organization of Jugoslav émigrés in the satellite capitals for action against the Belgrade Government; the discovery of a Cominform underground in Jugoslavia—all these events shocked the Jugoslav Communist leaders into realizing for the first time that the Soviet Government was an aggressive aggregation rather than a defender of the peace as they had believed it to be.

This discovery, the disillusionment which followed and the necessity for self-preservation confronted the Communist leaders in Belgrade with the necessity of reëxamining Soviet policies and practices—a reëxamination which produced a most effective critique of the Soviet system, of the relationship of this system to Soviet foreign policy and of the relations between the Soviet Government and the satellite states. Another reason for the Jugoslav reëxamination of Soviet policies and practices appears to have been the need for effective arguments to be used in psychological warfare. The discovery of one fact led to the discovery of another and, in the end, the process gained a momentum which could not be stopped. The clinical analysis of the evolution of Soviet practice since Lenin's death produced such evidence of Soviet malfeasance that, in the end, the Jugoslav Communist leaders came to regard Stalin and his partners as dangerous to humanity.

The exposure of the accumulated myths concerning the Soviet Union had an almost cathartic effect on the Jugoslav Communist

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leaders themselves. As an illustration, we may take the Jugoslav critique of the Bolshevik Party. The predatory character of Soviet foreign policy, the brutal internal dictatorship within the Soviet Union, the dehumanization of all social relationships under that dictatorship—all can be traced, in the Jugoslav view, to the transformation of the Bolshevik Party into a self-perpetuating bureaucratic caste, which bears neither organizational nor functional resemblance to a political party. The Bolshevik Party today, in the minds of the Jugoslavs, is an appointive hierarchic caste whose sole interest is to perpetuate and extend its power. The clear-cut division of functions between the Party and the state administration, which the Jugoslavs claim existed under Lenin, has disappeared, they assert, under Stalin. The two have merged in such a manner that the state functions have obliterated those of the Party. Instead of exercising the direction of power, the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union has become power in itself. The submission of state administration to party doctrine has been supplanted by the submission of party doctrine to the requirements of the state. The rôles of state and party have been reversed, and the Party has become an instrument of the state in international as well as domestic affairs.

In reaching these conclusions concerning the rôle of the Bolshevik Party, the Jugoslav Communist leaders could not escape the logic as applied to their own Party. They could not help but see more clearly the defects of their own Party and the development of the same tendencies in Jugoslavia which had led to the stratification of society in the Soviet Union. The effect of such research became clear in 1950, when the decision was taken to curb the Jugoslav bureaucracy which had grown apace since the end of the war. Certain classic means were adopted to accomplish this, but they proved ineffective; and by the end of 1951 the Jugoslav Communist leaders had come to the conclusion that the only way to prevent a repetition of Soviet history would be to maintain a sharp division of functions between their state bureaucracy and the Jugoslav Communist Party.

III

However, there is no evidence to indicate that throughout this period while the Jugoslav leaders were reassessing the Soviet Union they ever questioned the fundamental economic concepts of Stalin. Their critique of Soviet policies and practices remained

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confined to the political organization and functioning of the Soviet state, in so far as this state represented a danger to peace and to the survival of the Jugoslav Communist Party. The two basic premises of Soviet economics—the expansion of heavy industry at the cost of all other sectors of the national economy, and total land collectivization—remained unchallenged. The Jugoslav Communist leaders continued to accept them as the basis for planning the economy of their own country. The first loan sought from the West was received from the Export-Import Bank in the autumn of 1949, and it was primarily used to develop heavy industry. On the other hand, the establishment of new collective farms was pushed with methods which included severe economic measures and even force against unwilling peasants. Under the double pressure of excessive capital investment and peasant resistance, the standard of living in Jugoslavia continued to decline. Thus it can be seen that, while continuing to fight the Soviet leaders on the political level, and learning valuable lessons about how to escape the political pitfalls into which the Bolshevik Party had stumbled, the Jugoslav Communist leaders continued to enforce slavishly the economic policies which they had borrowed from the Soviet Union as being the only true prescription for the modernization of a backward state.

By this time the Jugoslav Government had begun to reorient its foreign trade to the West; but in seeking economic and financial assistance from the West, its emphasis remained placed squarely on capital investment. The standard of living was depressed to a low level in order to make the capital investment program possible; and, in the Jugoslav Government's subsequent approaches to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and to the Western governments—principally, the United States Government—it did not, until the drought of 1950, seek assistance to alleviate the lot of its people. The drought marked the first departure in this respect. This change in direction was initiated, strangely, by Mr. John Haggerty, Agricultural Attaché of the United States Embassy in Belgrade, who warned the Jugoslav Ministry of Agriculture (weeks before it received reports from its own agents) that the condition of the soil was such that, unless substantial rainfall came within a short time, the country would face a serious drought. He advised the Ministry to start thinking about precautions to be taken for feeding the population before the situation became serious.

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The story of the United States food relief program in Jugoslavia in the winter of 1950–51 is well known, but it should be recorded that the officials involved in the operation in Washington, Belgrade, Germany and Italy performed a remarkable feat in planning and delivering 525,000 tons of foodstuffs to Jugoslavia within a short space of time. The rapidity and the scale of the American intervention to safeguard the Jugoslav people against the possibility of famine was an eye-opener for the Jugoslav leaders. The United States Government remained faithful to the letter of the agreement it signed with the Jugoslav Government and carried out the food relief program without any interference in the internal affairs of Jugoslavia. Communist leaders in Eastern Europe had always been haunted by the possibility of interference in their internal affairs whenever the problem of coöperation with the capitalist states of the West arose. The fear originated in their attribution to Western governments of the conspiratorial methods which cannot be dissociated from Communist régimes. The experience of the Jugoslav Communists with the United States Government's food relief program in the autumn and winter of 1950 was therefore a revelation. They discovered that, except for academic discussions in which Americans expressed dislike for dictatorship methods of government, they had neither the intention nor the desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Jugoslavia.

The generosity and the forthright dealings of the United States Government at this time contributed heavily toward convincing the Jugoslav Communist leaders that they had nothing to fear in seeking closer economic and political ties with the United States. In point of chronology, this occurred in the winter of 1950–51, at a time when a national inventory of industrial raw materials on hand disclosed an alarming situation. Stocks of raw materials had been seriously depleted and, unless they could be quickly replenished, the Jugoslav factories would be forced to close down and industrial unemployment would become widespread for the first time in the history of the régime. It was under these circumstances that Foreign Minister Edvard Kardelj approached Washington for a grant-in-aid of industrial raw materials to keep Jugoslav factories in operation. The United States responded to the appeal, and was joined later by Britain and France.

The history of this tripartite assistance to Jugoslavia in 1951, which took the form of underwriting the Jugoslav Government's

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current trade deficit, provides another field in which we may attempt an assessment of the extent to which the Jugoslav leaders have remained faithful to, or deviated from, Soviet economic concepts of Socialism. The immediate concern of the Jugoslav Government in seeking and receiving essential raw materials for its factories was to prevent unemployment and to maintain the modest flow of consumer goods into the market necessary for the preservation of the standard of living even at its existing low level. Even such meager coöperation as the Belgrade Government received from the collectivized and independent peasants was dependent on its ability to deliver some consumer goods—few though they were, and low as they were in quality. In retrospect, nevertheless, it can be accepted as fact that the creaking economy of Jugoslavia was kept in motion largely because the United States, British and French Governments paid the bill for the essential raw materials.

One of the contributing factors in the Jugoslav Government's inability to meet its international balance of payments in 1951 was, of course, the suspension of food exports because of the 1950 drought. But this was not the chief cause. The primary reason was the Government's continued emphasis on capital investment and the subordination of all other sectors of the national economy to it. Two deductions may be made from these facts. The first is that the underwriting of Jugoslavia's current trade deficit by the United States, British and French Governments made it possible for the Jugoslav Communist leaders to persevere with their original plan for industrializing Jugoslavia. This was because once the responsibility of the deficit had been shouldered by the three Western governments the Belgrade Government was free to use part of the proceeds of Jugoslav exports and swing credits from the European governments for the purchase of capital equipment. The second deduction is that, despite the conclusive evidence that they could not achieve their capital investment program with their own resources, and despite the catastrophe of the 1950 drought, the Jugoslav Communist leaders were not prepared to seek another solution to the problem of industrialization of their country.

One can only conclude that the Jugoslav Communist leaders, despite a slight downward revision of their industrialization program, involving the postponement of secondary projects, were still animated throughout 1951 by the Soviet thesis as to the

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necessity of industrializing a backward country. Their concept was based on the theory that no country can achieve true independence without possessing a highly industrialized sector in its economy. Without freeing themselves from "dependence" on the more industrialized states, they argued, Jugoslavia would continue to occupy a semi-colonial status as a producer of cheap raw materials which she would have to exchange for expensive manufactured goods. This theoretical basis for forced industrialization, which gripped the Jugoslav leaders in 1951, and still does today, neglects the fundamental and glaring facts that in the twentieth century no industrial state, even one as powerful as the United States, can claim to be independent from the rest of the world. The postwar history of such highly industrialized states as the United Kingdom, Western Germany, France, Belgium and Italy, to cite only a few, shows that frequently the more industrialized a state becomes the more it finds itself dependent on imported essential raw materials in order to keep its factories in operation, and the greater its dependence on foreign suppliers.

In the face of this evidence, the Jugoslav Communist leaders continued to adhere to the concept of industrial planning which they had inherited from the Soviet Union. The expansion of heavy industry must be given the highest priority and all other sectors of the national economy must be geared to the capital investment program. In fact, the entire national economy must work in only one direction—the completion of the industrialization program as quickly as possible. As late as January 1952, Boris Kidrich, the Chairman of the State Economic Council and a member of the Jugoslav Politburo, told the Party officials of the Voivodina that the Government's entire economic program depended on the completion of the capital investment program and that all it could hope to do for the people would be to try to maintain the standard of living at the present level.

The inescapable conclusion therefore seems to be that the Jugoslav Communist leaders, despite the decentralization of economic control and the establishment of Workers Councils to participate in the management of factories, still adhere to the Soviet approach to the whole problem of industrialization and the subordination of the rest of the national economy to the requirements of the capital investment program. To this end, the Jugoslav Government is not only seeking a second capital investment loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-

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opment but also capital investment goods from the three Western Powers which are underwriting its current trade deficit.

The Jugoslav Government may point to the reduction of its annual capital investment rate from the previous high of 28 percent of the national income to 17.6 percent for 1952. This decline is more impressive on paper than in reality when one takes into consideration some of the projects which the Jugoslav economic planners hope to complete this year. The program for 1952 includes the completion of the construction work on 21 hydroelectric and thermoelectric stations, several coking plants, steel plants, asbestos and aluminum works, the modernization of 12 coal mines and an unspecified number of nonferrous metal mines. It is doubtful whether even the most highly industrialized state in Europe today could embark on such a vast program in 1952.

IV

The issue in the agrarian policy of the Jugoslav Communist leaders is no longer so clear-cut. Until the winter of 1951, they were categorical in their assertions that collectivized agriculture was the only solution for the agrarian problem and the general economic problem of their country. The bitter resistance of the Jugoslav peasants—independent as well as collectivized—from the middle of July 1951 until the end of the autumn produced a violent reaction among the Jugoslav Communist leaders, who spoke of the peasants as if they were enemies of the state and threatened them with severe punishment if they persisted in their efforts to break up the collective farms. The speeches of Premier Tito and his associates reaffirmed many times that collectivized agriculture and industrialization were the two foundations upon which a Socialist Jugoslavia would have to rest.

There is no need to recapitulate here the events of last year's struggle of the peasants against collectivized agriculture. Today we know that their resistance aroused great alarm among the Jugoslav leaders, who at one point feared that if it went unchecked there might be an explosion. We understand now far better than we did when they were made the violent speeches of Tito and his associates against the peasants. The Jugoslav Communist leaders had come to recognize that the collective farms, as they had been organized and operated, had failed. Production instead of going up went down. The only sector of agriculture which maintained its level of production in 1951 was that of the

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independent peasants who, for the first time, were receiving some relief from economic pressures because of the abolition of most of the compulsory deliveries required by the Government, and who could now sell much of their produce on the free market. Many of the collectivized peasants were demoralized. In the district of Beli Monastir in Croatia, the collectivized peasants refused to go to work, according to the report of Slavko Komar, a member of the Croatian Politburo, and the Government had to call in farm hands from distant regions—in common parlance, strike breakers.

Although recognizing that the form of collectivized agriculture which had been taken over organizationally and functionally from the Soviet Union had failed, the Jugoslav Communist leaders not only could not admit this failure publicly but had to take every possible measure to prevent the collective farms from disintegrating, pending a new approach to the problem. A temporary solution was found and incorporated in a directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Jugoslavia. The existing collective farms were to be completely reorganized to allow a greater participation of the members in the management. Managers who were efficient farmers were to be appointed and managerial control taken out of the hands of Party officials. The Jugoslav leaders described this process as the elimination of Soviet *kolkhoz* principles of organization and management.

Pending this reorganization, the Central Committee decided to attempt to reëmphasize the conventional type of farm coöperative, known here as the "general type." This type of coöperative, in which the peasants own their own land but share their farm implements, had survived the war but had been allowed to go to seed in favor of the collective farms. Despite this new departure, the Government decided to consolidate the existing collective farms by permitting them once again to expropriate the independent peasants who owned land situated between the main collective farms and their outlying strips. The independent peasants are to be compensated with farm land lying outside the collective domains or in money upon agreement between the interested parties. The fact that the collective farms were empowered to resume the expropriation of independent peasants, even though to a limited degree, indicates that although the Jugoslav leaders have recognized the failure of collectivized agriculture they cannot divorce themselves from collectivization as an instrument and as a foundation of their economic state.

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Additional evidence on this point is to be found in the decision to levy punitive taxes against the independent peasants who have begun to suffer from falling prices in the free markets. The Jugoslav planners consciously took this step, as they have explained publicly, in order to convince the independent peasant that he would be far better off as a member of a collective farm. The Jugoslav economic planners believe that within two or three years the independent peasants will not be able to survive under the double pressure of punitive taxation and low market prices, and will ask the authorities to admit them into the collective farms. The Zagreb newspapers boasted in January of this year that 20 new collective farms had been formed in Croatia between November 1, 1951, and January 1, 1952, and that a total of 80 new ones would be formed by March 1.

One important point must be underlined in the shift in the Jugoslav Government's agrarian policy. The Jugoslav Communist leaders have reached an interim conclusion to the effect that the establishment of collective farms in the mountain republics was perhaps a mistake and that, under certain conditions, the land may go back to private farming. A corollary to this was another interim conclusion to the effect that collective agriculture, whatever form it may ultimately acquire in Jugoslavia, is to be concentrated in the fertile regions.

The events in the latter part of 1951 and the temporary changes introduced in the agrarian policy by the Central Committee do not permit a definitive answer to the question as to how far the Jugoslav Communist leaders have moved away from Soviet agrarian economics of total land collectivization and the reduction of the members of a *kolkhoz* to the status of a proletariat. Clearly, however, the deviation from the Soviet concept of the economic state has been one of degree and not of kind. Except for changes in the tempo, the deviation from the Soviet pattern of industrialization has been negligible. The removal from Soviet agrarian economics has been more substantial but, as has been shown, there has been no definitive break with the Soviet attitude on how farming should be organized.

V

Brief visitors to Jugoslavia often make the mistake of trying to establish a relationship between internal changes and the degree to which the Jugoslav Communists are supposedly mov-

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ing toward Western theories and practices. The fallacy involved is a gross one, because the events of the last three-and-a-half years have demonstrated that whatever changes have taken place inside Jugoslavia have occurred within the framework of the Soviet model which the Jugoslav Communist leaders have accepted for themselves. In other words, the problem should be put in the following form: To what degree are the Jugoslav Communist leaders deviating from the Soviet model? It is erroneous to suppose that the question concerns the degree to which the Jugoslav leaders are leaning toward the West; there is not a scrap of evidence that they have done so, or ever intend to. In their present state of development, the Jugoslav Communist leaders reject with equal vigor the two possible Western concepts of a political and economic state—the social democratic and the capitalistic.

There was a tendency for a time to regard the limited political reforms carried out by the Jugoslav Communist leaders as evidence that they were orienting themselves toward some form of social democracy. These reforms included the curbing of the power of the police, the liberalization of the criminal code, an attempt to separate the functions of the Communist Party and the state bureaucracy, the decentralization of economic control, the reform of the criminal procedure act and the reorganization of the courts (the latter two are still under consideration). There is also a project under consideration to reorganize the functioning of the parliament. The meaning of these changes with relation to the future of the Jugoslav state would require a lengthy discussion and there is space here to offer only several observations.

The reform of the criminal code and the reorganization of the courts were proposed by the Government to the legislative committee of the National Assembly on the grounds that these reforms would "strengthen legality" in the country and would go a long way toward limiting the power of the police. Government spokesmen admitted during the discussions that police power had been almost absolute, particularly in the rural districts, and that very frequently the courts had been unduly influenced in their verdicts by investigations carried out by the police.

Acting on proposals submitted by the Government, the legislative committees agreed that all judges should be elected by the assemblies of the nation, the republics and the regions, but they also agreed that the judges so elected were to be responsible *to*

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the assemblies which elected them. This means that the judges who are to be elected will not be responsible to the law but to those men who have the power to make the law at any particular moment. The independence of the judiciary was therefore not clearly established, although it will enjoy more independence than it did when it was a direct instrument of the executive branch of the Government. However, as long as the elected assemblies in Jugoslavia continue in practice to function solely as bodies of ratification, the judiciary will still be under the executive, if at one step removed.

In assessing the importance of the political reforms, it is important to bear in mind that the Jugoslav Communist leaders regard the single-party state as the ideal from which they will never depart. Late last fall, the Jugoslav Communist leaders felt it incumbent upon themselves to defend the single-party state and to attack the multi-party system. Moshe Pijade, of the Politburo, and others declared in public speeches that the single-party state represented the best guarantee for "true democracy," whereas the multi-party state vitiated the foundations of a democratic system. Pijade and his colleagues said there could be no question of restoring a multi-party system in Jugoslavia, because that would mean bringing back to power those politicians who, they said, were responsible for the prewar conditions which led to the defeat and occupation of Jugoslavia. The insistence upon the one-party state must, by definition, set very narrow limits upon liberal reforms, because such a state is predicated on the primacy of the executive branch of the Government, to which all other branches must be subordinated. The emphasis of the Jugoslav Communist leaders on the perpetuation of the single-party state must therefore be regarded as the essential point of reference for a consideration of past and future internal political changes. To ignore this would be indulgence in wishful thinking.

VI

Thus far we have been concerned solely with the Communist leaders and Government of Jugoslavia. But there are only approximately 500,000 members of the Communist Party of Jugoslavia. The question therefore arises as to the relationship of the people to the policies and practices of the men who govern them. It would be a hardy person indeed who would dare to answer this question with generalizations. One can only safely deal with cer-

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tain known factors in an attempt to gauge the morale of the Jugoslav people with relation to the defense of their country against attack, and the willingness with which they would follow the present régime in resisting attack.

Several assumptions must be accepted if there is to be any reasonable discussion of this subject. The first is that people do not necessarily fight for their government. They fight to defend their country, and they will, of course, fight harder if they feel that they are being led by determined men who know what they are doing. Observers frequently argue the point as to whether the Jugoslav people, who are non-Marxist to say the least, would fight for Tito. The problem is badly put in this way. The question is whether the Jugoslav people will fight for their country. The lessons of the last war and every preceding war have demonstrated a fact which is generally ignored. It is that every invaded country produces its quota of collaborators with the enemy. When observers argue the question of whether or not the Jugoslav people would fight for Tito, they generally argue in absolutes. The problem is not how many will desert and collaborate with the Soviets, but how many will stay and fight. That is a question which may also be raised in every country in Western Europe. It is more important to know how many men and women will resist an aggressor than to know how many will assist him. It is only through such knowledge that the United States Government can plan for the future.

Jugoslavia produced her quota of collaborators and traitors in the last war, but she also produced a resurgence of the national spirit and a liberation movement which was unequalled by any other occupied country in Europe. That is the positive fact on which we must fix our minds. In the last analysis, the number of men and women who joined in the fight to liberate their country will be more useful to us in assessing Jugoslavia's future possibilities than the number of collaborators and traitors who assisted the enemy. On the basis of comparison and analogy with past performances, United States policy toward Jugoslavia would, on these military grounds, appear to be more than amply justified.

In assessing the future conduct of the Jugoslav people in the event of war, it is important to bear the following factors in mind. The Jugoslav peasants and industrial workers who represent the backbone of the country and who will have to do the fighting in case of an invasion are politically literate, in spite of their low

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standard of living. It is always a source of astonishment to observers to note how categorically the peasants and workers of this country make a distinction between the national and the individual interest. The defense of the country and the survival of Jugoslavia as an independent state are not subjects for debate as they so often are in Western Europe. The very same peasants and workers who will violently attack the Government's domestic policies will, almost in the same breath, approve its defiance of the Soviet Union, its renewed association with the West and its declared intention to resist an invasion.

The propaganda of the Jugoslav Government for the past three-and-a-half years has aimed at the single target of heightening the national spirit to defend the country against Soviet invasion. The propaganda was so intense that any dissenting opinion was regarded as treasonable and punishable. National defense became the theme of every action of the Government in domestic and foreign policy. It was commonly supposed that the failure of the Cominform's underground in Jugoslavia was due solely to effective police action. Police action was effective, but it could not have dealt with the problem unless the Jugoslav people themselves regarded their national independence as important above all things else and unless the Government propaganda had sharpened the national spirit.

There can be no doubt that one of the Jugoslav Government's principal achievements in the past three years has been to convince the Jugoslav people, who resent the domestic policies of the Communist Party, to place the national interest above all other considerations. The term "Jugoslav people" does not include all the people, because there are elements in the Jugoslav population which are prepared to sit out another war if there is any chance of recovering their property confiscated by the régime. The absence of any real dissension over the question of national defense must therefore be considered as one of the most important points in favor of the United States Government's short-term policy of supporting the Jugoslav Government. The policy, which has cost the United States Government relatively little, has already produced important benefits—benefits, be it noted, received without request. They were: a substantial Jugoslav contribution to the ending of the Greek civil war through the closing of the Jugoslav-Greek frontier; the removal of Soviet pressure on sections of the Italian and Austrian frontiers; the

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transformation of the Jugoslav Army from a hostile into a friendly army; the return of the West to the Balkans; and finally the fact that the Adriatic will be open instead of closed to Allied fleets in case of war.

American policy often seems to take too little account of the fact that Jugoslavia will continue to have importance so long as she remains a dynamic state on a Continent which appears to have largely lost its dynamic force. Since the rupture of the European balance of power, Jugoslavia has been propelled into an arena where she never was present before and where she is fulfilling a rôle like that formerly held exclusively by Great Britain, France and Italy. History has put American power into the Balkans because no other Western nation has the strength to hold a position there. An American retreat from Jugoslavia today is as unthinkable as would be a retreat from Greece. The United States should become conscious of this fact, should examine the problem and prepare a policy which goes beyond the immediate needs of the defense program. If one of the aims of American policy is to restore some balance of power in Europe, then obviously the United States must regard Jugoslavia with the same general and continuing interest as it does any and all of the other European states which it is supporting. The Jugoslavia of today is more than a defensive outpost for the West.

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THE THREAT OF THE SOVIET NAVY

By Frank Uhlig, Jr.

THE essential strategic characteristics of the world's present division between land power and sea power are a familiar picture to historians. One part of the globe is ruled by a great army, capable of marching across continents. The other part is dominated by the sea, and in turn dominates the seas. A famous example is the situation in the third century B.C., when the Republican armies of Rome faced Carthaginian sea power in the Mediterranean. The Romans learned how to build fleets and win battles at sea, and overwhelmed Carthage in three successive wars. There is now very little to remind us that Carthage ever existed.

The Napoleonic wars, which covered a period of more than 20 years, supply another instance. The great armies of the Continent were stopped at the seashore, for the French were never able to gain control of the English Channel for those 24 hours for which Napoleon begged. When the Emperor turned his army away from the Channel coast, he conceded the defeat which took ten years to catch up with him. "Those far distant, storm beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world."

Twice in these past 50 years the contest has been repeated. In each case, after a long struggle upon both land and sea, the sea Powers won over the land Powers. One aspect of World War II is especially significant. United States submarines of the 7th Fleet, ranging up and down the Asiatic coast, together with those of the Central Pacific Fleet operating near Japan, completely cut off sea traffic between Japan and the East Indies–Malayan area, thereby depriving Japan of essential oil and raw materials. Perhaps even more important was the fact that 2,000,000 armed Japanese on the mainland were isolated. Our problem would have been infinitely greater if those Japanese armies could have reinforced the garrisons on the islands which we had to take en route to the Philippines and Japan. But the sea was denied them, and Japan was defeated even before we dropped the atom bomb.

II

Though the Russian Navy is one of the greatest of current mil-

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itary mysteries, considerable data is available from published sources, even though not well known. Russia's submarine fleet is properly credited with being the world's largest, with 300 or 400 boats in existence and a plan for 1,000 more at some future date. (The United States has 170 submarines, and Britain 56.) It includes some of the best of the German U-boats; and the services of German designers and technicians are on call, part of the naval harvest gathered by the Russians at the end of the war. Among the prizes gained was the snorkel breathing device which allows the submarines to travel as rapidly underwater as on the surface. This was perhaps the most important of all recent naval developments, aside from atomic power.

The current Russian submarine force may be divided into three general groups, according to size. Many of the vessels are of the tiny "M" or "Malutka" type, fit only for short-range operations near their bases. Of the 200 submarines described in the latest issue of "Jane's Fighting Ships," almost 80 are of this type. Their small size limits them to defensive rôles near the coast. The probable nature of a future war will leave them with little to do in the first stages. But they are small enough to be carried by rail (dismantled if necessary) to restricted waters such as the English Channel and the Adriatic Sea, where they would be useful against coastal traffic and small vessels. They would be one of the hazards to be faced in a seaborne assault on enemy-held territory.

More important are the seagoing submarines of 500 to 800 tons. These ships are capable of cruising all the Russian seas—the Baltic, the Black, the Arctic, the Sea of Japan—and far beyond into the Pacific or the mid-Atlantic where the supply and troopships pass. With submarines such as these, the Germans came close to winning the last two wars. Largest of all are those fleet-type submarines of 1,000 tons and up. They can go anywhere and would be the subs most likely to torpedo our freighters coming from Africa and South America with raw materials, and the tankers from the Gulf and the Caribbean. This trade, a major target, was almost destroyed by the U-boats in 1942. It is even more important now than it was ten years ago, with uranium ore coming from the Congo and so much of our oil and iron from Venezuela.

We can only speculate as to what postwar developments in submarine and anti-submarine warfare have done to the balance of war at sea. We do know that submarines provided with the

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latest devices have achieved great theoretical successes in American naval manœuvres. The new submarine equipment—snorkels, streamlined hulls and atomic propulsion—has received a great deal of notice. Anti-submarine devices have received less. We know that new equipment and new techniques have been developed, with airplane teams, supersensitive radar, and long-range sonar to locate the submarines, and rockets and homing torpedoes to kill them. But we do not know much about these things, except that many ships and many planes, all properly equipped, will be needed to get maximum value out of the new methods of detection and destruction. In 1939 the British depended on their new "Asdic" sound gear for submarine detection. It was a good device; but the lack of destroyers and escorts to carry the Asdics might have permitted the enemy to win the war. At the present time the Western allies have about 500 destroyers and 200 fast escorts (the only kind that counts now). That is a lot of ships, but when divided among a thousand tasks over the globe the number shrinks alarmingly. There must be many sterile patrols and fruitless attacks in order to produce one kill.

The torpedo is the best known and most frequently used submarine weapon, and will probably continue to be. The deck gun is going out of favor, for the submarine must cruise on the surface to use it, and then the submarine is very vulnerable to detection and attack. Mining is an old method of submarine warfare and is still important. In both wars the U-boats stopped traffic in and out of American harbors with their mines, and American submarines carried out the same task against the Japanese. The Russians have always been masters at mining. There is no reason to think them inferior either to the Germans or the Americans in submarine mine-planting. The advantage of mine-laying is that the submarine does not immediately disclose its presence, as it must when it uses a torpedo. The minefield may not be discovered for hours or days after the sub has gone. Minefields call forth tremendous efforts on the part of the defense to clear and keep clear the entrances to harbors, bays and canals, where the depth of water is not too great to prevent planting an effective field. Since all ships must pass through these relatively shallow waters, both at the beginning and at the end of their voyage, the threat of mining restricts their movements severely.

The latest weapon in the submarine armory is the guided missile. The long coastlines of the United States and of our allies, and

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the many waterfront cities, provide plenty of easy targets for missile-firing submarines. It would be possible for a wolf pack armed with missiles to bombard any coastal city in the Western world, and many cities far inland. Submarines would run far less chance of detection and interception than would bombing planes; and when danger is upon them submarines can sink out of sight and beyond the reach of radar, which, like the human eye, cannot penetrate seawater. Guided missiles have opened to bombardment targets once immune from naval attack except by carrier planes, and inferior navies cannot send their carriers voyaging across the hostile sea the way they can send submarines underneath it.

Submarines are the strongest arm of the Russian Navy, but aviation is in all likelihood the weakest. There probably is one carrier in the Soviet fleet; perhaps there are two, but no more than that. We have little information to go on here. In 1945 the Soviets obtained the German *Graf Zeppelin*, then about 85 percent completed. There is no evidence that this ship has been dismantled, though the Russians were pledged to do so by inter-Allied agreement. Since they added other Axis prizes of war to their fleet, it is safe to assume that this ship too has joined their navy. In any event, Russian carrier strength is not great, and Russian sailors have had no experience in handling this type of ship in action. Yet carriers could do great damage to Allied convoys and land installations, if operated properly and in conjunction with other types of warships.

Though the Russian Navy has not had carriers before, it has had experience with the small bombers and torpedo planes normally based on carriers. In the last war Russian naval planes were used against German coastal convoys in the Baltic and off the northern tips of Norway and Finland. This phase of the war is still obscure. The Russians made great claims for their attacks on convoys, and the Germans denied their truth. It is probable that the Germans were closer to the facts than the Russians. However, no nation can fight a long war without finding out a great deal about the weapons it is using, and we must assume that the Soviets have a reasonably efficient naval air service. Recently new types of long-range naval patrol planes have been unveiled. They are on the order of our Lockheed Neptunes, though jet powered, and are suited for the strategic defensive: long-distance scouting and destruction of enemy submarines.

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III

But though the Soviet fleet would prove a terrible foe beneath the seas and might be a threat in the air, the most interesting questions about Russian naval strength are those raised by the mounting power of its surface ships. The U.S.S.R. now holds third place in surface naval power. A decade ago it was a poor seventh. Since then Japan and Germany have been eliminated, and France and Italy have only small collections of old, captured and borrowed ships. But the dropping out of other Powers is a negative way of gaining position, and the Soviets have not depended on that. They have acquired through inter-Allied agreement, peace treaties and salvage a number of former Axis ships of all types. To the degree that the Soviet surface fleet is made up of captured ships, it suffers from the same lack of uniformity which burdens the French and Italian navies. But it has in addition a vigorous building program, begun before the war and intensified since, which is now beginning to yield new warships in considerable numbers.

This Soviet surface fleet is composed, as nearly as we can guess, of two battleships, with a third under construction (compare with Great Britain's five); 14 or 15 cruisers, with another nearing completion (Britain has 24); about 60 destroyers (Britain has 106) plus 33 small destroyers, called "torpedo boats" (no relation to our wartime PTs). In addition there are some very old but perhaps still useful vessels: three battleships, a pair of cruisers and about ten destroyers, mostly in the Black Sea. Besides these there are the usual frigates and auxiliaries, and several hundred motor torpedo boats. There are 28 icebreakers (we have six). Comparison with the British figures shows that the Soviets are within measurable distance of becoming the world's second naval Power. This is not to say that the Western Allies are in danger of being swept from the seas by Russian squadrons, for the U. S. Navy is several times the size of the British. But it does show that Russia, with the largest army and air force in existence, is becoming a real opponent at sea. "Jane's" lists the following building program: three battleships, 20 cruisers, 120 destroyers. Presumably this includes some ships already completed, but even so it is an ambitious undertaking. If the Russians are in fact capable of building that many ships, it will not be long before they challenge England for second place at sea.

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This Soviet Navy, then, is a formidable force, and promises to become stronger with the passage of time and the completion of new ships. But it has one great weakness. The Russian squadrons, of necessity, are scattered over four seas: the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black and the Pacific. Between the Arctic and Baltic Seas there is a canal through which smaller ships can pass. Very small ships may be able to travel from the Baltic to the Black Sea by means of the great rivers of European Russia. But there is no way for big ships of one of these fleets to join either of the other squadrons except by passing through waters dominated by the West, while the Pacific squadron can be reached only by a cruise of many months through the ice-packed Northeast Passage over the top of Russia.

There is but one Russian naval base from which Soviet ships and submarines can issue forth to cut our oceanic supply lines. Leningrad is at the wrong end of the Baltic, and Sevastopol is on the landlocked Black Sea. Murmansk and Petsamo are out of the way on the far northern Arctic coast. In the Pacific, however, the Soviets have a port of great strategic value—not Vladivostok, which is blocked off from the ocean by the Japanese Islands, but Petropavlovsk, near the tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula, which hangs down deep into the North Pacific. Petropavlovsk lies astride the Great Circle routes to Japan and the Philippine Islands. From there the cruisers, the submarines and the bombers could launch their raids on the troopships and freighters supplying our Far Eastern frontier. We do not know if Petropavlovsk is yet a great base, but it could be one. It might be difficult to supply and maintain by overland routes, since there are no railroads in that part of Siberia. But, regarded as an island, the base can be supported from the sea, much as Hawaii is, or that other peninsula tip, Gibraltar. Provided that there were ships and submarines and planes enough to do the job, our positions in the Far East would be outflanked from Petropavlovsk, and Japan greatly endangered. The present Russian Pacific squadron is weak: two cruisers, about 20 destroyers, 100 submarines, half of them of the tiny M class, useless in the great distances of the Pacific.

Bridging the distance from the Kamchatka to Japan are the Kurile Islands, once Japanese, but Russian since 1945. These islands lie even closer to the trade routes than does Petropavlovsk, and they parallel the steamer lanes for several hundred miles, affording convenient bases for attacks on the convoys. However,

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our Pacific convoys need not travel Great Circle. They can be routed to Japan by more southerly routes, such as via the Hawaiian Islands. But this increases the length of the journey and reduces the effectiveness of each freighter, troopship and escorting warship. And while planes from the northern bases could be avoided, any route to Japan would be well within the range of cruisers and submarines based on Kamchatka or the Kuriles.

We must note that the Sea of Japan is dominated by Vladivostok, still probably the largest Russian base in the Far East. There is no sizable Japanese port on that side of the Islands. But while Vladivostok commands the Sea of Japan, it commands no more than that, for it is hemmed in by a bowl formed by Japan, Korea and the Siberian mainland. Nowadays, with Chinese ports like Port Arthur, Tsingtao and Shanghai available to Soviet ships, Vladivostok's importance to the Russian Navy has been reduced. However, some time must pass before there will be facilities for naval operations from the Chinese ports, or sufficient naval forces to use them. That is fortunate for us and for Japan, for it gives us a chance to gather strength in the Japanese outpost. It would be needed, for if the Russians and Chinese can amass great naval and air strength at both Petropavlovsk and Shanghai, Japan would be even more embattled than were the British Isles in 1940.

IV

In short, there are many fine potential naval bases for Russian use in the Far East, but not much present naval strength. In Europe, the Soviets have several well-established bases—at Leningrad and Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg) in the Baltic, at Murmansk and Petsamo in the Arctic, and at Sevastopol and Novorossiisk in the Black Sea. But, as we have noted, each of these is blocked from our Atlantic and Mediterranean sea routes by some geographic barrier. The Arctic ports are distant from the British Isles and the Mediterranean. Those in the Baltic are closed from the great oceans by the Scandinavian peninsulas. And the only way out of the Black Sea is through the narrow Dardanelles, held by Turkey.

Why, then, these new Soviet battleships, and hundreds of submarines? The bulk of the new ships are in the Baltic, including the new battleships, along with seven or eight modern cruisers, more than 20 of the destroyers, plus some of the small destroyers

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(torpedo boats) and nearly 100 seagoing U-boats. If the carriers are ready this is where they are in training. Within that sea there are three missions open to a Russian fleet. It can engage the Swedish fleet (three cruisers, a dozen destroyers, 25 submarines) and clear naval opposition from the Baltic. With the Baltic an all-Russian lake—and it is nearly that now—the fleet could turn its attention to other tasks, none of them expensive in terms of ships. One would be gunnery support of the army as it moved along the Jutland Peninsula from Germany to secure the southern lip of the Skagerrak leading to the open sea. The other would be amphibious—to land troops on the lower coast of Norway and gain control of those harbors from which the German submarines and battleships raided in 1940–1944. Once this is understood, the new battleships and carriers make sense. In the Baltic they would be useful ships, but not essential. Once in the open they would gain a new character and become factors of the greatest importance. Our Atlantic convoys would be vulnerable to these big ships, and they would become an even more dangerous threat to the citizens and armies of Europe than the submarines. A convoy under attack by a strong surface squadron or carrier air group is a hopeless thing. The anti-submarine vessels provided for convoy protection are of little use against battleships and cruisers; they can be eaten up as fast as the freighters and troopships.

Or, if the Soviets chose to leave convoy raiding to the submarines, the surface forces and carriers could be concentrated in the North Sea, where they would be a threat to the British and American naval forces based at Scapa Flow. In 1914–18 and 1939–44 the big British ships at Scapa Flow were the pin upon which the conduct of the war hinged. Had they been sunk or removed in some manner, the German surface task forces could have sallied forth into the Atlantic and stopped the convoys from America. Even if they did no more than sink the escorting corvettes and frigates, the merchant ships would have been defenseless against the submarines. The Battle of the Atlantic was the crucial campaign in the two great wars of the century. Large portions of the Mediterranean and Pacific were lost to us, but they were regained when our strength had grown. Had we lost the Atlantic we would have lost all. That cold ocean remains the crux of all strategic planning. With the Atlantic lost, the British Isles must go. Without the British Isles we cannot hold any position in Europe, in the Mediterranean or in North Africa. The lands bordering the

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Red Sea and Indian Ocean must go by default, for we could not protect them and they have little strength of their own. We would find ourselves back on our own shores, with the natural and productive wealth of all the rest of the world in the hands of our enemies. This is not to say that, with England on our side, the security of these places is guaranteed. The Soviets might gain many of them by political methods, or by ground forces. What it means is that without England we cannot hope to hold them.

The Soviet White Sea Fleet, based on the shores of the Arctic Ocean, is a weak squadron, and would probably be looked upon by the Russians as a distant arm of the Baltic Fleet. The few surface ships might act as escorts for Soviet Army troops advancing upon the northern Norwegian fjords by sea, rather than overland through mountains and snow. The Soviets would need to take only a few points near the coast for submarine and air bases; the rest would fall in due course, and would be of little account in any event. Norway's strategic values lie in her fjords, where ships and submarines can lie in safety. A small but not minor task for the White Sea Fleet would be the setting up of weather stations in Iceland and Greenland. Weather travels from west to east, and reporting stations on these islands would be needed before amphibious or aerial campaigns were launched.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is in large part composed of old ships, but its only opponent is the Turkish Fleet, which it outweighs several times. It would dominate the Black Sea and it would be able to provide heavy fire support for the Army, unless we were able to provide a strong naval task force to aid the Turks. It is true that airplanes can sink ships, but we must remember that in the last war, with the Luftwaffe in control of the air over the Black Sea, and with all the naval bases in the hands of the Wehrmacht, the Black Sea Fleet continued to exist, without any major losses caused by German bombers. When the war turned in favor of the Russians, that Fleet assisted in the drive westward. As long as the Dardanelles remain in Turkish hands the influence of the Black Sea Fleet will not extend beyond the borders of that sea. But if the Straits fall to the Russians, then we must expect enemy submarines in the Mediterranean. We have not much to fear from Russian surface ships in the Mediterranean, for most of theirs are very old.

For some years there have been rumors of a Soviet submarine base on the Albanian island of Saseno at the entrance to the Adri-

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atic. If a strong base is in fact there, one of the main supply routes to Trieste and Jugoslavia could be snapped. But it is not likely that a sizable base exists, since Albania, a small and backward country without the heavy industry or technical skill needed to construct a modern naval base, is cut off from physical contact with the rest of the Soviet world by hostile Jugoslavia and Greece. All the personnel and machinery, and the submarines themselves, would have to come from the U.S.S.R., through waters dominated by the West.

V

These reflections assume that the Russian Government is in an expansionist mood. Such a mood has not been lacking in the past, whether that government were Soviet or Tsarist. Without exception every Russian ruler for centuries has added or attempted to add to his dominions, and most have been successful in the effort. For 500 years the goal of Russian policy has been a gateway to the sea, and the possession of warm-water ports. This drive has been carried on by the army, by explorers in Siberia and by statesmen. Russia experienced a series of bad setbacks in her progress to this goal from 1904 to 1920; but all losses have been regained since 1945 and much added—control of most of the southern Baltic shores, the Albanian pocket on the Adriatic, and a firm hold on the North China ports. The defection of Jugoslavia in 1948, and the subsequent failure of the Soviet-supported war in Greece, have been the only recent failures.

Interestingly, the Russian Admiralty itself has not in the past shared this aggressive mood. Whether in war or in peace, the Russian Navy has taken little part in the territorial expansion of the country. Russian naval history has been characterized by passivity, and, often, by defeat. It was the Russians who applied the "front-end-back" doctrine of the "fortress fleet"—the theory under which the fleet is merely an extension of the fortified base. To reason that the fleet exists for the base is the negation of all naval power. By that doctrine, the ships retire behind the guns of the fort when danger threatens; that was the pattern in the Crimean War a hundred years ago, and in the Japanese War in 1905.

In the First World War the German Navy kept the Russians in check with a few second-rate ships; and there were no clashes between Russian and German surface craft in the last war. The Russians claimed to have sunk quite a number of German ships,

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but the claims have been shown false. In four years of war the Russians sank three German torpedo boats, one by planes, two by mines; none by submarine or surface craft. But note those two mine victims. The Russians have been masters of this form of sea war for many years. In 1905 two Japanese battleships were sunk in one day by Russian mines. We have had four minesweepers sunk off Korea and five destroyers damaged by mines; our ships could not enter the important Korean port of Wonsan for a long period after its capture in 1950 because of the minefields.

And though in the last war the Soviet fleets were no more aggressive than the Tsarist fleets had been before them, we must remember that they had their bases cut from under them by German ground forces. The Black Sea Fleet had nothing at all upon which to support itself, while the Baltic Fleet was backed into the trap at Leningrad, where it lay blockaded and besieged. But at Leningrad the ships fought successfully in the defense of their base. (Had they not succeeded they must have been lost, for this was their last stand and there was no way out.) When the tide of war turned, the ships advanced with the army, lending support with their big guns and carrying out short-range amphibious operations. Yet even that late in the war there was no attempt to engage the surviving German warships, which were providing effective support for their retreating troops.

Russian naval history has been a checkered one, with much of defeat and frustration and little of victory. But never before has the sea meant so much to Russia as it does now. The Soviet Union has attained warm-water ports, and the goal of free gateways to the open sea lies within striking distance. But the home base of the chief opponent is beyond the reach of the huge armies Russia can put in the field. Doubtless Soviet strategists have studied the lessons of the last war, when German armies checkmated her warships by capturing or besieging their bases. There is no likelihood that the Soviets will underestimate the importance of ground forces. But to beat down the vast-spread arms of the Western world, or to claw at the heart of power of that world, will require ships. There is little reason for the Russians to build speedy new battleships and cruisers, and a thousand submarines, if their strategists intend merely to hide them behind fortress walls—not when the prize being fought for is the rest of the world.

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THE DILEMMA OF BRITISH LABOR

By R. V. Sampson

ALTHOUGH the British Labor Government went down to defeat in October last it still remained the strongest single party in the state. In terms of the popular vote, it led by more than 200,000 over its Conservative opponents, and was defeated in terms of seats by only the narrowest of margins, largely determined by Liberal Party supporters who had finally recognized the collapse of their own party. Now the defeat of an active reformist administration after more than six years in office is scarcely a matter of surprise. Disraeli's description of Gladstone's famous first reform administration two years before its demise in 1874 as "a range of exhausted volcanoes" comes at once to mind. When we consider further that the Labor Party held office during the years following the greatest physical and economic strain Britain has ever had to endure, in which the exhaustions of war were followed by the arduous and lean years of reconstruction, what is surprising is that the party should have succeeded in retaining so much popular support.

My purpose here is twofold—to explain the sources of such enduring loyalty as the Labor Party clearly commands in Britain, and to attempt an assessment of its future rôle, particularly in the light of the threatened schism within the Party, foreshadowed by the resignation of Mr. Aneurin Bevan and his supporters from the Labor Cabinet. This domestic rift in the lute, temporarily papered over perhaps, masks a fundamental crisis in the history of the Labor movement, on the outcome of which may well depend the destiny of Britain in the decades to come.

The Attlee Administration of 1945–1951 was by any standard a very remarkable one. It was not merely its professed intention to make unremitting war on what Sir William (now Lord) Beveridge happily termed the "five giants on the road of reconstruction," Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness; the Administration actually proceeded to implement its promises. Moreover, it waged this war without resorting to force. It succeeded no less than Churchill's Administration had done before it in evoking a powerful moral response from the people it led. To unite a people in the face of a common external danger may not be easy, but it is more difficult to unite a people in the struggle

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against social injustice bound up with many entrenched interests.

In the nineteenth century, the British succeeded in the face of many dangers in building a political democracy without incurring a violent revolution. The generation which emerged from World War II formulated their immediate task as that of establishing a system of social justice without incurring the hated rigors of authoritarianism. To accomplish that, they needed a government with the courage to act boldly in the face of a powerful opposition, and at the same time to resist being carried by the impetus of its reforming zeal beyond the existing state of public opinion. In the Attlee Administration they found a leadership which possessed both these virtues in full measure. The Government conceived its task to be essentially a moral one. "I may do well to remind you," John Maynard Keynes had written in 1924, ". . . that the fiercest contests and the most deeply felt divisions of opinion are likely to be waged in the coming years not round technical questions, where the arguments on either side are mainly economic, but round those which. . . . may be called psychological or, perhaps, moral."

At first sight this might appear to involve a revolutionary break in the tradition stemming from Locke in the seventeenth century down to the classical economists and the Benthamite utilitarians in the nineteenth—a tradition which conceived society as a loosely bound group of individuals competing by a law of natural harmony to promote the general interest. On such a view, the rôle of the state was as small as possible; it was the instrument of law and order, and of defense, but little more. "Our rulers," wrote Macaulay in 1830, "will best promote the improvement of the nation by strictly confining themselves to their own legitimate duties, by leaving capital to find its most lucrative course, commodities their fair price, industry and intelligence their natural reward, idleness and folly their natural punishment, by maintaining peace, by defending property . . . and by observing strict economy. . . . Let the Government do this: the People will assuredly do the rest."

In the first half of the nineteenth century, that undoubtedly represented the authentic voice of liberal individualism, although even at that time the social consequences of the Industrial Revolution were demanding of sensitive opinion remedial action, incompatible with the strict canons of laissez-faire. By the 1870's, the core of the orthodox liberal position was being destroyed

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from within. Both J. S. Mill and T. H. Green were utilitarians; both reached conclusions concerning the legitimate rôle of the state in regulating social and economic conditions, which were poles removed from the position taken up by the philosophic radicals earlier in the century. In Green, indeed, utilitarianism was formally wedded with philosophic idealism in an effort to reconcile the liberal conception of freedom with the radical's misgivings concerning the lot of "the underfed denizen of a London yard" whose proven neglect was already disturbing the social conscience of his betters. The rôle of the state might be a negative one, Green argued; certainly it was important not to undermine the wellsprings of self-help and individual improvement, but since society had a right to demand of its citizens the fulfilment of certain obligations, it had a corresponding obligation to remove obstacles to the individual's development which he could not cope with. Thus was the road opened in the name of individualism to state provision of minimum conditions of health, housing and education for all its citizens. Even idealists like Bradley and Bosanquet, with their emphasis on the duty of the individual to conduct himself worthily whatever the station or class to which God had seen fit to call him, indirectly paved the way to a new attitude toward the responsibilities of the state by the fervor with which they stressed its moral function.

At the same time the Fabians, more intimately associated with the detail of institutional anomalies, continued the pragmatic, radical elements of the English reform tradition by undertaking a detailed survey of the inadequacies of existing institutions. The culminating triumph of their work may be seen in that monument to patient scientific inquiry, informed by a deep concern for the impoverished masses, the Minority Report on the Poor Law of 1909, for which the Webbs must be given most of the credit. Their recommendations involved no less than a total repudiation of the poor-law structure, with its roots going back in an almost unbroken tradition to the Elizabethan Statute of 1601. Instead of a stop-gap system of *ad hoc* charity, reluctantly given on the one hand and received with humiliation and bitterness on the other, the Webbs urged on society its duty to recognize its responsibility to provide for the care of those on whose ultimate well-being and capacity society must depend for its advancement. In place of the principle of "less eligibility," institutionalized in the shape of the detested workhouse, in place of the per-

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petuation of pauperdom on a hand-to-mouth basis from the cradle to the grave, they proposed the revolutionary principles of compulsory, curative treatment, universally provided as a means to preventing the tragedies of destitution.

The primary condition for this novel attack on poverty lay, however, in a sphere outside the terms of reference of the Poor Law Commission. No society could hope to shoulder the immense financial burden implicit in these recommendations unless it was able to control the level of employment. And this contemporary British capitalist society was to prove itself increasingly unable to do. The somewhat unpredictable career of the recurring trade cycles in the business world was a long-familiar phenomenon. So long as these periodic upheavals did not get entirely out of hand, they were regarded as a necessary evil compensated for by the blessings of an undiluted individualism which alone could infuse the necessary vigor of incentive to boost production to the level of prosperity. In the inter-war years, however, when the cycle of boom and depression was accelerated to the feverish climax of the world slump of 1929, when the resultant unemployment figures passed the 2,000,000 mark and never fell below 1,000,000, even the most ardent disciples of Adam Smith could not wholly stifle their misgivings. Certainly in the face of such cataclysmic disorders, it could no longer be argued that poverty and social inadequacy were the outcome of the moral shortcomings and improvidence of the unhappy victims. When the unemployed population oscillated between one in five and one in ten of the employables, the futility, not to say mockery, of moral exhortation was fully exposed.

Among those who reacted constructively to the situation are to be distinguished two major schools of thought, the cleavage between which still lies at the root of the present schism in intelligent British political thinking. To put it briefly, the controversy was essentially of the end-or-mend variety. On the one hand were those who argued that the industrialist capitalist structure had stood the country in good stead for 150 years or more, that an alternative system would involve a revolutionary change with unpredictable consequences, that there was no evidence that the system's appeal to the fundamental money-making instinct in mankind could be superseded by anything more reliable, that the existing defects were amenable to intelligent thought, and that accordingly we should seek to retain a modified version of what

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we had rather than precipitately to embrace evils we know not of. This school looked for leadership to avowed non-Socialist liberal aristocrats, remarkable alike for their intellectual powers and their integrity—preëminent among them Keynes and Beveridge.

While this group wished to prescribe shock treatment to keep the patient alive, others argued that nothing short of a lethal dose could do any good. It was necessary to make a fresh start. The Socialists did not wish to stop the holes in the capitalist dike, for the very good reason that they objected to capitalism on grounds more fundamental than those of economic efficiency. Capitalism was to be condemned primarily because it depended on its appeal to the profit motive. Socialists held that the acquisitive society, resting on privilege and inequality, was basically inimical to the moral aspirations of which men were capable.

This clash of opinion might at first sight appear to be fundamental. The vast majority of British Socialists, however, inherit a strongly pragmatic tradition within the framework of lawful constitutional action. The Fabians, after all, advocated the "inevitability of gradualness." Revolution and authoritarian methods are as inimical to Socialists as to any other British political party, the Communists excepted. This results in a basic ambivalence of attitudes, often subconscious in British Socialists. On the one hand, liberal proposals to mend capitalism, involving an extension of state regulation of economic life and a broader distribution of the national wealth, seem from a Socialist angle to be welcome as a step in the right direction. On the other hand, Socialists fear that such remedies might succeed in persuading people of the spiritual adequacy of a society which still rests basically on an appeal to the despised profit motive. Thus fidelity to their ideal of voluntary coöperation in pursuit of the good life for all causes them to oppose measures which may be economically sound from an immediate standpoint.

This conflict, which Keynes once diagnosed as one between the head and the heart, is crucial to an understanding of present-day alignments in left-wing British politics. For the Labor Governments of 1945–1951, while pursuing policies acceptable to most Socialists, did nothing to demonstrate decisively that they had passed beyond the Keynesian-Beveridge position of making capitalism work. Only in the tardy and somewhat hesitant nationalization of steel did they come close to burning their boats, and that measure is already due for repeal by Churchill's second

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Administration. The implementation of the remedies of the "liberal aristocrats" for alleged capitalist inefficiency and injustice required a program extending over six years; so long as it was being enacted, it was possible to evade the issue of whether or not this remedy was only a transition stage on the road to a full democratic and Socialist society. When the program was completed, however, the ambivalence in the minds of Socialists came to the surface and threatened a schism within the ranks of Labor.

Though this may seem surprising to those who have been wont to consider the Labor Government as a full-fledged Socialist government, a comparison of the main outlines of the Keynesian-Beveridge proposals with the policies actually pursued by the Labor Government in office shows how far from Socialist most of them are. Keynes, it need scarcely be said, was always an avowed opponent of state Socialism, while Beveridge (like Keynes a lifelong member of the Liberal Party) was careful to emphasize in his "Full Employment in a Free Society" that his proposals were irrelevant to the Socialist-capitalist debate. His conclusions, he stated, implied "only a judgment that it would be possible to obtain full productive employment under conditions of private enterprise." Both men, moreover, shared an "apostolic" faith in a moral and intellectual élite matched by a corresponding disinclination to attribute much in the way of responsibility or capacity for leadership to the masses of a modern democracy.

The theory of employment implicit in the classical conception of laissez-faire maintained that the price of labor competing in a free market would be determined by the requirements of full employment. If in fact conditions of full employment were not realized, this could only mean that the price of labor had been artificially forced up. If, for example, the labor unions were strong enough to make it politically impracticable to allow the unimpeded forces of supply and demand to drive wages down to the requisite level, then unemployment must be accepted as an unavoidable evil. It might, however, even be desirable to maintain a pool of unemployed in the interests of the living standards of the employed, and also as an incentive to their efficiency.

The burden of Keynes' critique is found in his denial that an unrestricted free-enterprise economy could, automatically, adjust the propensity to save to the inducement to invest. An increase of savings as a result, for example, of increased profits would produce unemployment by reducing consumption. This

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in turn would reduce the margin of saving available to others. There was accordingly no guarantee that an increase in the propensity to save would, by reducing the rate of interest, result in an increased inducement to invest. On the contrary, in so far as diminished consumption tends to undermine the confidence of entrepreneurs in their expectations of a return on their investments at a rate higher than the prevailing rate of interest, their logical incentive will be to stop creating new assets and to substitute for them investments with greater liquidity. The logic of the system, moreover, produced a permanent pressure toward disequilibrium, because of the automatic reduction of the value of capital assets through their own increase in a boom period. In the nineteenth century this fluctuation was not disastrous in its effects because the demand for capital outlay tended constantly to run ahead of the capacity to invest—a result of the combined factors of a steadily increasing population, immense technological advances and seemingly inexhaustible overseas markets. In the twentieth century, however, the impetus of the Industrial Revolution had exhausted itself at the very time that the "great frontier" (in Professor W. P. Webb's phrase) was approaching its physical limits.

Under these changed circumstances, there was only one way to maintain the amount of investment at a level equal to the sum that consumers would wish to save out of incomes derived from the full employment of all available resources. The state, as the only agency powerful enough to restore the requisite balance, *must,* if existing economic forms were to be preserved from internal collapse, be permitted an increased degree of economic control. And Keynes envisaged conditions in which these controls might have to extend beyond monetary controls over the flow of investment to include state programs of public works, control of profits, and the redistribution of the national income to increase consumer demand. Thus he arrived at the paradox of delimiting the sphere of unrestricted private enterprise in order to safeguard "the traditional advantages of individualism" in those fields where they still held good.

Lord Beveridge is, of course, most widely known for his historic "Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services," made in November 1942, from which it can be seen that his main interests place him with the institutionalists in the tradition of the Webbs rather than with the great economic theorists. So successful was

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he in his task of demonstrating that a comprehensive social insurance scheme was administratively practicable that the Government eventually translated his proposals on to the statute book almost as they stood. No more a Socialist than Keynes, his proposals to cure the twin evils of unemployment and underconsumption similarly involved a drastic extension of the traditional rôle of the state. The defects of capitalism he diagnosed (in the Herbert Spencer Lecture, May 1935) as liability to monetary disturbance, gross inequalities of income and mutual antagonism between capital and labor. These defects he proposed to cure by granting the state the power to maintain a total capital outlay sufficient to maintain full employment, to control the location of industry, and to secure the organized mobility of labor. Moreover, his extensive social insurance proposals, though conceived as intrinsically valuable in relieving wage earners from distress and anxiety, would also involve a supplementary means of redistributing the national income through taxation. In this respect, too, Beveridge's links with Keynes are clear.

These non-Socialist economic prescriptions and political assumptions help us to evaluate the significance of the Labor Government's postwar program. The program can be summarized as an attempt to reconcile national planning in the interests of social welfare and full employment with the limits imposed upon state action by a deeply cherished tradition of political liberty. It will be convenient to discuss the means to this end under three heads: first, the extension in the Government's powers to control the flow of investment; second, the national taxation policy; and third, the actual postwar social welfare measures themselves.

Governmental control over investment is exercised financially and physically. To exert adequate financial pressure, the Government assumed control of the Bank of England and increased the powers of the Bank to coerce the Joint Stock Banks; it further passed the Investment (Control and Guarantees) Act of 1946, perpetuating the wartime Capital Issues Committee and establishing a National Investment Council. Pressure was applied to the flow of investment by maintaining the rate of interest at a low level, and thus stimulating a high monetary demand; this made possible a controlled expansion of capital investment through inflationary pressure. At the same time, under the Supplies and Services Act of 1945, counter-inflationary physical controls were exercised through the licensing system. These enabled

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the Government to control the flow of raw materials and imports on a basis of priority allocations. In such industries as coal, electricity and gas, internal transport and overseas airways, the Labor Government could, of course, control the flow of investment directly by transferring what it regarded as vital public utilities from the sphere of private enterprise to public ownership.

So far we have discussed policies designed to secure the requisite total capital outlay by the controlled stimulation of the entrepreneur's inducement to invest. But however extensive the financial controls, they will not in themselves secure full employment if the national income is so unequally distributed as to leave the bulk of consumers unable to translate their basic needs into effective economic demand. This problem was attacked on two fronts: direct taxation and the provision of social services.

Since the new social services would cost the state a great deal of money, the Government had to decide how the money was to be raised. Its policy on this issue was frank. "We shall shift the burden," announced Chancellor Dalton, "from the poorer to the richer, from the active element to the passive element. . . ." Of the 10,000,000 people newly subjected to income tax by wartime Chancellors, over 3,000,000 were wholly exempted from liability. Further reliefs were given to the lower income groups in the shape of reduced rates on small incomes, and increased personal and dependents' allowances. At the other end of the scale, surtax rates were increased to a level which in effect reduced the legal maximum annual net income to £5,000 or £6,000.

The enormous extension in the social services, enacted by the Family Allowances Act, the National Insurance Act, Industrial Injuries Act, National Assistance Act and the National Health Service Act, secured for every active citizen, including housewives, a minimum subsistence level, whatever the reason for the loss of earning capacity. This giant social insurance scheme was financed in large part by universal compulsory insurance contributions, although in the case of the Health Service, which provides everyone with free medical treatment, the bulk of the expenditure is supplied by the Exchequer. Nor is this by any means the sum total of the state expenditure on social services. Further redistribution of the national income is effected through free compulsory education, housing subsidies and, above all, through extensive food subsidies. Indirectly, too, the rent restriction acts have served to subsidize the tenant class at the expense of the

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landlord class. Some idea of the extent of these schemes can be gained when it is realized that considerably more than one-third of the total state expenditure is consumed in supporting them.

As a result of this immense program, the vast majority of the working population are undoubtedly better provided for today than at any time in the past. For example, Mr. B. Seebohm Rowntree and Mr. G. R. Lavers, in the third social survey of the City of York, conclude that whereas in 1936 over 17 percent of the total population of the city were living below a minimum "human needs standard," the corresponding figure for 1950 was less than 2 percent.

There is, however, another and darker side to the picture: the problem of the balance of payments. So long as the British cannot be confident of their capacity to export enough to pay for their necessary imports of food and raw materials, so long must they feel that the financial stability and with it their social welfare provisions are in constant jeopardy.

For a time at least after the war, it seemed plausible enough to explain the dollar gap in terms of the liquidation of most of Britain's overseas assets and their replacement by a prodigiously swollen national debt. Moreover, the entire economy had been gravely distorted in the interests of prosecuting the war. Plant normally devoted to the production of civil requirements had been allowed to stand idle or to depreciate. In the interests of increased war production valuable overseas markets had been lost. Shipping services, one of the most important of Britain's invisible exports, had been grievously hit by the war. But laudable as have been the production feats of British industry, and generous as has been the aid afforded by the United States and the British Dominions, the position has continued seemingly intractable.

Part of the explanation for this lies, of course, in the continued burden of armaments required by the demands of national security. At no time since the war have British military commitments abroad been remotely commensurate to the limited economic capacities of the nation, and the latest rearmament effort is a severe trial. It is finally plain to the British people that the economic ills of the nation are not going to disappear overnight. The hard fact of the matter is that Britain achieved the prosperity which enabled her to expand her population to some 50,000,000 by her primacy in the race of the Industrial Revolution. In the nineteenth century, conditions of world trade favored enor-

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mously a nation which was peculiarly dependent upon foreign trade. But the conditions which produced high prices for manufactured goods and low prices for food and raw materials have now been decisively reversed, and all the available evidence suggests that this state of things is likely to endure. If Britain is to survive as a prosperous nation in terms of her present population, she cannot long continue to carry the present burden of armaments and she must still further increase her levels of production.

This latter requirement at any rate is not impossible of fulfilment. Three basic industries in Britain are chronically undermanned—coal, textiles and agriculture. It has been estimated that if scarcely more than 1 percent of the employed industrial population could be persuaded to transfer to these industries, the over-all economic position of the nation would be immeasurably improved. But this at once raises the crucial problem of how to induce men to perform vital but unattractive services to the community in a free society. Economic freedom, *i.e.* full employment, excludes the solution of the problem of incentive through the economic whip of fear in the shape of unemployment. Political freedom excludes the solution of civil conscription of labor.

These are the conflicting needs which create the dilemma confronting the Labor movement. The British economy is still far from being a Socialist economy; it is at most a mixed economy with the privately controlled sector of industry still playing the predominant rôle. The economy relies still on the profit motive for its effective functioning. Although much has been done to diminish vast disparities of personal wealth, and the social classes blend into one another more easily than in the past, the complicated web of social relations cannot possibly be described as a classless society. Moreover, such advances as have been made toward this somewhat abstract ideal are, as we have seen, beset with dangers. In the hazardous and difficult circumstances of the mid-century, when the security of the state makes demands on human energy more unremitting than ever before, the Labor movement in Britain will shortly have to make the fateful choice as to whether the circumstances are such as to encourage it to press on with further measures designed to bring about a society in which men will be content to labor and create for the common good, instead of being driven by motives of personal enrichment.

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THE SOVIET CONQUEST OF RUMANIA

By Barry Brannen

THE possibility of negotiating a full settlement with the Soviet Government has been the subject of searching inquiry on both sides of the Atlantic. It was made an issue in the British elections, and was debated at the last meeting of the United Nations Assembly in Paris. The President of the United States has expressed the hope that if our strength increases, a final settlement may be reached. But there is no consensus in the matter. Many believe that all such discussions are idle. How, they ask, can we reach an agreement with men who test the good faith of their actions by criteria which we abandoned almost two thousand years ago? Others feel that if an agreement can but be reduced to writing, and signed, the long-sought goal will be at hand, forgetting that it is not the promise but the fulfillment that is important. Of this, the current history of Rumania provides mournful illustration and example.

Unlike the neighboring states of Bulgaria and Jugoslavia, Rumania is not Slavic in race or language. Unlike Bulgaria, her foreign policy has never been oriented toward Russia. There has never been the slightest disposition on the part of the great majority of Rumanians to collaborate with Russia on a military, economic or political plane. Accordingly, what we witness in the country today is the direct imposition of Soviet controls on a people whose race, language and previous politics give no indication that such controls are desirable or acceptable. It was accomplished, moreover, under an Armistice Convention, *i.e.* a negotiated settlement, the expressed purpose of which was to safeguard the "independence and sovereignty" of the country.[1] The experience is a warning to all free peoples against trusting in pacts with the Soviets.

II

Any attempt to analyze the Rumanian débâcle must commence with the events of August 23, 1944. On that date King Michael, in conjunction with a number of Rumanian military leaders and the support of the leaders of the National Peasant

[1] The Armistice Convention was signed on September 12, 1944. The Peace Treaty which superseded it did not become effective until September 15, 1947, long after the Soviet conquest had been substantially completed.

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and Liberal Parties, effected a successful coup d'état. The King acted forcefully and bravely, outfaced Marshal Antonescu, and ended by imprisoning him in the Palace. The army followed the King to a man. The not inconsiderable German forces in the Bucharest area were taken by surprise, and in a brief but spirited campaign were driven to the Hungarian frontier.

The Antonescu régime was succeeded by a government headed by General Sanatescu, who had served before the war as military attaché in London. Though this government was hastily established, it nevertheless contained representatives of all political parties. It lasted until shortly after the execution of the Armistice Convention on September 21, 1944.

It was at this stage that, in company with other American representatives on the Allied Control Commission, I first arrived in Rumania. We flew in from Athens, and landed at Baneasa airport, just north of Bucharest, on October 25, 1944. Our Russian and British colleagues were already on the scene.

General Sanatescu had succeeded meanwhile in forming a second coalition government, in which all political elements of the Rumanian electorate were represented. Undoubtedly he intended well, but the Communist opposition was strong, and he had little personal support throughout the country. No one expected his second government to last long. A crisis developed in the latter part of November, and on December 2, 1944, the King called upon General Nicolae Radescu, an old soldier and an uncompromising anti-Fascist, to form a new government.

Prior to General Radescu's term of office, all left-wing elements had been engaged in a vigorous attack on the Sanatescu régime. The cabinet meetings were torn with dissension. Proposals made by the National Peasant and National Liberal leaders were criticized by the Communist Ministers in the most intemperate terms. Accordingly, when the Government fell there seemed no possibility of forming a coalition government in which the Communists would be willing to participate. Nevertheless, to the surprise of some observers, the Communists again accepted portfolios in the Government and endorsed Radescu's program. A cardinal principle of this program required all Ministers "to cooperate in order and discipline with the Prime Minister."

The term of the Radescu Government may be divided into two periods. The first lasted from his appointment as Prime Minister until January 24, 1945, when the Communist leader and

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Minister of Communications, Gheorghiu-Dej, returned from an official visit to Moscow. Until then the political cauldron had been quiet. Communist press attacks against the Government had almost entirely ceased, and there was little criticism even of the leaders of the traditional (National Peasant and National Liberal) parties. General Radescu had used a firm hand against radicals who were attempting to usurp administrative powers in the provinces, and his administration appeared to grow stronger every day.

Upon returning to Bucharest, however, Gheorghiu-Dej issued a scathing statement attacking what he called the "anti-democratic" elements in the country. He repeated his charges a few days later in a speech before the Union of Railroad Workmen. At the same time a coalition of left-wing parties, called the National Democratic Front (F.N.D.),[2] appeared to swing, surprisingly enough, to the Right. The National Democratic Front published a new party platform and appealed vigorously for public support. On its face, the new program seemed far less radical than a previous platform, published three months before. In particular, the National Democratic Front no longer proposed the nationalization of banks or large industries. In an unpublished address to the railway workers, Gheorghiu-Dej stated expressly that the National Democratic Front expected to coöperate with all industrialists who would make their capital available for the reconstruction of Rumania; left-wing elements were apparently seeking conservative support.

The publication of the new platform was the signal for renewed criticism of the Government by the Communist press, and the period of political serenity came abruptly to an end. The Communist leader, Teohari Georgescu, attacked not only the "anti-democratic" elements in the country but the policies of the Government itself. His action was significant since he occupied the post of Undersecretary of the Interior, and his attack was patently contrary to the understanding which all Ministers had entered into at the time the Radescu Government took office. The traditional parties came actively to the support of the Government and attempted to publish manifestoes of their own. They

[2] This was the name given by the Communist Party to a hastily organized coalition of putative "political parties" whose policies and organizations were subject entirely to Communist direction and control. In every Balkan country, a similar "front" was organized and in each country the attempt was made to induce the Socialist Party to adhere to it. In Rumania, the latter tactic was successful.

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were prevented from doing so, however, by the Communist-controlled printers' unions which refused to print any newspapers carrying the texts. *Viitorul,* the official newspaper of the National Liberal Party, continued to appear, but, perforce, without the program of the Liberal Party. The official newspaper of the National Peasant Party, *Dreptatea,* suspended publication rather than accede to the printers' demands.

In this state of affairs General Radescu announced that he would make a public address at the Scala Theater in Bucharest on February 11, 1945. When I arrived at the theater, the Communists were already in full control. They had, in fact, occupied the building the previous night and refused to leave. To avoid public disturbance, the Prime Minister chose to deliver his address at the Aro Theater nearby. In it he severely criticized the action of the printers' unions, charging that their attempt to censor political publications amounted to a denial of freedom of the press. He considered the question of land reform at length, and announced that the Government would take no action with reference to the division of large estates at that time. He gave two reasons: first, that the contemplated land reform would interfere with the maximum production of wheat and corn, required of Rumania under the Armistice Agreement, and secondly, that soldiers then at the front had the right to be consulted and to participate in any measures designed to redistribute the land.

The National Democratic Front joined issue on the question of immediate land reform and called for a mass street demonstration against the Radescu Government on February 13, 1945. This was the first of a series of such demonstrations organized by the Communists. I saw them all, and the pattern was always the same. The labor unions attended in force, being marshalled to their places by organizers of the National Democratic Front. It seemed to many of us that approximately 25,000 people participated in this particular demonstration. They paraded down the Calea Victoriei to the King's Palace, and dispersed without disorder. Though there was no untoward incident, political and social unrest evidently was increasing sharply throughout the country. Shortly thereafter, the Communists made a number of abortive attempts to seize the governmental prefectures in the provinces. In Bucharest a series of disorders culminated in an armed attack on the Malaxa Steel and Locomotive Plant on February 20, 1945.

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This plant had been under the direction of self-installed Communist elements for several months, as had other industrial establishments. To combat these tactics, the National Peasant Party had commenced a campaign to enlist industrial workers among its own members, and its efforts in this regard had extended to the Malaxa plant.

On February 20, the workers at the plant attempted to hold an election to designate their bargaining representatives. When it appeared that left-wing leaders would be defeated, a group of several hundred armed workers from adjoining industrial establishments demonstrated in front of the gates. Soon they attempted to enter, and shots were exchanged with workers within the plant, who meanwhile had possessed themselves of arms. During the course of the mêlée the labor leader Apostol, who had led the demonstration, was wounded by rifle fire.

The Communist press seized upon the disorders as the work of "Fascists" and "saboteurs of the Armistice," and called for a second mass demonstration to be held in Bucharest on February 24. This time approximately 50,000 people, assembling as before, paraded down the Calea Victoriei. The parade was without incident until the first marchers reached the building housing the Ministry of the Interior, directly across the square from the King's Palace. At this stage, a group of approximately 500 men detached themselves from the marchers, advanced against the building, and attempted to force an entrance. Soldiers posted near the entrance repelled the men with rifle fire. While the soldiers appeared to be firing over the heads of the crowd, bullets ricocheted from adjoining structures and a number of casualties resulted. Meanwhile the demonstrators had fled in panic.

That night the disorders continued. Members of the National Liberal Party attempted to demonstrate in front of the Ministry of the Interior on behalf of Premier Radescu, but were fired upon without warning by unidentified assailants. The next morning the Communist press charged that the Radescu Government, by provocative action, had created the disturbances and had utilized them as an excuse to fire upon the populace. The sequence of events and the happenings of the day were completely misrepresented and the Government was viciously attacked. General Radescu in turn spoke out hotly against the Communist leaders.

Russian support of the National Democratic Front, heretofore passive, now became active and direct. From Moscow, by press

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and radio, came a completely distorted picture of the events of February 24. The Russian dispatches strongly attacked the traditional parties and openly demanded the ouster of the Government.[3] By direction of the Russian military, a number of measures were taken to disarm the Bucharest garrison. The Russians insisted that the Rumanian forces in rear areas greatly exceeded the requirements of security and constituted a threat to the Russian armies at the front.

Still another mass demonstration was called by the National Democratic Front to be held in Piata Natiunei, in Bucharest, on March 8, 1945. Reliable reports at this time indicated that workmen were being armed, particularly by the militant Communist organization, *Apararea Patriotica.* It was evident that the security of the Government was directly threatened, for (as a result of the Soviet measures) no armed forces were available to prevent the occupancy of public buildings. To many of us it seemed that the possibility of a Communist coup d'état was very great indeed.

At this juncture Andrei Vishinsky, then Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Marshal Malinovsky, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, arrived in Bucharest. In the most militant terms Vishinsky demanded that the King dismiss General Radescu. Otherwise, he said, he would not be responsible for the continued independence of Rumania. He terminated the audience abruptly, and on leaving slammed the door with the greatest violence. I remember that the King later pointed out, somewhat ruefully, the resulting damage to the plaster on the wall.

The King yielded to the show of force. A mandate was first tendered Prince Barbu Stirbey, elder statesman and former Premier, who proved unable to form a government. At Vishinsky's suggestion, a limited mandate was then given to Dr. Petru Groza authorizing the formation of a coalition government only. It appeared almost at once that Groza could not obtain the support of either the Liberal Party or the National Peasant Party and

[3] I remember attending a meeting of the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest many months later at which the happenings on February 24 were recounted by General Vinogradoff, then Deputy Chairman of the Commission. General Vinogradoff was not the least coöperative Soviet official with whom we were in contact in Rumania: in many respects, he was the most. Nevertheless he misstated the facts and misrepresented the events of that day completely. He knew that we had both been in Rumania at the time. But the fact that he knew that I knew that what he had to say was the very antithesis of the truth did not appear to embarrass him. He seemed to take for granted that I could distinguish between truth and policy.

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that coalition under Groza of all political elements in the country was not feasible.

Nevertheless Groza did not return his mandate but presented to the King a list of Ministers which contained no representatives of the traditional parties. Again the King protested, and again Vishinsky intervened. The King's approval was given reluctantly during the late afternoon of March 6. The Government thus formed was not a coalition government but was composed entirely of left-wing elements. The Prime Minister, Groza, did not call himself a Communist, but the leader of a small political party termed the Ploughmen's Front. But both before and after his designation as Prime Minister, Groza and his followers consistently followed the Communist Party line.

III

The Soviet Government lost no time demonstrating its confidence in Groza and tendering his Government active political support.[4] Groza predicted at his first cabinet meeting, on March 7, 1945, that Russia would shortly agree to the return of Rumanian administrative control in northern Transylvania. Ever since the Armistice, all Rumanian officials had been excluded from the Transylvanian area by Russian military authorities. The Rumanian Administrator for Transylvania, Ionel Pop, appointed by General Radescu, had never been permitted by Soviet authorities to exercise the functions of his office. Of course, the return of full control over Transylvania was considered a cardinal issue in Rumanian politics.

Groza's prediction proved accurate, and the return of Rumanian administration to the province was formally observed in ceremonies at Cluj on March 14, 1945, attended by most of the members of the Rumanian Council of Ministers and by Russian officials on the Allied Control Commission. At this time, neither the American nor the British Government had taken any steps

[4] In the summer of 1944, Prime Minister Churchill and the British Foreign Secretary initiated discussions with the Russians relative to the extent and compass of the respective activities of their governments in the Balkans. The agreement reached in October was not made public at the time. In substance it made Rumania and Bulgaria the primary concern of Russia, and accorded the British the initiative in Greece. The United States Government had been notified, and objected to any division of the Balkans into spheres of influence. In the end, it seems to have approved the arrangement, but only as a wartime measure and for a limited period of three months (*cf.* "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull," Vol. 2, p. 1453 *et seq.*). This agreement did not initiate the Russian conquest of the Balkans, but it undoubtedly encouraged and aided Soviet designs in this regard and may have served also to strengthen Russian claims at Yalta.

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to recognize the Groza agreement or express approval of it; hence, neither the American nor the British representative on the Allied Control Commission attended the ceremonies at Cluj.

At the first cabinet meeting of the new Government steps were taken to consolidate administrative control in the provinces. Prefects, with F.N.D. affiliation, were appointed in all administrative districts throughout the country. A small percentage of the newly appointed officials were Socialists (whose party had joined the National Democratic Front), but the remainder were Communists, or members of putative "parties," such as the Ploughmen's Front, whose members always followed the Communist line.

Selection of the prefects was under the direct supervision of the Communist, Teohari Georgescu, who had become the new Minister of the Interior. These officials directly supervised the conduct of all Rumanian elections and had immediate charge of the Rumanian police in their districts. All administrative reports to the National Government passed directly through their hands. The appointment of Communist prefects effected, therefore, a revolutionary political change in the local administration of the country.

Within a week of the inauguration of the Groza Government, evidence was irrefutable that arrests for political purposes were being made. A concentration camp was established at Caracal for political opponents of the Government and of the Communist Party. The anti-Communist labor leaders who participated in the disturbances at the Malaxa plant the preceding February, for example, were sent there, as were the printers who, during the preceding March, attempted to revive the National Peasant newspaper *Dreptatea*. On May 10, 1945, two Ministers in former Rumanian National Governments, who were also members of the National Peasant Party, were arrested at Timisoara. On June 13, 11 leaders of the National Peasant Party in Bucharest were seized. The arrest of General Radescu at this time was averted only when he asked for, and received, asylum from the British Mission. All arrests were made by officials of *Sigurantza*, the national police, which had been completely reorganized and staffed with Communists and other F.N.D. sympathizers. Conspicuous among the newly appointed officials were men who held like posts under the totalitarian régime of Marshal Antonescu.

Arrests of the leaders of opposing political elements continued

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steadily throughout the months following. In June, the Chiefs of the National Peasant organization at Touci and Braila were arrested, together with one of the four Section Chiefs of the National Peasant organization in Bucharest. Emil Hatigeanu, the National Peasant Party leader in Transylvania, was placed in custody, as was also N. Caradine, formerly editor of the newspaper *Dreptatea*. All these men were seized without proper legal process; no Rumanian court ordered their arrest and they were not brought before a magistrate within the period required by Rumanian law.

General Schuyler, the chief American representative on the Commission, called formally to the attention of the Commission the facts surrounding this breakdown of law. He urged the establishment of a Joint Board of Enquiry to determine the conditions under which Rumanian leaders of opposing political views were being imprisoned by government agents. His action was endorsed immediately by Air Vice Marshal Stephenson, the chief British representative. No action whatsoever was taken by the Soviet authorities, nor was the slightest attempt made to remedy the conditions. The explanation is implicit in the way in which the Allied Control Commission was organized and permitted to function.

The Armistice Convention had been signed by the United States, Great Britain and Russia, and only their representatives were members of the Allied Control Commission. Upon their arrival in Bucharest, the British had proposed that the Commission be organized along the general lines adopted during the war by the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff. In effect, their suggestion called for direct participation by all three Powers in the work of the several sections of the Allied Control Commission—Army, Navy, Economic and Air. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Chairman of the Commission, who suggested nothing to take its place. Instead, the four sections of the Commission were established unilaterally by the Chairman, and staffed with Soviet personnel. Soviet section heads were appointed, who reported directly to the Chairman of the Commission.

It is true that combined meetings of the Chief Representatives of the Soviet, British and American Missions were held regularly at stated intervals. At these meetings the British and American representatives listened to reports of the Soviet section heads,

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presented the respective points of view of their governments, and urged particular action on the part of the Commission on matters in which they were interested. But the functions of the British and American representatives were at all times advisory only. The Soviet Chairman reserved full authority to commit the Allied Control Commission to any policy or any course of action.[5]

It must not be thought that these conditions were in any degree acceptable to the British or American representatives. General Schuyler, who was able and astute, objected strenuously in meetings of the Control Committee and in reports to Washington, and pressed the American claims for greater participation. The question was taken up at the Potsdam Conference in midsummer of 1945, but though a number of inconsequential changes in the organization of the Committee took place as a result, and American representatives on the Commission did gain the right to travel throughout Rumania (on two days' notice to the Soviet Chairman) without being accompanied on the journey by a Soviet Liaison Officer, the actual situation was not changed in the slightest.

Along with its efforts to terrorize political opponents, the Groza Government maintained rigid control of the opposition press. The measures it employed were as bad as anything experienced by the press under the Antonescu régime.By December 1945, the Government had succeeded in suppressing all of the newspapers which supported the National Peasant and National Liberal Parties. Other so-called independent newspapers were suspended periodically for the slightest violation of the censorship rules; for example, the newspaper *Semnalul* was suspended for one day for failing to print a headline as directed by the censor.

The Propaganda Minister (occupying a post for which there had been no counterpart in the Radescu Government) held weekly press conferences at which he outlined the general propaganda line. All newspapers were expected to obey his instructions. At the press conference on June 9, 1945, for example, he directed that the large land and factory owners throughout the country be charged in the press with responsibility for the prevailing in-

[5] Under the provisions of Paragraph 18 of the Armistice Convention of September 12, 1944, the Allied Control Commission performed its functions "under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command." This cryptic and otherwise undefined phrase proved in practice to refer to the Soviet High Command and nothing else. Although the Government of the United States did not participate actively in drafting the text of the Convention, it seems to have been aware of the over-all direction accorded the Soviet High Command.

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flation in Rumania. He also directed that the amount of space accorded Prime Minister Churchill's speeches be reduced, on the ground that Churchill was attempting to sow discord among the members of the United Nations.

All newspapers in Bucharest received daily from the Minister of Propaganda a bundle of material they were required to print. There could be no variation even in the titles of articles, and the size type to be used was frequently specified. The Propaganda Minister was in constant touch with the Soviet press representative in Bucharest, and the material delivered daily to the newspapers was strictly in accordance with Soviet over-all policy.

In August 1945, a number of youthful members of the National Liberal Party were charged by the Communist Minister of the Interior with forming "terrorist" organizations to oppose the Groza Government, and were incarcerated in the prefecture at Bucharest. The provisions of Rumanian law to the contrary, they were not then, or later, brought before a magistrate. The Communist newspapers, acting in concert, reiterated and embroidered the charges and accused the arrested men and women not only of conspiring to assassinate a number of personalities in the Administration but of plotting against an Allied victory in the war. There is little doubt that those arrested opposed the policies of the Groza régime. But no evidence was adduced at the trial, or otherwise, that they plotted against the Allies or contemplated violent action of any kind against the Government. Significantly the Social Democratic newspaper *Libertatea* considered the charges so unfounded that it refused to print the Government communiqué containing them.

When the trial of the 33 defendants opened on September 10, 1945, its political motive was at once apparent. In the first place, the Government instituted the proceedings before a Military Tribunal under Rumanian Law 236 of September 6, 1941. This Law, enacted under the Antonescu régime, appeared to be contrary to the Rumanian Constitution in providing for a double penalty whenever any defendant convicted under its provisions was a Jew or Communist. Counsel for the defendants took the position that the law was in fact repealed by the Decree of the King on September 2, 1944, abrogating all laws enacted during the Antonescu régime which were in conflict with the Rumanian Constitution. It certainly seemed to come within the category of discriminatory legislation which Rumania was required to repeal

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under Article 6 of the Armistice Convention. Nevertheless, the defendants' objections on these grounds were overruled.

When the trial began, the Military Tribunal of three was headed by General Cretulescu. He was thereafter replaced at government direction by Alexandru Petrescu, who had acted as President of a similar tribunal under the Antonescu régime. The remaining members of the original Military Tribunal were also replaced by the Government before the conclusion of the trial. Defendants' counsel (more than 70 volunteered their services) naturally took the position that the change of judges in the midst of the proceedings was unprecedented in any country and specifically contrary to Rumanian law. The proceedings continued notwithstanding.

No evidence of a conspiracy against the state was offered at the trial except the confessions of a number of defendants. The only overt act was the publication in Rumanian of the life of Abraham Lincoln! The defendants had indeed confessed but, as it developed, under varying forms of coercion and torture. Each of the defendants whose confession was introduced into the record took the stand and related the physical beatings and, in some cases, indescribable forms of torture he was forced to undergo. Some of the defendants still bore the marks of their treatment. There can be no question of the facts. I had directed an American sergeant, attached to the Mission, who spoke Rumanian, to attend the trial and report his findings. When the first defendant was examined by his own counsel the Court ordered the room cleared of all spectators. The sergeant, however, stood his ground; after heated argument he was permitted to remain and his knowledge of the proceedings was acquired at firsthand.

The trial was concluded on September 13,1945. Three defendants were acquitted, and 25 convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from one month to seven years. No verdict was returned against the remaining five defendants, who were released with the statement that the state reserved the right to re-try them at a later date. As intended, the proceedings constituted the most direct warning to all opponents of the Government that continued political activity would be ruthlessly punished. The trial was a travesty of justice.

Although Groza remained at all times the titular head of the Rumanian Government, Communists in his administration provided the driving force from the beginning. Governmental action

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was initiated by members of the Communist Executive Committee through the Communist Ministers in the Council, among whom were Ana Pauker and Laszlo Luca. Both were Rumanian citizens who had spent many years in Russia before the war; both had been charged by General Radescu with initiating the turbulent rioting in Bucharest on February 24, 1945. The principal Communist leaders in the Government itself, in addition to the Minister of the Interior, Teohari Georgescu, and the Minister of Communications, Gheorghiu-Dej, already mentioned, were L. Patrascanu, Minister of Justice, and the Secretary of the Presidency of the Council, Emil Bodnara. The influence of the latter derived largely from the fact that he served on the Communist Executive Committee. He also was a Rumanian citizen who had taken up his residence in Russia before the war and returned under Russian auspices.

IV

The Social Democratic Party had been a member of the National Democratic Front since shortly after the coup d'état of August 23,1944, but it was entirely without influence. Its representatives on the Council of Ministers held the relatively unimportant posts of Minister of Education and Minister of Mines and Petroleum; the Minister of Labor was appointed as a Socialist but his allegiance to Social Democratic principles was short-lived.

At this time, the program of the Socialists was anything but Communist in character; their leader, Titel Petrescu, likened it to that of the Labor Party in England. Shortly before the inauguration of the Groza Government, he had taken steps to preserve the integrity of his Party and disassociate it from Communist measures. He came out against the expropriation of land without legal authority, the removal of prefects and other local administrative officials by citizens' committees, and the enforced censorship resulting from action of the Communist-controlled printers' syndicates. He also declared that the entry of the Social Democratic Party into the National Democratic Front did not involve a merger with any other party, or any change of the political principles of the Socialists.

In the months following Groza's appointment, Petrescu grew increasingly critical of the Government, and by May of 1945 he no longer attended meetings of the National Democratic Front. The Communists looked upon him as "unreliable" and sought

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an opportunity to supplant him. They found a willing instrument in the Socialist Minister of Labor, Lothar Radaceanu, who had gained control of a dissident, radical wing of the party. The leaders of the traditional parties hoped that Petrescu would withdraw the Socialists from the National Democratic Front, and that this would bring about the reconstitution of a government representative of all political parties. But though Petrescu spoke up forthrightly against various government measures, he took no action, and working through Radaceanu, the Communists succeeded in splitting the Socialist Party and rendering it powerless. In the national election held in the fall of 1946 only the radical wing of the Party led by Radaceanu supported the Government and the balance of the Party, still led by Petrescu, followed the National Peasant Party and the National Liberal Party into political obscurity. The end came in 1948 when Petrescu was placed under house arrest.

The National Peasant Party was by far the largest political party in Rumania. The Communists sought, therefore, to weaken it in every way and to profit from its total exclusion from the Groza Government. The leader of the Party, Iuliu Maniu, was unremittingly attacked as a "Fascist" and a "Nazi collaborator." Actually, he was one of the most influential members of the group who organized the coup d'état of August 1944 which brought Rumania into the war on the side of the Allied nations. But his opposition to Communist domination of Rumania was absolute and unalterable. He could neither be intimidated nor cajoled. He had a great following throughout the country and escaped imprisonment until the summer of 1947 only because his arrest was considered too risky.

According to their customary tactics, the Communists first tried to reach and influence Maniu's followers by a campaign of calumny and abuse against him. And in the early part of July 1945, they organized a dissident National Peasant group, which commenced its activities by announcing that a "General Congress of the National Peasant Party" would shortly be convoked. They appointed a committee to advise the electorate of the aims and purposes of the movement. On this committee were several former members of the National Peasant Party who had already foregone their party allegiance by accepting office in the Groza Government: Anton Alexandrescu, Minister of Coöperatives, Professor A. Potop, Undersecretary of Education, Mircea Nicu-

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Iescu, Undersecretary of Public Works, and Ion Simion, Secretary General of the Ministry of Coöperatives.

The dissident movement failed to prove a substantial division in the party's ranks, however, and never became an effective political force. It had relied heavily on the fact that the party's orthodox organization did not participate in the Government, and that Alexandrescu and other members of the dissident Committee were in a position to dispense patronage in the name of the National Peasant Party. But Maniu's hold on the affections of his followers was strong, and there was never the slightest indication that his leadership of the rank and file was threatened.

The President of the National Liberals, the other traditional party, was C.I.C. (Dinu) Brătianu. However, dissident elements in the party had long followed the leadership of Gheorghe Tatarescu, who had become Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister in the Groza Government. On July 1, 1945, after much publicity, the Tatarescu followers held a "General Congress of the National Liberal Party" in Bucharest. Supporters of Brătianu did not attend and deprecated the importance of the proceedings, but a substantial number of the National Liberal district leaders throughout the country did put in an appearance. Tatarescu's followers counted on and received full Soviet support, and expelled from their own ranks any who could not stomach the excesses of the Groza régime. But Tatarescu's subserviency gained him nothing. As soon as the Communists had consolidated their power he was dropped from the Government and his place as Foreign Minister taken by the Communist Ana Pauker. Thereafter his movements were restricted by government direction and he shortly found himself under arrest.

V

It must not be supposed that the Government of the United States remained unaware of the character of the Groza Government or was uninformed of the means by which it came to power. The Groza Government had not been recognized at its inception, and communications were maintained with the greatest reserve. Not unexpectedly, therefore, the American Government announced, on March 17, 1945, that it would require discussion of the Rumanian political situation in the spirit of the Yalta Agreement. While reference to the statement in the Rumanian press was censored by governmental authorities, the announcement

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created the greatest interest in all political quarters.[6] The Government of Great Britain promptly gave notice that it was prepared to commence such discussions. The Government of the U.S.S.R. maintained an ominous silence. Nevertheless, the National Peasant and Liberal Party leaders were greatly heartened. With a hopefulness that was warranted by nothing in the text of the announcement, they expected that there would be direct American and British intervention in Rumanian politics. At once they became open and vocal in their opposition to the Groza Government.

But the Soviet Government succeeded in blocking any discussion of Rumania's status until the Conference at Potsdam in July of that year, and prevented any real settlement of the issues at the Conference. However, the communiqué issued at the end of the Conference directed the newly-created Council of Foreign Ministers to negotiate a peace treaty with Rumania, as well as with Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland and Italy, and stipulated particularly that negotiations should be undertaken with "recognized democratic governments" of these countries.

The comment on the Potsdam communiqué in the controlled Rumanian press was favorable enough. All Bucharest newspapers professed to interpret the declaration as an indication that the United Nations proposed to extirpate all vestiges of Fascism throughout Europe and to encourage the development of free and democratic institutions. But it was noteworthy that none of the journals discussed the status of the Groza régime as a "recognized democratic government." The leaders of the traditional political parties, however, seized upon the quoted text of the communiqué as an indication that the Groza Government would have to go. They again voiced the often-expressed hope that no Rumanian Government would be recognized which did not include representatives of their organizations.

Their hope that Russia had shifted her policy proved of short duration, however, for the Soviet Government, acting independently, recognized the Groza régime at the beginning of August 1945. This action was immediately characterized in the Communist press as a Soviet gesture of good will and friendship for the Rumanian people.

[6] Under the Yalta Agreement the three Allied Powers agreed jointly to assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population," and agreed to consult together on the measures necessary to discharge their joint responsibilities in this regard.

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The response of Britain and the United States was immediate and direct. Upon the specific instructions of the State Department, the Acting United States Political Representative in Rumania advised the King, as well as the leaders of the National Peasant, National Liberal and Social Democratic Parties, that the Groza régime was not representative within the meaning and intention of the Yalta Agreement. He endeavored to transmit the same message also to the leader of the Communist Party but was informed by Party members that no Communist could be designated to hear the message until the matter had been referred to Moscow! At the same time the British Political Representative made a similar statement to the King.

Of course, these declarations greatly heartened the opponents of the Government, since they were construed to mean that no peace treaty would be concluded with the régime. Rumanian non-Communists urged the King to withdraw the mandate tendered to Groza the preceding March. The King conferred with Groza on August 19, 1945. He advised Groza that in view of the developing political crises, and in accordance with his constitutional obligations, he proposed to consult the leaders of all political parties on a possible change of government. Conferences with all political leaders were in fact held by the King on the two succeeding days. On August 21, on the advice of the majority of the leaders of the Rumanian political parties, the King demanded that Groza resign. Groza's refusal was immediate and final, and was given on behalf of all the members of his Government.

The resulting position of the Government was without precedent in Rumanian history. Groza's refusal to surrender his mandate at the King's request was in direct violation of the requirements of the Rumanian Constitution. It deprived his Government of legality and amounted to a usurpation of political power. According to the Constitution, the King would have been justified in proclaiming the illegality of the Government, advising the highest judicial officer in the country of the illegal seizure of political power, and, as Commander of the Rumanian Army, taking whatever steps were necessary to enforce compliance with Rumanian law.

However, the King did none of these things. Instead he requested the joint intervention of the United States, Great Britain and Russia under the terms of the Yalta Declaration. As conceived by the King and his advisers, the Yalta Declaration re-

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quired the United States, Great Britain and Russia to consult together and act jointly in a crisis of this sort. The United States and Great Britain had already indicated that the Groza Government did not meet the express requirements of the Potsdam communiqué, and the King believed that the issue had been directly raised.

Although the American Government evinced its willingness to discuss the question with the other signatories of the Yalta Agreement, and the Government of Great Britain also agreed, the Soviet Government, replying directly to the King, announced simply that the Government of Petru Groza, as then constituted, was democratic and entirely representative and met the requirements of the Yalta Declaration in every way. No separate discussion of the problem among the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and Russia ever took place.

Nevertheless both the American and British Governments raised the issue directly, as it affected both Rumania and Bulgaria, at the London Conference in September 1945. The result was the complete disruption of the Conference. Of course, the Soviet Government chose to terminate the Conference on the procedural question of whether France and China were entitled to participate in the discussions, but this was unmistakably a pretext to conceal Russia's unwillingness to debate in public the implications of her Balkan policy. The failure of the Conference etched in sharp outline the opposing policies developing in Eastern Europe. If the American public did not know before the London Conference that a conflict had arisen between Russia and the Western Powers they were not thereafter left in doubt.

Meanwhile, although the Groza Government had not resigned, it functioned with considerable difficulty. The King refused to sign decrees and forebore to participate in most official ceremonies. When he did participate, it was with obvious reluctance and only as a result of Soviet pressure. The resulting difficulties were soon accentuated by the resignation of the Minister of Finance. The Undersecretary of Finance had strictly limited powers, and a valid appointment of a new Secretary required the King's signature. From that time forward the legal authority upon which the Government's expenditures were based became increasingly dubious.

On November 8, 1945, the Rumanian populace celebrated the anniversary of the King's Name Day. Early in the morning

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crowds began gathering in the Palace Square, waving Rumanian flags, singing the Rumanian national anthem and cheering the King. Military patrols placed at all entrances to the square by the Groza Government checked identification papers and turned many demonstrators away. Later in the forenoon, when the demonstration before the Palace had reached its height, a Communist counter-demonstration was begun. Several trucks, filled with Communist sympathizers, appeared in the square and were driven rapidly back and forth in an attempt to disperse the crowds. Before noon two of the trucks had been seized by the demonstrators, overturned and set afire, and street fighting had become general in the area.

Soldiers of the Tudor Vladimirescu Division (composed largely of former Rumanian prisoners of war, who had been recruited, indoctrinated and trained in Russia), who had arrived in small units, commenced to arrest a large number of demonstrators and take them to the nearby Ministry of the Interior. Shortly thereafter, that part of the crowd nearest the Ministry rushed the entrance—possibly to liberate the individuals arrested—and were met by gunfire from troops stationed on the premises. A check made of the Bucharest hospitals and morgue on November 9 established that the casualties from gunfire were heavy.

The Communist Minister of the Interior promptly assigned full responsibility for the events occurring on November 9 to the leaders and the rank and file of the traditional political parties, and instituted a series of repressive measures against them. A governmental communiqué, published in all Bucharest newspapers on November 9, gave an entirely distorted version of the facts. On that day and the day following, several hundred members of the National Peasant and National Liberal Parties were arrested.

VI

This, then, was the state of affairs when the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and Russia met in Moscow in December 1945. They had gathered to consider, among other matters, the objections raised by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain to the non-representative character of the Rumanian Government. The Foreign Ministers agreed that the Rumanian Government would be broadened by the inclusion in the Council of Ministers of one representative of the National

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Peasant Party and one representative of the National Liberal Party. A Commission consisting of the American Ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman, the British Ambassador to Russia, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, and the Russian Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Vishinsky, was directed to proceed to Bucharest and assist in the selection of representatives. In addition, the Groza Government was required to give assurances that free and unfettered elections would be held at an early date and would guarantee to the Rumanian electorate freedom of press, speech, religion and assembly. On the basis of these assurances, the communiqué issued at the end of the conference indicated that such a Rumanian government would be recognized by the United States and Great Britain.

This way of disposing of the British and American objections to the character of the Rumanian Government was received with dismay by the leaders of the traditional parties. They realized at once the significance of the concessions that had been made by America and Britain. They had hoped that the existing governmental impasses would be resolved in accordance with the terms of the Yalta Convention. The inclusion in the Government of one representative of each of the two largest parties in Rumania hardly seemed in keeping with the language of that pact, or likely to bring about freedom of press, speech and assembly, and the end of political terrorism. They awaited the arrival of the special Commission in Bucharest with misgivings.

This Commission did indeed secure the appointment in the Groza Government of two Ministers representing respectively the National Peasant and National Liberal Parties. The Ministers accepted office, without portfolio, largely in the hope that they could improve the desperate plight of their party members. These hopes proved illusory almost at once. After a brief lull, the same political tactics of menace and compulsion were introduced and were employed until election time. The representatives of the Liberal and National Peasant Parties in the Government found themselves entirely without influence or authority; official action was taken without their participation or knowledge.

Prior to the Moscow communiqué, the feeling was general in Bucharest that although the policy of the United States in the Balkan area had been slow in taking shape, it had assumed definite direction in the declarations of the Acting United States Political Representative which preceded the demand for Groza's

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resignation. Now all was uncertain again. The action of the Harriman-Clark-Kerr-Vishinsky Commission greatly strengthened the hand of the Government in its conflict with the King, resulted in the reëstablishment of official relations with him, and hence freed it of the charge of usurpation and illegality. The Communist Minister of the Interior remained in power, and hence in charge of the police and of all administrative officials in the districts. The Peasant and Liberal leaders knew what effect resumption of political terrorism, combined with the presence of large concentrations of Soviet troops in the country, would have on the elections. They were certain that if the elections were free, the Communist and other extremist elements in the country would be overwhelmingly defeated, as they were in Hungary in 1945. And they foresaw that, if the elections were not free, the Groza Government could insure its continuance in power, as had comparable régimes in Jugoslavia and Bulgaria. The traditional parties urged early elections; the Groza Government sought by delay to consolidate its power.

What was so long expected came at last to pass. The Government fixed November 19, 1946, as the election date, but only after a new electoral law had been enacted which disenfranchised thousands of Rumanians. Once the election date had been announced terroristic practices were directed with full force against all political opposition. Meetings of the National Peasant Party and the Liberal Party were broken up by organized gangs. Conservative Party leaders were beaten and otherwise terrorized. Both Maniu and Brătianu protested the palpable fraud in the preparation of the electoral registers. During the electoral campaign the Government of the United States criticized officially and publicly the tactics of the Groza régime.

Before the elections took place I had been assigned to other duty, having been relieved on February 9, 1946, by Captain Armit Thomas, U.S.N., who was succeeded, shortly thereafter, by Captain Eugene S. Karpe. The latter's tragic death, in 1949, upon the completion of his duty, has never been explained.[7] But full and firsthand accounts of the elections make it plain that they were farcical. They did not have even the appearance of being free. On election day the American Mission in Bucharest was

[7] Captain Karpe had boarded the Arlberg Express in Vienna, on his way to Paris and thence to Washington. His mangled body was found the next morning in the Pass Füg tunnel into which he had fallen or been thrown.

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stormed by thousands who had been denied voting cards. With apparent indifference the Groza Government announced an overwhelming Communist victory. It appeared to have allocated to itself 75 percent of the votes cast. The elections so eagerly sought by the opposition had resulted merely in consolidating Communist controls throughout the country.

The rest of the story may be briefly told. Rumania soon lost every vestige of sovereignty. The National Peasant Party was formally suppressed in 1947, and the leaders tried for espionage and conspiracy against the state. Both Maniu and Mihalache were sentenced in November of that year to solitary confinement for life. On December 30, 1947, the King, who had fought a valiant but losing battle against Soviet encroachment, was compelled to abdicate. Rumania was proclaimed a "popular republic."

In all respects the new Constitution bears a striking resemblance to its Soviet prototype: new administrative subdivisions are created on the Soviet model and sovereignty is vested in the Praesidium of Parliament. Even the country's ancient name is not secure, for though the world's press still reports the fateful happenings in "Rumania," the Communist papers in Bucharest extoll, without surcease, the newly discovered glories of the *R.P.R.*—"Republica Populară Română."

In 1944, Rumania had been urged to cast off the German chains, and had done so. She had waged a belated but nevertheless costly war against her former German and Hungarian allies. She had hoped to work her passage home and to earn the freedom and independence the Armistice Agreement had promised her. But after the elections of November 1946 the people of Rumania found themselves bound in the tightest serfdom which the country has ever known.

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REVISING THE HISTORY OF RUSSIAN COLONIALISM

By Solomon M. Schwarz

AN offensive against historical science is in full swing in the Soviet Union, with the Communist Party scoring victory after victory in "the battle against objectivism and cosmopolitanism." One of the most important tasks recently imposed on Soviet historians is to rehabilitate the old Russian colonial policy. The fact that they have at the same time had to intensify their "unmasking" of the colonial policy of the Western nations has made their assignment all the more complicated.

In this connection so-called "East-researcher historians" are receiving particular attention. Their field of study is broader than that of the "Orientalist" in other countries, for it embraces not only the Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East, but also the "Soviet East," *i.e.* the Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia. In recent years, it has often been the subject of leading articles in the principal Soviet historical journal, *Voprosy Istorii*, published by the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. The April 1949 issue, for example, carried an article, "Urgent Tasks of Soviet East-researcher Historians," which asserted:

> It is necessary to explode completely the myth, which right-wing Socialists are at present particularly active in propagating, that conditions have been and are being created within the framework of the British or French or American colonial system for the gradual transition to independent national development of the backward peoples which are to be "civilized." It must be shown that British rule brought India not culture and civilization, but poverty, hunger and a crushing death-rate. The fact that tendencies toward idealizing British rule in India can be found even in certain works of progressive historians, who by no means belong to the imperialist camp, makes this all the more essential. Thus, for example, not even the valuable work of Palme Dutt, *India Today*, is free of occasional errors of this type.

Matters have taken a drastic turn indeed when even Palme Dutt, one of the most orthodox British Communists and himself an Indian by birth, cannot meet the demands of the new line.

Another part of the task of Soviet East-researchers is made plain in a later issue:

> As they expose the predatory colonial policy of the imperialists and their flunkies, the bourgeois Orientalists and all sorts of pseudo-scholars who try to whitewash and embellish that policy and deceive gullible people . . . Soviet East-researchers must propagandize in their works the great achievements in the model republics of the Soviet East.[1]

All this, however, is a secondary goal of the Soviet East-researcher historians. The chief one prescribed for them in recent years has been to expound a positive view of the process of Russian colonial expansion under the Tsars, the period when what is today the "Soviet East" was integrated into the great Russian Empire. The history of the peoples of the present-day Sov-

[1] *Voprosy Istorii*, December 1950.

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iet East must henceforth be depicted as "the history of their friendship with the great Russian people."[2]

Thus, in the last 15 years the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has made a full 180-degree turn in its appraisal of Russian colonial policy. During the first two decades of Communist rule, Russian penetration into the Caucasus and Turkestan was represented in Communist literature as a search for colonial plunder. As late as August 1934, when Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov published "Remarks on the Outline Textbook of the History of the U.S.S.R.," which became a turning-point in the teaching of history in the Soviet Union, they clung to the old anti-colonial position in evaluating Russian colonial history. They criticized the "Outline Textbook" explicitly because "the annexationist-colonialist rôle of Russian Tsarism . . . is not emphasized."[3]

This past sin of Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov can no longer be mentioned in the Soviet Union. In the latest Soviet historiography, their report is no longer regarded as the basic document which first "correctly oriented" historians in the evaluation of Russian colonial policy. This honor is now reserved for a document entitled the "Decision of the Committee of Experts of the Government Board for the Competition for the Best Textbook in the History of the U.S.S.R.," published three years later. There we read:

> The fact that, let us say, Georgia came under a Russian protectorate at the end of the eighteenth century, as well as the fact that the Ukraine passed under Russian rule, is regarded by the authors [of the textbooks submitted in the competition] as an absolute evil, without taking into consideration the concrete historical conditions of that time. The authors do not perceive that Georgia was at that time faced with the alternative either of being conquered by the Persian Shah and the Turkish Sultan or coming under the protectorate of Russia. . . . They do not perceive that the latter prospect was the lesser evil.

The theory of "the lesser evil" was at once universally adopted in Soviet literature. In recent years, however, even this no longer suffices, and the official historians go far beyond it. For example, in an article by Professor M. V. Nechkina, published in the form of a "letter to the editor" of *Voprosy Istorii*, April 1951, the author does not presume to question the correctness of the formulation in the "Decision of the Committee of Experts" but attempts to give it a new interpretation corresponding to the latest official demands. "A lesser evil is an evil nonetheless, that is, a negative concept; but, taken as a whole, the quotation [from the "Decision"] does not speak of an evil, of a negative factor as such, but indeed of a positive factor." The words "lesser evil" should not be torn out of the context. The "basic thought" of the "Decision" had the effect of "establishing the positive factor." One should not forget, of course, that there was also national oppression and that "this oppression was a genuine evil for the people." The author continues: "But does the concept of national-colonial oppression cover the essence of all the facts which constituted the life of the people *after* its annexation to Russia, *after* its incorporation into the latter's structure? Of course not." And she adds: "The Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, after their annexation to Russia,

[2] *Voprosy Istorii*, April 1951.

[3] *K Izucheniyu Istorii: Sbornik* ("Toward the Study of History: a Symposium"). Moscow: Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1937, p. 22.

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were incorporated into the economic life of Russia, which was on a higher level than their own. They, in turn, made a vast contribution to the economic life of the country, to its forward movement. Economic intercourse among the various peoples was not exhausted by the national-colonial relationship even though it proceeded under its yoke." The importance "of the cultural intercourse of the peoples through their best, most advanced representatives" was just as great. Hence the conclusion (with a logically rather unexpected emphasis on the rôle of the "older brother"):

> In appraising the results of the peoples' incorporation into the structure of Tsarist Russia, historians must pay special attention to the intercourse among the peoples, to the new and positive content that the great Russian people, in spite of Tsarism, introduced into their economic and cultural life. The task of historians is to depict the historical perspective of the unity and struggle of the toilers of various peoples under the leadership of their older brother, the Russian people.

A great deal is left unexpressed in this exposition, and the article will probably be criticized by more consistent champions of the new line. Nevertheless, the basic ideas of the new orientation are all there.

Of course, we would be wrong to paint Russian colonial expansion in unrelieved black. All the positive factors mentioned in the above quotations actually existed. But there were also contrary factors in the form of brutal national oppression and harsh colonial exploitation, and among independent-minded writers there has never been any question that the negative factors were predominant. Formerly the Communists went furthest of all in their condemnations, ignoring everything positive in Russian colonial development just as today they deny the existence of positive elements in the history of British rule in India or American rule in the Philippines. But now they bend every effort to make their readers forget everything in the history of Russian colonial policy that gave rise to the popular—though oversimplified—phrase, "Russia—the prison of nations." Before long the colonial policy of Tsarist Russia may become, in these writings, a "liberation" policy, linked with the Soviet Union's "liberation" policy after World War II.

It is impossible, in a brief space, to trace the manner in which this reorientation influences the entire treatment of the history of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. Two examples of the revised treatment may, however, be noted—the new interpretation of the revolt of the Kazakhs under the leadership of Kenesary Kasymov from 1837 to 1846, and of the struggle for the independence of the North Caucasus carried on from 1834 to 1859 by Shamil.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Kazakh steppes were not yet actually part of the Russian Empire. The vast territory inhabited by the Kazakhs (or, as they were generally called at that time, the Kirghiz), extending from the southern Urals in the west to the Chinese border in the east, then comprised three quasi-statelike units—the Small, Middle and Great Hordes. The first two had accepted a Russian protectorate as early as the eighteenth century, but actually remained semi-independent, while the more distant Great Horde retained complete independence. The Kazakhs were already painfully aware of Russian pressure, especially when Russian colonization assumed a state-organized pattern. The aims of the colonization were

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primarily military; the best lands were taken from the nomadic Kazakhs so that Russian colonists (Cossacks) could be settled on them. This policy, conducted for the most part with complete disregard for Kazakh interests and rights, led from time to time to uprisings, of which Kenesary's was the most important.

This revolt was recently the subject of a major historical work, "Kazakhstan in the Period from the 1820's to the 1840's," published in Alma-Ata in 1947 by E. Bekmakhanov, a Kazakh. He portrayed Kenesary as a fighter for national liberation and national unity and, at the same time, as an outstanding and progressive statesman. The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. accorded the author the title of Doctor of Historical Science for this work. At a conference in the Academy's Institute of History, he was supported in his presentation and his conclusions by the leading Russian historians, particularly the East-researchers. He was also enthusiastically backed by the Party and academic leading lights in Kazakhstan. Thus when the Institute for History, Anthropology and Ethnography of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences assembled for its first plenary session in 1948, Bekmakhanov won general acclaim; and the President, Professor S. Yushkov, compared Kenesary with Shamil, at that time an undisputed hero. It is true that when an account of the session was published in *Voprosy Istorii* in March 1949, the writer (A. Yakunin) criticized Yushkov's report and particularly objected to the analogy between Kenesary and Shamil, since in Kenesary's activity—in contrast to Shamil's—social motives had allegedly played no part. But even this commentator found it "beyond question that the war of the Kazakh people under Kenesary's leadership against the expansionist policy of Tsarism was an anti-colonial war, a war for national liberation."

This evaluation of Kenesary, which was still essentially favorable, even if moderate in comparison wtih Bekmakhanov's, received more detailed support in a critical discussion of the Bekmakhanov book by K. Sharipov,[4] in the second edition of the university textbook "History of the U.S.S.R.," and in the "History of the Kazakh S.S.R. from Earliest Times to Our Day," by Omarov and Pankratova, both published in 1949. We read in the latter work:

> Kenesary's revolt, which was anti-colonial in character, played a progressive rôle in the history of the people. It was progressive because of the political demands advanced by Kenesary, whose ambition was to unite the Kazakhs in a single state and to overcome their inter-tribal enmity and feudal dismemberment.

The time was at hand, however, for a complete official about-face. Even Kenesary's efforts to overcome "feudal dismemberment" were soon declared to have been "usurpation." An article in *Voprosy Istorii,* June 1949, on the "History of the Kazakh S.S.R." asserted: "Kenesary's policy directed at the creation of a centralized state was an expression of his unsurpationist efforts to subordinate all other holders of power to himself." It was only a step from this to Kenesary's complete condemnation. On December 26, 1950, *Pravda* published an annihilating article on the errors committed by the historians who had dealt with the history of Kazakhstan. Nothing was left of Bekmakhanov's entire conception:

> Instead of revealing the profoundly progressive significance of Kazakhstan's an-

[4] *Voprosy Istorii,* April 1949, p. 109–14.

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nexation to Russia, Bekmakhanov sees in it nothing but colonial oppression. . . . The emergence of the Kasymovs [Kenesary and his brother], which stood in the way of annexation, was contrary to the aspirations of the progressive section of the Kazakh people. . . . This was a reactionary movement, which dragged the Kazakh people backward. . . .

Thus, Kenesary's principal guilt had lain in his resistance to annexation to Russia. After all this it was a simple matter to render a final judgment:

Khan Kenesary was a typical feudal bandit. . . . Kenesary's revolt, which was not supported by the Kazakh people, was a reactionary, feudal-nationalist movement, aided by forces abroad which were hostile to Russia.[5]

To complete the proceeding, Kenesary's Communist historian, only yesterday the object of general acclaim, was suddenly degraded to the rank of an "unmasked bourgeois nationalist."[6]

After Kenesary, it was bound to be Shamil's turn. This was a more difficult matter, however. Until recently, even educated Russians had known little or nothing about Kenesary; but almost every schoolboy knew about Shamil, leader of the North Caucasian mountaineers in their fight for independence. Thus the "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" said:

Shamil was the leader of the national liberation movement of the Caucasian mountain peoples, which was directed against the colonial policy of Tsarist Russia. . . . The popular revolt, directed against Russia and against the local propertied classes, was basically anti-feudal. The rebels' social demands were hidden under a religious mantle.

Somewhere in the depths of the Communist Party apparatus, however, the idea had begun to mature that the "legend" of Shamil and the religious-national movement of the "murids" which he led must be done away with. In 1947 a conference was called at the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. to discuss the question of "the historical essence of Caucasian muridism." The rapporteur, K. G. Adzhemian, launched a sharp attack on the prevailing view. Shamil's movement had not been a struggle for national freedom but a struggle "for freedom for wolves, for freedom for backwardness, oppression, darkness, Asiaticism." Adzhemian also reproached Shamil with having strengthened the anti-Russian coalition at the time of the Crimean War, thus hastening the "fall of heroic Sevastopol," and with having shown hospitality to the "Polish and Hungarian rabble" that offered him aid.

Many participants in the debate opposed Adzhemian, condemning him for defending "the old colonialist thesis" and "in essence, reviving the views of the Tsarist generals." The chairman, Professor N. M. Druzhinin, reminded him that it was Polish and Hungarian revolutionaries (after 1848) whom he had characterized as "rabble."

For three years thereafter no one dared attack Shamil openly. In March 1950, Geidar Guseinov was awarded the Stalin Prize for an historical work, "From the History of Social and Feudal Thought in Nineteenth-Century Azerbaidjan," in which Shamil was portrayed very sympathetically. Shamil, wrote Guseinov, "attempted in every way to aid the struggle of the Azerbaid-

[5] "Several Questions of Central Asian History," *Voprosy Istorii*, April 1951.
[6] *Pravda*, October 20, 1951.

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jan peasants . . . against Tsarist national oppression and against the Azerbaidjanian feudal lords." But in May 1950 the decision honoring Guseinov was rescinded—an unprecedented act in the history of the Stalin Prize. The Prize Committee administered a sharp rebuke to itself by declaring that the appraisal of Shamil and of "muridism" in Guseinov's work "basically distorts the meaning of the movement, which was reactionary and nationalistic, and was in the service of British capitalism and the Turkish Sultan."[7]

After that, no one any longer dared stand up for the attitude toward Shamil which a short while before had been universally held. Without risk of opposition, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaidjan, M. D. Bagirov, could now write (*Bolshevik*, July 1950) that "the longing of progressive people in the Caucasus for union with Russia reflected the feelings of the broad masses." And he now could also settle accounts with all those—many of whom he cited by name—who "distorted the historical truth, glorifying muridism and its leader, Shamil, which were inspired by Russia's rivals, Turkey and England." And A. Daniyalov in *Voprosy Istorii*, September 1950, asserted flatly that "objectively, Russia filled the rôle of liberator of the Caucasian peoples from the cruel and arbitrary oppression of the Iranian and Turkish bandits" and that "Shamil was forced to overcome the stubborn resistance of the people, which expressed its sympathy for Russia, the savior of Dagestan from the eastern brutes."[8]

The circle is complete. The "old colonialist thesis," in a somewhat modernized "liberation" version, today enjoys unqualified recognition in the Soviet Union.

[7] *Pravda*, May 14, 1950.

[8] A. Daniyalov, "Distortions in the Examination of Muridism and the Shamil Movement," *Voprosy Istorii*, September 1950.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

NOTE—*Foreign Affairs* will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, *Foreign Affairs*, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

DOMINATIONS AND POWERS. By George Santayana. New York: Scribner, 1951, 481 p. $4.50.

These "Reflections on Liberty, Society and Government," written over a period of many years, defy simple classification. Abounding in observations on humanity—detached, ironic and opinionated—the book overflows all boundaries, including even those provided by its author.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE SETTLEMENTS. By Redvers Opie and Others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1951, 366 p. $4.00.

An informative survey of the difficulties in achieving agreement on peace settlements during and after the Second World War.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND POWER POLITICS. By John MacLaurin. New York: Harper, 1951, 468 p. $5.00.

A popular exposition of current world affairs and tensions as they affect, or are handled by, the United Nations. The author is of the opinion that the U. N. has many unused potentialities.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Alf Ross. New York: Rinehart, 1951, 236 p. $3.00.

An analysis of structure and function by a professor of international law at the University of Copenhagen.

LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES. By P. E. Corbett. New York: Harcourt, 1951, 337 p. $4.75.

An essay on international law working from the premise that "while legal ideas play a substantial and often beneficent part in the relations of States, their influence is grossly overrated in the traditional literature of international law and, on the other hand, discounted to excess by the Machiavellis of our time."

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. By Oliver J. Lissitzyn. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1951, 118 p. $1.75.

A scholarly and intelligent monograph appraising the Court "as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security."

HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS. By Pieter N. Drost. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1951, 272 p. Florins 18.50. (New York: Beutler, $5.50.)

The author, who was in the Division of Human Rights of the United Nations, has written a carefully annotated memorandum on the realization of individual human rights in positive international law.

GUIDE TO LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS. By Hans Aufricht. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, 682 p. $10.00.

This useful bibliographical survey is also of value in outlining the scope and development of the League's manifold activities.

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UM RECHT UND GERECHTIGKEIT. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Kohlhammer, 1950, 401 p.

A *Festschrift* for Erich Kaufmann: essays on politics, government and international law.

BRITISH AND SOVIET COLONIAL SYSTEMS. By Kathleen M. Stahl. New York: Praeger, 1951, 114 p. $2.50.

A comparison of British colonial policies and those of the U.S.S.R. as displayed in the dependent Central Asian republics.

THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS. By David B. Truman. New York: Knopf, 1951, 544 p. $5.00.

Professor Truman undertakes to formulate systematically the rôle of interest groups in the political process. These are seen not as inimical to good government but as a natural part of political life.

THE IDEA AND PRACTICE OF WORLD GOVERNMENT. By Gerard J. Mangone. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, 278 p. $3.75.

The author studies the conditions necessary for the formation of a world government, which in his view presupposes a democratic world society. He considers the possibility of one nation being the "chosen instrument" for the advance to the new order.

LE MONDIALISME CONTRE LA GUERRE. By Yves Arnaud-Ulliet. Paris: La Technique du Livre, 1950, 252 p. Fr. 270.

Another searcher for the way to establish a world government.

THE WAY OF THE FREE. By Stefan Osusky. New York: Dutton, 1951, 320 p. $3.75.

The former Czech minister to France and Britain defends the American way of life against European critics, and presents as its antithesis the Stalinist régime, which is seen as not merely tyrannical but basically anti-Slav.

LA GUERRE N'EST PAS FATALE. By Paul Noirot. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1951, 207 p. Fr. 250.

While purporting to advocate "peaceful competition between the two systems," the author, a Communist, continues to harp on the old theme of "capitalist imperialism."

QUI FERA LA PAIX? By Mario and Hilaire Massilia. Paris: Lacoste, 1950, 359 p. Fr. 1500.

Rather esoterically framed discussions of political topics, with a proposed charter for a world union, a "Charte Terrunie."

¿QUIÉN GOBERNARÁ EL MUNDO? By Guillén Salaya. Madrid: Colenda, 1950, 390 p. Ptas. 40.

A survey of dominant political and social systems in the world, the British, American, Russian and Spanish. The latter, it appears, is the only one to have found the right path—that of "syndicalist democracy" under the Caudillo.

BREVIARIO DE PROBLEMAS CONTEMPORÁNEOS. By Juan Ventosa y Calvell. Madrid: Editorial Plus-Ultra, 1950, 293 p. Ptas. 40.

Observations suggested to the author by his contemplation of the world and its problems. Like much recent Spanish writing, its somewhat universalistic pretensions do not compensate for a lack of precision and solidity.

AM RANDE DES ABGRUNDS. By Bruno Brehm. Graz (Austria): Stocker, 1950, 650 p. Schillings 69.

Chapters, generally personal and episodic, on the developing world crisis since Lenin. Most emphasis on Russia, Germany and Austria.

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TWO CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY. By E. M. Forster. New York: Harcourt, 1951, 363 p. $4.00.

Essays written over the last 15 years. In the opening section, as the author says, "the climate is political, and the conclusion suggested is that, though we cannot expect to love one another, we must learn to put up with one another."

COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY, AND CATHOLIC POWER. By Paul Blanshard. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951, 340 p. $3.50.

A highly controversial book simultaneously criticizing Communist totalitarianism and Catholic authoritarianism as inimical to democracy. Apart from the familiar and traditional disputes involved, the real question is of the validity of this method of establishing "deadly parallels."

EL COMUNISMO Y LA CONSPIRACIÓN CONTRA EL ORDEN CRISTIANO. By Joaquín Cardoso, S.J. Mexico: Buena Prensa, 1950, 512 p. Pesos 20.

Communism somehow becomes tangled up with the Illuminati and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Of clinical interest only.

A SHORT HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I. Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, 454 p. $7.00.

A strictly military history compiled by the Director of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defense. Highly compressed but authoritative.

EPICS OF ESPIONAGE. By Bernard Newman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 270 p. $4.50.

An episodic rather than epic treatment of the history of espionage.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1952. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1952, 229 p. $3.50.

The up-to-date 1952 edition of this standard reference book contains a new section on Indonesia, and includes data about the new governments which came into power in South America as a result of revolutions last year. Members of all governments of the world are listed, party programs summarized and newspapers identified.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. By J. E. Meade. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1951, 432 p. $5.50.

A very important and comprehensive treatise on the "closely related problems of preserving a balance in the financial payments between nations and, at the same time, of maintaining full employment domestically within each nation." The present volume is designed as the first of a series by the author on the theory of international economic policy.

AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY. By E. A. Goldenweiser. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 391 p. $4.50.

A balanced study of monetary policy since 1914 by the former Director of Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve Board.

WANDLUNGEN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT. By Ferdinand Fried. Munich (U. S. Zone): Goldmann, 1950, 303 p.

An interpretative survey of changes in the world's economy, emphasizing the revolutionary nature of these changes and the approach of a new economic order.

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DESTINS INDUSTRIELS DU MONDE. By Albert Ducrocq. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1951, 326 p. Fr. 560.

The author, a competent "vulgarisateur," explores the expanding horizon of industrial development, with much stress on the contending economies of the United States and U.S.S.R.

THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL. By Rosa Luxemburg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951, 475 p. $5.00.

A new translation of a neo-Marxist classic.

PETROLIO E METANO: REGIME LEGISLATIVO IN ITALIA E NEL MONDO. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Economia, 1950, 252 p. L. 800.

A study of the direction and scope of petroleum legislation in Italy, in countries with competitive oil industries, and in regions of monopoly or nationalized industry.

PROPAGANDA IN WAR AND CRISIS. Edited by Daniel Lerner. New York: Stewart, 1951, 500 p. $4.75.

A collection of writings on the theory and practice of psychological warfare; many of the authors were active practitioners in World War II.

THE MAKING OF PUBLIC OPINION. By Emory S. Bogardus. New York: Association Press, 1951, 265 p. $4.00.

A professor of sociology expounds the process by which public opinion is formed. Useful for instruction.

UNESCO: PEACE IN THE MINDS OF MEN. By Theodore Besterman. New York: Praeger, 1951, 132 p. $2.50.

An outline of UNESCO's aims and achievements.

L'HOMME HUMILIÉ. By François Nourissier. Paris: Spes, 1950, 196 p. Fr. 225.

A brief history of the tribulations of "displaced persons" since 1912.

The Second World War

CLOSING THE RING. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1951, 749 p. $6.00.

In this fifth volume of his great memoirs Mr. Churchill covers the year from June 1943 to June 1944—the 12 months that witnessed the fall of Mussolini, the invasion of Sicily and Italy, the Teheran Conference and the launching of Overlord. Of particular interest are the discussion of the issues dividing him and President Roosevelt and the explanation of his views on a Balkan landing.

THE SEIZURE OF TINIAN. By Major Carl W. Hoffman. Washington: U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1951, 169 p. $2.50.

An account of what Admiral Spruance has called "the most brilliantly conceived and executed amphibious operation in World War II."

UNDER THE SOUTHERN CROSS. By Captain Francis D. Cronin. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1951, 432 p. $6.00.

The record of the Americal Division in the Pacific during World War II.

HITLER'S STRATEGY. By F. H. Hinsley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951, 254 p. $3.75.

A scholarly effort to reconstruct the formulation of the Führer's military strategy, largely on the evidence of the captured German naval archives—a procedure that

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may place undue emphasis on sea warfare and give a somewhat misleading impression of the manner in which strategic decisions were reached under Hitler.

DIE WENDEPUNKTE DES KRIEGES. By Herbert A. Quint. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Steingrüben, 1950, 260 p.

A discussion of what the author sees as the critical turning points of the war: the failure of Operation Sea Lion for the invasion of Britain, the battle before Moscow, El Alamein, the decisive rôle of radar in the air war, and the allied invasions of Italy and Normandy.

EL RHIN EN LLAMAS. By Marques de Lema. Madrid: Dossat, 1950, 259 p. Ptas. 40.

Diplomatic memoirs of a Spanish consular official in Germany, from 1939 to 1944. Most emphasis on the wartime experiences of Cologne and Düsseldorf.

MASTER SPY. By Ian Colvin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 286 p. $3.50.

An overly romantic portrait of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the German *Abwehr*.

SOUVENIRS. By Colonel Passy. Monte Carlo: Solar, 1947–8, 2 v. Fr. 770.

MISSIONS SECRÈTES EN FRANCE (NOVEMBRE 1942–JUIN 1943). By Colonel Passy. Paris: Plon, 1951, 439 p. Fr. 600.

Wartime memoirs, often polemical, of a member of the French Resistance, director of the secret service *Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action*. The three volumes (by two publishers) which have appeared thus far cover the period from June 1940 to June 1943. Two forthcoming volumes on the remainder of the war are promised.

LA FRANCE AUX ANTILLES. By Admiral Georges Robert. Paris: Plon, 1950, 230 p. Fr. 330.

Memoirs of the High Commissioner of the Antilles who stood by the Pétain régime until July 1943.

UNTER PARTISANEN UND KREUZFAHRERN. By Gerhard Nebel. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Klett, 1950, 380 p.

The personal diary of a German soldier in Italy, who cared neither for the partisans nor the crusaders which the war brought forth.

DECIMA FLOTTIGLIA MAS. By J. Valerio Borghese. Milan: Garzanti, 1950, 367 p. L. 950.

The interesting story of the Italian Navy's activities with submarine and other underwater techniques in World War II.

GUERRA SENZA BANDIERA. By Edgardo Sogno. Milan: Rizzoli, 1950, 365 p. L. 700.

Memoirs of an Italian officer, parachuted into northern Italy to organize partisan resistance after the Italian armistice.

CAP SUR LA CORSE. By Captain Lepotier. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1950, 314 p. Fr. 450.

A naval history of Corsica during World War II.

The United States

THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION, 1937–1940. By William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1952, 794 p. $7.50.

This impressive study is easily the most complete and authoritative account of American diplomacy from President Roosevelt's "quarantine" speech to the destroyer deal. The product of extensive and expert research, including full use of files

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of the State Department and many unpublished diaries and memoranda of leading protagonists, it is highly successful in accomplishing its purpose of relating American policy to the developing world situation. The authors' experienced mastery of European diplomacy is evident throughout. A forthcoming volume will carry the story to December 1941.

DESIGN FOR WAR. By Frederic R. Sanborn. New York: Devin-Adair, 1951, 607 p. $5.00.

An extensive though hardly ground-breaking addition to the Beard-Chamberlin-Morgenstern school which sees President Roosevelt as plotting American participation in World War II to divert attention from domestic difficulties.

THE PATTERN OF RESPONSIBILITY. Edited by McGeorge Bundy from the Record of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Boston: Houghton, 1952, 309 p. $4.00.

An admirably edited selection of statements from the public record of the Secretary of State which performs a much needed service in presenting what Mr. Acheson has actually said and advised in his conduct of American foreign policy.

JOE TUMULTY AND THE WILSON ERA. By John M. Blum. Boston: Houghton, 1951, 337 p. $4.00.

A comprehensive and substantial biography of Woodrow Wilson's secretary; fair to his subject, though sometimes at the expense of the President.

ACROSS WORLD FRONTIERS. By Thomas W. Lamont. New York: Harcourt, 1951, 278 p. $3.50.

Posthumously published memoirs of the banker and public servant. About half the volume deals with the Versailles Conference and Wilson's fight for the League.

BECKONING FRONTIERS. By Marriner S. Eccles. New York: Knopf, 1951, 499 p. $5.00.

These recollections of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from 1936 to 1948 provide one of the better Washington memoirs. Mr. Eccles' major themes of public finance and banking policy are preceded by an account of his earlier years in the West.

FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS. By Jesse H. Jones with Edward Angly. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 631 p. $6.00.

The former head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with considerable assistance by Mr. Angly, presents a somewhat complaisant account of his stewardship. It contains a good deal of information on R.F.C. activities and on high politics in the Roosevelt era which, when Mr. Jones has drawn his feuding irons, should be accepted with caution.

EISENHOWER: THE MAN AND THE SYMBOL. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1952, 180 p. $2.50.

A timely, balanced appraisal, obviously friendly to the subject but not uncritical and not a campaign blurb.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICANS. By Senator Robert A. Taft. Garden City: Doubleday, 1951, 127 p. $2.00.

A frankly political book "to emphasize the fact that the freedom of the people of the United States is in serious danger from the foreign policy of the present Administration."

MAN WAS MEANT TO BE FREE. Selected Statements of Governor Harold E. Stassen. Garden City: Doubleday, 1951, 460 p. $3.50.

A selection of addresses, statements and articles from 1940 to 1951.

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THE PRESIDENCY. By Stefan Lorant. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 775 p. $15.00.

A pictorial history of every presidential election from Washington to Truman. In this case the "visual aids"—a wealth of portraits, photographs and campaign cartoons—are really the center of interest. The text and the election statistics provide a useful accompaniment.

CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE. By Ernest S. Griffith. New York: New York University Press, 1951, 193 p. $3.50.

Optimistic lectures, delivered at New York University, on the virtues and functions of Congress today.

THE ECONOMICS OF MOBILIZATION AND INFLATION. By Seymour E. Harris. New York: Norton, 1951, 308 p. $4.50.

Somewhat hastily turned out prescriptions for achieving the resources for economic mobilization without undue damage through inflation.

DIE AMERIKANISCHE HANDELSPOLITIK NACH DEM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG UND DIE WIEDERBELEBUNG DES WELTHANDELS. By Hugo Henikstein. Vienna: Cesam, 1950, 233 p. Schillings 96.60.

An Austrian interpretation of United States commercial policy since 1945.

CAPITALISM IN AMERICA. By Frederick Martin Stern. New York: Rinehart, 1951, 119 p. $2.00.

Letters to a friend in Paris describing America's advance to a "classless society."

IMPACT OF WAR ON FEDERAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION: 1939–1945. By Gladys M. Kammerer. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1951, 372 p. $6.00.

A general study of the wartime adaptations of personnel administration in the Federal Government, based largely on the experience of the War and Navy Departments, O.P.A. and the Department of Agriculture.

SHIPS FOR VICTORY. By Frederic C. Lane and Others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, 881 p. $12.50.

This substantial volume in the series sponsored by the Committee on Records of War Administration deals with the achievement of the shipbuilding industry mobilized under the United States Maritime Commission in World War II.

WHAT'S AHEAD FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS. By Sumner H. Slichter. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1951, 216 p. $2.75.

The economic future as seen in Professor Slichter's rose-colored (not pink) crystal ball. Based on lectures delivered in 1950, with an added post-Korean chapter.

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By J. A. R. Pimlott. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 265 p. $4.00.

A British civil servant has written a well-informed and sophisticated survey of the meaning of the public relations profession for American democracy. While whittling down the claims of some public relations counsel, the book is well balanced and free of animus.

AMERICA'S COLONIAL EXPERIMENT. By Julius W. Pratt. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950, 460 p. $6.00.

While the facts are generally familiar, Professor Pratt has performed a useful service in providing a general survey of the "American experiment in colonialism, or imperialism—its motives, its methods, its achievements, and its present status."

THE CROSS, THE SWORD AND THE DOLLAR. By Charles C. Hilliard. New York: North River Press, 1951, 185 p. $3.00.

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The three terms of the title are taken as "symbols of the integral strengths essential to the existence of the American Republic."

Western Europe

NO GREEN PASTURES. By Roi Ottley. New York: Scribner, 1951, 234 p. $3.00.

An American Negro journalist's report on attitudes toward Negroes abroad, primarily, however, in Britain, France and Italy. As the title indicates, the European record is not a happy one—prejudice and discrimination thrive there, too, when they have material to feed upon.

LA EUROPA DE ESTRASBURGO. By Ernesto Gimenez Caballero. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1950, 154 p. Ptas. 40.

Reflections on the state of Europe and the Strasbourg assembly.

THE FOURTH REPUBLIC OF FRANCE. By O. R. Taylor. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951, 221 p. $3.00.

Largely fulfills its aim to be "a simple, concise description of the origins and nature of the present constitution of France and a guide to postwar French political parties."

LA RÉPUBLIQUE ET SON POUVOIR. By Michel Debré. Paris: Nagel, 1950, 204 p. Fr. 495.

The appeal of this *fonctionnaire* become politician is that "France be governed; that France be governed by Republicans; that the Republicans be, if not revolutionaries (the term is ambiguous), at least the most audacious and tenacious of reformers."

ACTUELLES: CHRONIQUES 1944–1948. By Albert Camus. Paris: Gallimard, 1950, 270 p. Fr. 325.

Political articles, marked by the author's characteristic driving honesty, originally published in *Combat*.

LETTRES DE GUERRE, 1914–1918. By General Mangin. Paris: Fayard, 1950, 323 p. Fr. 600.

A selection of wartime letters to his wife by one of the generals defending Verdun, the famous commander of the 6th French Army.

CAPITAINE PHILIPPE (J.-J. CHAPOU). By Georges Cazard and Marcel Metges. Cahors (France): Coueslant, 1950, 358 p. Fr. 700.

A volume of documents and recollections in homage to a member of the Resistance in the Department of Lot, killed in 1944.

FRENCH LEGIONNAIRE. By Alfred Perrott-White. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1951, 212 p. $4.00.

An Englishman's experience in the French Foreign Legion between 1938 and 1943.

"HONNEUR ET PATRIE!" . . . DES MOTS À LA RÉALITÉ. By Jean Marcaux. Paris: Éditions de la Pensée Nouvelle, 1950, 254 p. Fr. 360.

A diatribe on the theory and practice of patriotism.

BELGIAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN TWO WARS, 1919–1940. By Jane Kathryn Miller. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951, 337 p. $5.00.

A competent review of a subject previously neglected in English. Colonial and commercial affairs are omitted and the tragedy of 1940 is treated very briefly.

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LES FINANCES DE 1939 À 1949. III:LA BELGIQUE ET LA HOLLANDE. By Fernand Baudhuin. Paris: Médicis, 1951, 177 p. Fr. 450.

In this third volume of a series of studies (two earlier volumes dealt with France and Germany) a Belgian economist reviews the finances of Belgium and the Netherlands on the eve of the Second World War, during the occupation and after liberation. He is somewhat more at ease in dealing with his own country.

THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES AND FINLAND. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951, 312 p. $4.00.

A concise and informative report by a number of specialists on the present situation, broadly conceived, in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

LA DÉMOCRATIE INDUSTRIELLE ET LES COMITÉS D'ENTREPRISE EN SUÈDE. By Charles Léger. Paris: Colin, 1950, 227 p. Fr. 500.

A scholarly monograph on the development of "industrial democracy" in Sweden, with emphasis on the 1946 convention and the creation of committees of production.

PETER MOEN'S DIARY. New York: Creative Age Press, 1951, 176 p. $3.00.

The posthumously published prison diary of a member of the Norwegian underground. Of interest as testimony to the internal struggles of twentieth century man.

MEIN LEBENSWEG. By Carl Severing. Cologne (British Zone): Greven, 1950, 2 v.

Extensive, plodding and rather dreary memoirs of a Social Democratic politician and Prussian Minister of the Interior, but a useful document for the history of German Social Democracy and the Weimar Republic.

DAS HERZ EUROPAS IM SPIEGEL DER JAHRTAUSENDE. By Paul Rohrbach. Wiesbaden (U. S. Zone): Brockhaus, 1950, 261 p.

A publicist of the older generation reviews the vicissitudes of Germany—"the heart of Europe"—throughout the centuries.

SCHATTENRISS EINER GENERATION, 1888–1919. By Bernhard Guttmann. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Koehler, 1950, 345 p.

An octogenarian journalist's recollections of the years of Wilhelm II's reign.

THE RISE AND FALL OF HERMANN GOERING. By Willi Frischauer. Boston: Houghton, 1951, 309 p. $3.50.

An Austrian journalist's conscientious biography of the late Nazi chieftain. Somehow the effort to write a balanced and mature chronicle of this clearly unbalanced and perversely infantile figure fails to make an altogether satisfactory portrait.

DER REICHSMARSCHALL IM KRIEGE. By Eitel Lange. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Schwab, 1950, 215 p.

Goering as seen by his personal photographer from 1940 to 1945.

DANCE OF DEATH. By Erich Kern. New York: Scribner, 1951, 255 p. $3.00.

DAS HARTE LEBEN. By Erich Kern. Wels (Austria): Verlag Welsermühl, 1950, 531 p. Schillings 55.60.

An SS officer's account of the campaign against Russia (a translation of "Der Grosse Rausch," noted here July 1950), and his diary of the postwar years, 1947–50.

WAS JEDER VON DER BUNDESREGIERUNG WISSEN MUSS. By Toni Pippon. Kevelaer (British Zone): Butzon, 1950, 227 p.

A political handbook, with biographical sketches of the leading members of the government and opposition.

POLITISCHES JAHRBUCH DER CDU/CSU. Edited by Bruno Dörpinghaus and Kurt Witt. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Lohse, 1950, 400 p.

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A mélange of articles, policy statements and documents published under the auspices of the Christlich-Demokratische Union.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND GREAT BRITAIN 1908–1914. By Alfred Francis Pribram. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, 328 p. $4.50.

THE HAPSBURG MONARCHY, 1867–1914. By Arthur J. May. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 532 p. $6.00.

THE MULTINATIONAL EMPIRE. By Robert A. Kann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 2 v. $12.50.

Though these books stop at 1914, they have a contemporary relevance by being in varying degrees concerned with Palacky's proposition, "If Austria did not exist it would be necessary to invent her." Dr. Pribram's posthumously published and not wholly reliable study covers Anglo-Austrian relations, particularly during the Bosnian crisis, the Balkan Wars and the outbreak of the First World War. Professor May has written a rather general political, social and cultural history of the Dual Monarchy from the *Ausgleich*. Mr. Kann's formidable anatomy describes first the component nationalities of the Empire and then the unsuccessful efforts at reform from 1848.

KAMPF UM KÄRNTENS EINHEIT UND FREIHEIT. By Vinzenz Schumy. Vienna: Göschl, 1950, 381 p. Schillings 39.

An Austrian history of the Carinthian problem, primarily in the years immediately after World War I.

ZWISCHEN DEMOKRATIE UND VOLKSDEMOKRATIE. By Adolf Schärf. Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1950, 143 p.

A Socialist interpretation of Austria's struggle for unity and reconstruction in the years of four-Power occupation.

ÖSTERREICH UND DER MARSHALL-PLAN. Edited by Norbert Grell. Vienna: Gerlach, 1950, 420 p. Schillings 75.

A collection of articles and documents celebrating the E.R.P.'s halfway mark.

NASCITA E AVVENTO DEL FASCISMO. By Angelo Tasca. Florence: Nuova Italia, 1950, 582 p. L. 3000.

An English translation, "The Rise of Italian Fascism," of this important study appeared under the author's pseudonym, A. Rossi, in 1938. This first Italian edition contains an extensive preface written in 1949 and incorporates some new material.

MUSSOLINI ALS BUNDESGENOSSE. By Enno v. Rintelen. Tübingen (French Zone): Wunderlich, 1951, 265 p.

Memoirs of a German officer who was military attaché in Rome from 1936 to 1939 and at Italian headquarters from 1940 to 1943.

MALEDETTA GUERRA! By M. Benevento Palmerini. Naples: Loffredo, 1950, 373 p. L. 850.

An Umbrian diary of occupation and liberation, September 1943 to July 1944.

ITALIA DISARMATA. By Umberto Guglielmotti. Rome: Edizioni l'Arnia, 1950, 238 p. L. 500.

A bitter account of the tribulations of the Italian army since the armistice of 1943, leading to a demand for a revision of Italy's treaty status.

L'AMMIRAGLIO MILLO DALL'IMPRESA DEI DARDANELLI ALLA PASSIONE DALMATICA. By Oscar di Giamberardino. Leghorn: Società Editrice Tirrena, 1950, 308 p. L. 750.

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The naval activities of Admiral Enrico Millo from the war with Turkey to the d'Annunzio expedition. Includes a collection of letters from d'Annunzio from October 1919 to December 1920.

PAGINE POLEMICHE. By Luigi Cadorna. Milan: Garzanti, 1950, 364 p. L. 1400.

The battle of Caporetto is fought again in General Cadorna's posthumously published memorial, written in 1926.

VITA DI VITTORIO EMANUELE III. By Alberto Consiglio. Milan: Rizzoli, 1950, 253 p. L. 600.

A rather slight political biography of a rather slight monarch.

ANNUARIO DELLA CONGIUNTURA ECONOMICA ITALIANA. VOLUME III—1949. Edited by Agostino de Vita. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Economia, 1950, 653 p. L. 2500.

The latest volume of an extensive annual survey of the Italian economy.

THE FACE OF SPAIN. By Gerald Brenan. New York: Pellegrini, 1951, 310 p. $3.75.

Mr. Brenan's rare qualifications as a writer on modern Spain include familiarity with his subject, an open mind, and a recognition that there have been serious faults on both sides. This discerning account of his return after 13 years' absence produces a feeling that there is still no easy exit from the "Spanish labyrinth."

THIS IS SPAIN. By Richard Pattee. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951, 541 p. $7.00.

A well-documented and substantial presentation of the pro-Franco case.

Eastern Europe

NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS. Edited by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951, 310 p. $3.50.

A highly instructive symposium of the experiences of ten Americans who have had the responsibility of negotiating with the Russians on a variety of issues over the last decade. As the editors note, "It is not intended to be a record of American foreign policy as such; it is intended to be a record of how we negotiate with Russians and what happens when we do."

RUSSIA'S SOVIET ECONOMY. By Harry Schwartz. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950, 592 p. $6.65.

Considering the inevitable paucity of statistical straw, the author has succeeded in molding some remarkably substantial bricks in this useful survey of the structure and operation of the Soviet economy. The treatment, following an historical and ideological background, is topical: industry, agriculture, transport, trade and services, finances, labor, and foreign economic relations.

A DOLLAR INDEX OF SOVIET MACHINERY OUTPUT, 1927-28 TO 1937. By Alexander Gerschenkron. Santa Monica (Cal.): Rand Corporation, 1951, 357 p.

This study represents part of a more comprehensive "recomputation of the rate of growth of industrial output in Russia," an undertaking justified by the shortcomings of the official Soviet index of industrial production.

RUSSIA, PAST AND PRESENT. By Anatole G. Mazour. New York: Van Nostrand, 1951, 785 p. $9.00.

A general history, but with half the book devoted to the years since 1917. Designed primarily as a textbook.

SOVIET STAFF OFFICER. By Ivan Krylov. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 298 p. $3.75.

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The author, who writes under a pseudonym, purports to have enjoyed the wartime confidence of Voroshilov and other high Soviet officials. As one reviewer has noted, however, many passages in the book are similar to those of Allen and Muratoff's "Russian Campaigns of 1941–43," and the reliability of the whole must be regarded as doubtful. An Italian edition, "La Mia Carriera Allo Stato Maggiore Sovietico," has been published in Milan (Rizzoli, 1950, 240 p. L. 550).

TAGEBUCH DER VERSUCHUNG. By Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel. Berlin: Pontes-Verlag, 1950, 239 p.

The experiences, in diary form, of a German officer, who was a vice president of the *Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland* from 1942 to 1947 and who broke with the Communists in 1949.

LA VIDA SECRETA DE LA KOMINTERN. By Enrique Castro Delgado. Madrid: E.P.E.S.A., 1950, 419 p. Ptas. 38.

The story of the disillusionment of a Spanish Communist, refugee in Moscow after the Civil War and subsequently expelled from the Party.

POUR LA VÉRITÉ SUR LES CAMPS. By David Rousset and Others. Paris: Éditions du Pavois, 1951, 254 p. Fr. 120.

A collection of testimony and depositions from the notable libel suit brought by Rousset against *Lettres Françaises.*

LÉNINE. By Gérard Walter. Paris: Julliard, 1950, 542 p. Fr. 960.

The author of studies on Thomas Münzer. Babeuf and Robespierre pursues his revolutionary enquiries, with an examination of the means by which Lenin was able to take advantage and become master of the Russian upheaval. A serious work.

STALINE AU POUVOIR. By Alexandre Ouralov. Paris: Les Iles d'Or (Plon), 1951, 318 p. Fr. 540.

A critical review of the Stalinist régime since the assassination of Kirov by a former Soviet authority on the Chechens, A. Avtorkhanov, writing under a pseudonym.

TOTAL EMPIRE: THE ROOTS AND PROGRESS OF WORLD COMMUNISM. By Edmund A. Walsh, S.J. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951, 293 p. $3.50.

The Regent of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University analyzes world Communism, with considerable stress upon geopolitics. The book also contains some notes on the author's experiences in Russia.

MARXISM AND THE BOLSHEVIK STATE. By George Spiro. New York: Red Star Press, 1951, 1077 p. $7.50.

A curious assault on Stalinism, Trotskyism, Marxism—and capitalism. Of interest for its extensive burrowings into out-of-the-way sources.

DER SOWJETRUSSISCHE DIALEKTISCHE MATERIALISMUS (DIAMAT). By I. M. Bocheński. Berne: Francke, 1950, 213 p. Sw. Fr. 8.40.

A concise critique of the philosophical premises of Marxism-Leninism.

BEARS IN THE CAVIAR. By Charles W. Thayer. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1951, 303 p. $3.50.

An American diplomat's amusing memoirs of his extra-curricular and non-professional activities, principally in Russia of the late 1930's.

CASES AND READINGS ON SOVIET LAW. By John N. Hazard and Morris L. Weisberg. New York: Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law (Columbia University), 1950, 431 p. $5.00.

An extensive collection of materials on Soviet law, designed not only for law students but for those more generally interested in the Soviet system.

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OSTEUROPA UND DIE SOWJETUNION. By Eugen Lemberg. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Schwab, 1950, 256 p.

A general and rather sketchy review of the history and recent tribulations of Europe east of Germany.

MUISTELMAT. By G. Mannerheim. Helsinki: Otava, 1951, 544 p. M. 2100.

The first volume of a long-awaited and highly publicized autobiography. Historical and political, rather than personal and subjective, the work covers Mannerheim's many-sided career to 1930. A second, concluding volume will appear shortly.

TAISTELU IHMISOIKEUKSISTA. YHTEISKUNNALLIS-HISTORIALLINEN TUTKIMUS RUOTSIN JA SUOMEN JUUTALAISKYSYMYKSEN VAIHEISTA. By Santeri Jacobsson. Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1951, 439 p. M. 800.

A detailed, informative study of the Jewish question in Sweden and Finland.

PATTERN FOR PEACE. By Antoni Gronowicz. New York: Paramount Publishing Co., 1951, 215 p. $3.50.

A defense of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's German frontier.

WHO'S NEXT? By John Brown. London: Hutchinson, 1951, 220 p. 12/6.

Writing pseudonymously, the author, evidently a Czech, adds his contribution, which includes some new insights, to our knowledge of the Communist coup d'état in Prague. Less satisfactory than Ripka's "Czechoslovakia Enslaved."

MAPS AND POLITICS. By H. R. Wilkinson. Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1951, 366 p. 30/.

An interesting approach to the Macedonian problem through a chronological analysis of some 200 ethnographic maps of the area.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

LLOYD GEORGE. By Thomas Jones. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 330 p. $5.00.

The author, a fellow Welshman and Assistant Secretary of the British Cabinet in the First World War, has written an excellent biography. Brief, admiring but balanced, it is the product of many years of close association with the late statesman.

BRITAIN TODAY. By C. F. O. Clarke. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 248 p. $3.00.

A general review by an official of the B.B.C. Originally delivered as the Lowell Lectures in Boston in 1950.

THE POST-WAR FINANCIAL PROBLEM, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By F. W. Paish. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 263 p. $3.00.

A collection of 11 able and illuminating essays on a wide range of British financial and monetary problems.

CANADA'S CENTURY. By D. M. LeBourdais. Toronto: Methuen, 1951, 214 p. $4.00. (New York: British Book Centre, $4.00.)

A useful geographic survey concentrating on the less well-known parts of Canada.

THE GOVERNMENT OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND. By Frank MacKinnon. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951, 385 p. $5.50.

This latest volume of the Canadian Government Series is apparently the first book to be written about the government of a province of Canada.

FORGOTTEN ISLANDS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC. By Rosaline Redwood. Wellington: Reed, 1950, 125 p. 10/6.

The story of the bleak islands lying between New Zealand and the Antarctic.

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The Middle East

NEAR EASTERN CULTURE AND SOCIETY. Edited by T. Cuyler Young. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 250 p. $4.00.

Papers originally read at a symposium held at Princeton University and largely devoted to the "Meeting of East and West."

CARAVAN: THE STORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. By Carleton S. Coon. New York: Holt, 1951, 376 p. $5.00.

A distinguished cultural anthropologist's description of the Middle East, its peoples, their response to and effect upon their environment. No current politics.

CAIRO TO DAMASCUS. By John Roy Carlson. New York: Knopf, 1951, 474 p. $4.50.

The author, who writes under a pen name, has a penchant for going underground to do his reporting. He here records his experiences in the Near East while involved in various anti-Jewish semi-Fascist Arab organizations. Too full of movement and exotic local color to give a very satisfying picture of the Arab world today.

✓ THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY AND IRAN. By Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 291 p. $4.25.

Two separate studies make up this new volume in the American Foreign Policy Library. Informative and concise but of somewhat less substance than other studies in the series.

✓ INDEPENDENT IRAQ. By Majid Khadduri. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1952, 291 p. $4.50.

The professor of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins has written a well-balanced account of Iraqi politics since the termination of the Mandate in 1932. The rise and fall of 45 cabinets is a complicated story, but the author maintains a lucid narrative.

MY MISSION IN ISRAEL, 1948–1951. By James G. McDonald. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951, 303 p. $3.50.

The first United States Ambassador to Israel reviews frankly but without heat his experiences from 1948 to 1951.

IN SEARCH. By Meyer Levin. New York: Horizon Press, 1950, 524 p. $3.75.

A journalist's autobiography, almost wholly concerned with Jewish questions, in the United States, in World War II and in Palestine.

THE BAHREIN ISLANDS (750–1951). By Abbas Faroughy. New York: Verry, 1951, 128 p. $3.50.

A brief descriptive and historical survey.

South and Southeast Asia

THE CHANGING MAP OF ASIA: A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. Edited by W. Gordon East and O. H. K. Spate. New York: Dutton, 1951, 414 p. $5.50.

An effort to set the geographical stage for political developments in Asia—from the Near East to Japan.

CHIEF MINISTERS SPEAK. New Delhi: All-India Congress Committee, 1950, 241 p. Rs. 2/8.

THIRD YEAR OF FREEDOM: AUGUST 1949–AUGUST 1950. New Delhi: All-India Congress Committee, 1950, 119 p. Rs. 1/8.

FOURTH YEAR OF FREEDOM: AUGUST 1950–AUGUST 1951. New Delhi: All-India Congress Committee, 1951, 224 p. Rs. 3.

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Résumés of governmental and Congress activities since 1947.

THE CHILDREN OF HARI. By Stephen Fuchs. New York: Praeger, 1951, 463 p. $7.50.

An extensive anthropological study of a group of "untouchables"—the Balahis, a weavers' caste in the Nimar district of the Central Provinces of India.

EDUCATION IN INDIA. By Aubrey Albert Zellner. New York: Bookman Associates, 1951, 272 p. $3.50.

An area study of the Lower Ganges Valley, from 1854 to 1947.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN CEYLON. By Sir Charles Collins. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs (in co-operation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1951, 162 p. $3.00.

A short historical account of public administration during the period of British control, by a former member of the Ceylon Civil Service.

SOUTHEAST ASIA. By E. H. G. Dobby. New York: Wiley, 1951, 415 p. $5.00.

A somewhat uneven physical and economic geography.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN SIAM. By W. D. Reeve. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs (in co-operation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1951, 93 p. $2.00.

A brief study of the system of administration in Siam since the establishment of limited monarchy in 1932.

POPULATION GROWTH IN MALAYA. By T. E. Smith. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952, 126 p. $3.00.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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